The Functional Complexity of Scientific Evidence

This article sketches the main features of traditional philosophical models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that it regards as doing more harm than good. It then proceeds to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, a view the author calls dynamic evidential functionalism (DEF). This alternative builds on insights from philosophy of scientific practice, Kuhnian philosophy of science, pragmatist epistemology, philosophy of experimentation, and functionalist philosophy of mind. Along the way, the article raises concerns about the total evidence condition, requirements of certainty or incorrigibility on evidence, and accounts that restrict the type of things that can serve as evidence (to, for example, sense data, facts about particulars). DEF can also help us see the special value of novel predictions and experiments as evidence, as well as help us think about how to critically evaluate the putative evidence to determine whether it is evidence.     

An Ecclesia and Missio Crucis: Douglas John Hall's Contribution to the Missional Church Conversation

Canadian theologian Douglas John Hall's contextual analysis of the church in North America has contributed significantly to the missional church conversation; however, his own constructive ecclesiology has received less attention. This article presents and critically examines Hall's proposal of a “suffering church” and offers constructive suggestions for further developing it: expanding solidarity into accompaniment; shifting from the category of representation to reconciliation as the paradigm for the church's mission; and finally, considering the theology of the cross in more pneumatological terms.     

EVOLUTIONARY THEODICY,REDEMPTION, AND TIME

Of the many problems which evolutionary theodicy tries to address, the ones of animal suffering and extinction seem especially intractable. In this essay, I show how C. D. Broad's growing block conception of time does much to ameliorate the problems. Additionally, I suggest it leads to another way of understanding the soul. Instead of it being understood as a substance, it is seen as a history—a history which is resurrected in the end times. Correspondingly, redemption, I argue, should not be seen as an event which redeems some future portion of time. God's triumph is over all of history, not just some future temporal portion.     

Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-compatibilism vs. Anti-fundamentalism

The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected.

A Mencian Version of Limited Democracy

The compatibility between Western democracy and other cultures, and the desirability of democracy, are two important problems in democratic theory. Following an insight from John Rawls’s later philosophy, and using some key passages in Mencius, I will show the compatibility between a ‘thin’ version of liberal democracy and Confucianism. Moreover, elaborating on Mencius’s ideas of the responsibility of government for the physical and moral well-being of the people, the respectability of the government and the ruling elite, and the competence-based limited political participation, I shall explore the Mencian criticisms of some ‘thick’ democratic ideas. Through the discussion in this paper, I hope to show the relevance of Confucianism to contemporary political philosophy and society.

Negotiating The Boundaries of Science and Religion: The Conversion of Allan Sandage

In the early 1950s, astronomer Allan Sandage inherited from Edwin Hubble the task of determining whether expansion was real. In the succeeding forty years, Sandage "established the discipline of observational cosmology" (Overbye 1991, 188). At the same time, he encountered the limits of science to address the full mystery of existence. In seeking an answer to the question of purpose, in particular, Sandage came to the "abyss of reason" and made the "leap of faith." This conversion, however, involved, and continues to involve, an ongoing process of balancing two avenues to the truth, drawing upon resources from both scientific and religious traditions. Reason and faith seem reconcilable in life lived as an experiment and in "bowing before the mystery" (Sandage 1990). Ultimately, Sandage suggests that religious conversion comes not so much through reasoned pursuit as in the realization of being pursued.     

Is our Universe Deterministic? Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections on an Elusive Topic

Abstract. The question of whether or not our universe is deterministic remains of interest to both scientists and theologians. In this essay I argue that this question can be solved only by metaphysical decision and that no scientific evidence for either determinism or indeterminism will ever be conclusive. No finite being, no matter how powerful its cognitive abilities, will ever be able to establish the deterministic nature of the universe. The only being that would be capable of doing so would be one that is at once transcendent and immanent. Such a being is compatible with the God of the Christian tradition, which yields that a deterministic worldview is compatible with (yet does not necessarily lead to) a deterministic worldview. A more important point is that because science is never able to establish the determinism of our universe, it can never definitely rule out divine action except on metaphysical grounds.     

The Role of a Merit Principle in Distributive Justice

The claim that the level of well-beingeach enjoys ought to be to some extent afunction of individuals' talents, efforts,accomplishments, and other meritoriousattributes faces serious challenge from bothegalitarians and libertarians, but also fromskeptics, who point to the poor historicalrecord of attempted merit assays and theubiquity of attribution biases arising fromlimited sweep, misattribution, custom andconvention, and mimicry. Yet merit-principlesare connected with reactive attitudes andinnate expectations, giving them some claim torecognition and there is a widespread beliefthat their use indirectly promotes thewell-being of all. After critically evaluatingarguments for and against assigning a prominentrole to merit in a distributive protocol, it isargued that an entitlement to the ``doubtful andspeculative' but not the ``known andpresumptive' components of well-being can flowfrom perceived relative merit. However,statistical equality of outcome with respect togroups is mandatory. Semi-meritocracies aredefensible institutions, but existing rewardschemes by and large do not meet the conditionsof social justice.     

On the survival of humanity

Abstract

What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition.