Is it always fallacious to derive values from facts?

Since the time of David Hume, many philosophers have held that there is a logical Is/Ought gap. According to the doctrine of the Is/Ought gap, there are no valid (i.e., non-fallacious) arguments from purely factual premises about whatis the case to moral or normative conclusions about whatought to be. Occasionally, this doctrine has been challenged, but frequently it has been accepted without argumentation. Charles Pigden has recently argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden's argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, and does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic. Moreover, my argument does not rely, as other alleged counter-examples do, on controversial assumptions from Aristotelian biology about natures or ends, or about institutions such as promise-making.     

Characterizations of Negative Definability in Modal Logic

Negative definability ([18]) is an alternative way of defining classes of Kripke frames via a modal language, one that enables us, for instance, to define the class of irreflexive frames. Besides a list of closure conditions for negatively definable classes, the paper contains two main theorems. First, a characterization is given of negatively definable classes of (rooted) finite transitive Kripke frames and of such classes defined using both traditional (positive) and negative definitions. Second, we characterize the negatively definable classes of rooted general frames.     

Curry-Howard Terms for Linear Logic

In this paper we 1. provide a natural deduction system for full first-order linear logic, 2. introduce Curry-Howard-style terms for this version of linear logic, 3. extend the notion of substitution of Curry-Howard terms for term variables, 4. define the reduction rules for the Curry-Howard terms and 5. outline a proof of the strong normalization for the full system of linear logic using a development of Girard's candidates for reducibility, thereby providing an alternative to Girard's proof using proof-nets.     

Axiomatizations with Context Rules of Inference in Modal Logic

A certain type of inference rules in (multi-) modal logics, generalizing Gabbay's Irreflexivity rule, is introduced and some general completeness results about modal logics axiomatized with such rules are proved.     

A Propositional Dynamic Logic with Qualitative Probabilities

This paper presents an -completeness theorem for a new propositional probabilistic logic, namely, the dynamic propositional logic of qualitative probabilities (D Q P), which has been introduced by the author as a dynamic extension of the logic of qualitative probabilities (Q P) introduced by Segerberg.     

Prolegomena of a Logic of Causality and Dynamism

We present in this article a new logical system inspired from linear logic. This system is designed in order to express causality and dynamism. The cut elimination theorem holds for this logic. Examples of applications are given.