RELIGION IS EASY,BUT SCIENCE IS HARD … UNDERSTANDING McCAULEY'S THESIS

Robert N. McCauley's new book Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not (2011) presents a new paradigm for investigating the relationship between science and religion by exploring the cognitive foundations of religious belief and scientific knowledge. McCauley's contention is that many of the differences and disagreements regarding religion and science are the product of distinct features of human cognition that process these two domains of knowledge very differently. McCauley's thesis provides valuable insights into this relationship while not necessarily leading to a dismissive view of theology or religious belief. His paradigm allows the research lens to focus on cognitive differences in processing scientific versus religious information and the important role of automatic, unconscious, and intuitive cognitive processes in understanding both the natural and supernatural worlds.     

处在夹缝中的哲学

针对当今科技文化与人文文化的矛盾,哲学能够在理解并弥合这种矛盾的过程中起不可替代的作用。在当前,马克思主义哲学是什么和能够做什么的问题是必须提出来弄清楚的。当前马克思主义哲学的研究水平有待提高：不要再追究国外争论已久的问题,史的研究也不能再停留在按原著顺序叙述的水平上;应该立足现实确立当代性的问题,并具备世界性的眼光。在苏东巨变后,马克思主义者在研究中不能回避原则性问题、为迎合对手而追求所谓非意识形态化。另外,防止离现实和民众愈来愈远的贵族化倾向和追求短平快的市场化倾向,注意术语的公央性和可理解性．也是须注意的问题。     

论构成的主体性与意动的主体性

先验主体性与客体性尽管在概念上相互对峙,但作为人类经验与实践的出发点,它们在运作上却从一开始就是浑然一体的。构成主体性是让在时空中对象化了的客体呈现在主体面前并获得意义的意向结构,意动主体性却是让主体获得目的性并将目的在与客体的相互作用中对象化的意向结构。在构成主体性和意动主体性之间的互动中协辩理性的介入,是使规范伦理学有可能在交互主体性的平台上展开的先决条件。     

传统儒家、道家哲学生态观比较

儒家、道家哲学生态观既有共同点,又存在差异。在生态存在论上,两者都是一种生成论世界观,强调人与自然万物的内在联系。不过,道家注重自然运化过程的自然性、一体性,儒家则强调自然运化的生命特征,肯定人与万物的差别;在生态价值论上,道家偏重“自然”的价值．强调自然运化的自然目的性和价值性,肯定人和万物的自然本性的价值。儒家则偏重“人文”价值。它强调人与社会的生存价值．肯定主体德性的价值;在生态实践观上,道家强调“自然无为”的实践原则,“自然无为”体现了对自然自组织、自协调智慧的信任。道家实践观体现在个人生活方式上具有消减性特征,强调慈爱利物、俭啬有度、知和不争。儒家强调发挥人的主体能动性,肯定主体对人与社会、人与自然关系的协调作用。在对农业生产实践的治理上。儒家强调顺应天时、因地制宜和“谨其时禁”。     

系统化细菌鉴定方法的探索及其启示

细菌鉴定有着悠久的历史。随着现代科学技术的快速发展,许多新方法、新技术在细菌鉴定中广泛应用,大大提高了鉴定水平。细菌鉴定技术的发展历程,引发我们探索系统化细菌鉴定的新方法,并带给我们对认识事物、看待问题、进行科学思维、继承与创新等方面的哲学思考。     

SCIENCE,SPIRITUALITY, AND AYAHUASCA: THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND SPIRITUAL ONTOLOGIES IN THE ACADEMY

Ayahuasca is a psychoactive brew from Amazonas, popularized in the last decades in part through transnational religious networks, but also due to interest in exploring spirituality through altered states of consciousness among academic schools and scientific researchers. In this article, the author analyzes the relation between science and religion proposing that the “demarcation problem” between the two arises from the relations among consciousness, intentionality, and spirituality. The analysis starts at the beginning of modern science, continues through the nineteenth century, and then examines the appearance of new schools in psychology and anthropology in the countercultural milieu of the 1960s. The author analyzes the case of ayahuasca against this historical background, first, in the general context of ayahuasca studies in the academic field. Second, he briefly describes three cases from Spain. Finally, he discusses the permeability of science to “spiritual ontologies” from an interdisciplinary perspective, using insights from social and cognitive sciences.     

论神经哲学的兴起

人类心身问题的研究一直是科学界关注的热点。近年来,国外学者将神经科学与哲学研究统一起来,集合两门学科的研究方法、综合双方的研究成果,以此来共同推进人类心身问题的研究,因此诞生了一门介于神经科学和哲学之间的独立学科,它有着学科交叉的研究领域和特殊的跨学科研究方法,这门学科就是神经哲学。     

“For a New World”: On the practical impulse of Husserlian theory

The thesis of this article is that in Husserlian phenomenology there is no opposition between theory and praxis. On the contrary, he understands the former to serve the latter, so as to usher in a new world. The means for doing is the phenomenological reduction or epoché. It gives the phenomenologist access to the starting point, the “first things,” and orients his/her striving towards reason and the renewal of humanity. Careful attention to the significance of the epoché also sheds light on Husserl’s understanding of the relationship of phenomenology not only to philosophy but also to the other sciences. Though an exposition of the “phenomenology of the philosophical vocation” which Husserl sketched in the 1920s, e.g., in his Kaizo articles and lectures on first philosophy, the author seeks to shore up his thesis. For Walter Biemel     

The Knowledge Argument and Objectivity

In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism, but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued.     

孔子与亚里士多德的朋友观之比较

Before and during the times of Confucius and Aristotle, the concept of friendship had very different implications. This paper compares Confucius’ with Aristotle’s thoughts on friendship from two perspectives: xin 信 (fidelity, faithfulness) and le 乐 (joy). The Analects emphasizes the xin as the basis of friendship. Aristotle holds that there are three kinds of friends and corresponding to them are three types of friendship. In the friendship for the sake of pleasure, there is no xin; in the legal form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by law; and in the moral form of friendship for the sake of utility, xin is guaranteed by morality; in the friendship for the sake of virtue, xin is an indispensable part. Both thinkers believe friends can bring joy to human life. According to Confucius, it is the joy of rendao 仁道 (benevolence), whereas for Aristotle, it is the joy of Reason. There are many commonalities and differences between the two. The commonalities reveal some inner links between Confucian rendao and Aristotelian Reason. It seems that the differences between rendao and Reason are the differences between moral reason and logical reason. The comparative study is helpful for us to understand the two masters’ ethics, politics and philosophy. Translated from Lunlixue Yanjiu 伦理学研究 (Research in Ethics), 2006, (1): 47–52