Vision and abstraction: an empirical refutation of Nico Orlandi’s non-cognitivism

This article argues against the non-cognitivist theory of vision that has been formulated in the work of Nico Orlandi. It shows that, if we understand ‘representation’ in the way Orlandi recommends, then the visual system’s response to abstract regularities must involve the formation of representations. Recent experiments show that those representations must be used by the visual system in the production of visual experiences. Their effects cannot be explained by taking them to be non-visual effects involving attention or memory. This contradicts Orlandi’s version of the non-cognitivist hypothesis, but does so while vindicating her methodological position.     

The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments

Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning (distal intentions) in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to short-term (proximal) intentions, so it is not sufficient to justify broader conclusions on the causal inefficacy of conscious will. In this essay we reconstruct the logic of this objection against illusionism, clarify why surveying folk intuitions on conscious distal intentions is essential to the debate, and present a study in which the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgment is clearly revealed. We also present other relevant findings, such as a gender effect on intentionality attributions, a moral influence on responsibility judgments, and confirmation of mechanistic incompatibilism.     

Evil and moral detachment: further reflections on The Mirror Thesis

A commonly accepted claim by philosophers investigating the nature of evil is that the evil person is, in some way, the mirror image of the moral saint. In this paper I will defend a new version of this thesis. I will argue that both the moral saint and the morally evil person are characterized by a lack of conflict between moral and non-moral concerns. However, while the saint achieves this unity through a reconciliation of the two, the evil person does so by eliminating moral concerns from her character.     

Withdrawing Versus Withholding Freedoms: Nudging and the Case of Tobacco Control

Is it a stronger interference with people's freedom to withdraw options they currently have than to withhold similar options they do not have? Drawing on recent theorizing about sociopolitical freedom, this article identifies considerations that often make this the case for public policy. However, when applied to tobacco control, these considerations are shown to give us at best only very weak freedom-based reason to prioritize the status quo. This supports a popular argument for so-called “endgame” tobacco control measures: If we believe that cigarettes would and should be withheld from entering markets in hypothetical scenarios in which they do not yet exist, then we also have reason to seek their abolition in situations, such as ours, in which cigarettes do exist—if necessary by banning their sale. The same considerations are then used to disarm objections that have recently been raised to using nudges in public policy.     

论医学哲学的特征

医学哲学也称为医学辩证法,是在总结医学科学成就的基础上,通过对医学理论和实践中一般、普遍、共性问题的研究,揭示医学认识主体思维活动普遍规律的科学：是人们认识和处理健康和疾病问题的一般方法论。无论是与医学还是与哲学相比。医学哲学都有着显著的区别,运用对比分析的方法。对医学哲学的研究对象、理论体系特别是思维方式等不同方面的特征,进行理论探讨。     

Two Philosophical Problems in the Study of Happiness

In this paper two philosophical issues are discussed that hold special interest for empirical researchers studying happiness. The first issue concerns the question of how the psychological notion(s) of happiness invoked in empirical research relates to those traditionally employed by philosophers. The second concerns the question of how we ought to conceive of happiness, understood as a purely psychological phenomenon. With respect to the first, I argue that 'happiness', as used in the philosophical literature, has three importantly different senses that are often confused. Empirical research on happiness concerns only one of these senses, and serious misunderstandings about the significance of empirical results can arise from such confusion. I then argue that the second question is indeed philosophical and that, in order to understand the nature of (what I call) psychological happiness, we need first to determine what a theory of happiness is supposed to do: what are our theoretical and practical interests in the notion of happiness? I sketch an example of how such an inquiry might proceed, and argue that this approach can shed more light on the nature and significance of happiness (and related mental states) than traditional philosophical methods.     

心脏病外科治疗之趋势——微创

在近20年间,伴随着科学技术的发展以及医疗水平的提高,微创已经成为了外科医生行使手术的重要选择之一;由于国家生活水平的提高,患者不但追求高生存率,同时提出了更高的要求——低病痛,快恢复期,伤口美观等,微创外科得到了越来越多的人的青睐。本文主要探讨了微创心脏外科的分类(小切口技术,电视胸腔镜辅助心脏外科技术,机器人辅助心脏外科技术)以及各种新技术在心脏外科领域所存在的优势和不足,同时辩证地指出了心脏外科的未来发展趋势以及在发展过程中可能存在的一系列矛盾,同时指出了医疗为患者个体服务的观点。     

McDowell on Kant: Redrawing the Bounds of Sense

John McDowell's Mind and World is a notable attempt to redirect the interest of analytic philosophers toward certain themes in Kantian and more recent continental thought. Only thus, he believes, can we move beyond the various failed attempts – by Quine, Davidson, Rorty, and others – to achieve a naturalised epistemology that casts off the various residual "dogmas" of old-style logical empiricism. In particular, McDowell suggests that we return to Kant's ideas of "spontaneity" and "receptivity" as the two jointly operative powers of mind which enable thought to transcend the otherwise unbridgeable gulf between sensuous intuitions and concepts of understanding. However, this project miscarries for several reasons. Chief among them is the highly problematical nature of Kant's claims, taken over by McDowell without reference to their later treatment at the hands of subjective and objective idealists. Hence he tends to fall back into different versions of the same mind/world dualism. I then question McDowell's idea that Kant can be "naturalised" by reinterpreting those claims from a more hermeneutic or communitarian standpoint with its sources in Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer. For the result is to deprive Kant's philosophy of its distinctively critical dimension not only with regard to epistemological issues but also in relation to matters of ethical and sociopolitical judgement.     

PHENOMENOLOGY OF DIVINE REVELATION: THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY IN DIALOGUE

Although the relationship between theology and philosophy is a perennial issue in the history of thought, recent debates surrounding the so-called theological turn of continental phenomenology have created a new space in which it can be explored from a fresh perspective. In this vein, I propose three theses concerning the relationship between theology and philosophy of religion, with particular focus on the phenomenon of divine revelation. First, a philosophy of religion that ignores theology's claim about divine self-revelation will remain incomplete and unsatisfactory, at least from the perspective of a Christian theology which begins with the faith in God's self-revelation in one particular human person. Second, a theology that does not acknowledge the possibility of philosophical reflections on the human aspect of divine revelation will not be able to escape blind dogmatism, but rather will isolate itself from the academic community. Third, and finally, despite the concerns of both parties, a dialogue between theology and philosophy centred on the phenomena of revelation can develop into mutually critical and mutually constructive interactions.