The weariness of the hero: depression and the self in a civilization in transition

According to the World Health Organization, depression is currently the leading cause of disability, which is of great concern worldwide; however there is much dispute about depression and its causes. This article raises the hypothesis that depression could be related to an increase or inflation of ego‐consciousness, which, in turn, is inseparable from the development of modernity. The ‘hero’, symbol of this historical process of self‐consciousness and autonomy, stands now wearied and disoriented. The paper outlines how, in this cultural scene, certain ideas from Carl Jung's and James Hillman's depth psychologies may be useful in addressing the issue: the rediscovery of figures of the other through the analysis of the unconscious (Jung) and associating with others in groups imbued with communal sense (Hillman) could help the depressed individual to mitigate his or her inflated ego‐consciousness. These are two complementary ways of experiencing the conglomerate nature of the self, thus promoting the process of individuation.     

Murdering an Accident Victim: A New Objection to the Bare-Difference Argument

Many philosophers, psychologists, and medical practitioners believe that killing is no worse than letting die on the basis of James Rachels's Bare-Difference Argument. I show that his argument is unsound. In particular, a premise of the argument is that his examples are as similar as is consistent with one being a case of killing and the other being a case of letting die. However, the subject who lets die has both the ability to kill and the ability to let die while the subject who kills lacks the ability to let die. Modifying the latter example so that the killer has both abilities yields a pair of cases with morally different acts. The hypothesis that killing is worse than letting die is the best explanation of this difference.     

FREGE IN CONTEXT

Although the Cambridge Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic James Ward was once one of Britain's most highly regarded Psychologists and Philosophers, today his work is unjustly neglected. This is because his philosophy is frequently misrepresented as a reactionary anti-naturalistic idealist theism. In this article, I argue, first, that this reading is false, and that by viewing Ward through the lens of pragmatism we obtain a fresh interpretation of his work that highlights the scientific nature of his philosophy and his original and promising theory of ‘evolutionary Kantianism’, with its applications to the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Second, I show that reading Ward as a pragmatist provides us with (1) a more complex history of the reception of pragmatism at Cambridge at the turn of the twentieth century than the straightforwardly hostile one traditionally told; and (2) a more detailed understanding of the wide range of philosophical problems to which pragmatism was deemed at this time to have an appropriate application.     

Pragmatism and revisionism: James's conception of truth

Abstract

The paper argues that James's conception of truth is non‐revisionist, that is, it sanctions common use of the notion of truth, but criticizes foundation‐alist philosophical accounts of that notion. This interpretation conflicts with traditional interpretations of James such as Russell's and Moore's, and contemporary interpretations such as Dummett's, all of which are revisionist. To the extent that objections raised against James's pragmatism depend on such revisionist reading, this paper constitutes a defence of James. The paper argues, further, that non‐revisionism distinguishes James from logical positivism and contemporary verificationism, and that James seeks to defend rather than renounce metaphysics. On this issue the paper disagrees with Rorty, who ascribes to James an extreme anti‐metaphysical stance.     

El pancalismo de James Mark Baldwin. Estética,psicología y constructivismo

Resumen

En este artículo nos proponemos realizar una exposición crítica del “pancalismo”, denominación que dio el psicólogo funcionalista James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) a la ontología que corona su psicología evolucionista y su epistemología genética. Defendiendo que el pancalismo constituye uno de los mejores frutos del constructivismo, presentamos sus filiaciones teóricas generales, discutimos sus interpretaciones metafísicas—en las cuales el propio Baldwin cayó—y apuntamos algunas de sus implicaciones actuales.     

Freedom in the Body: The Physical, the Causal, and the Possibility of Choice

Abstract. In Minding God Gregory Peterson takes a careful look at the kind of freedom that human persons have. He concludes that humans are constrained to be free and unpacks this into a version of compatibilism. That is, humans are not metaphysically free under current existence because of the causal determination inherent in their physical nature, but they can take credit for the origination of selfforming decisions because the causes occur inside of us. Peterson does advocate an eschatological hope looking forward to the breaking of causal determination by God's own action. Thus, Minding God presents an eschatologically limited compatibilism. Compatibilism of any kind, however, presents serious challenges to most Christian theologies and to many religious traditions broadly considered. After I interpret Peterson's position I make the argument that compatibilism is neither desirable nor required for a theological anthropology intent on serious engagement of cognitive science.     

The Conflict Between Religion and Science in Light of the Patterns of Religious Belief Among Scientists

Recent summaries of psychologist James H. Leuba's pioneering studies on the religious beliefs of American scientists have misrepresented his findings and ignored important aspects of his analyses, including predictions regarding the future of religion. Much of the recent interest in Leuba was sparked by Edward J. Larson and Larry Witham's commentary in Nature (3 April 1997), “Scientists Are Still Keeping the Faith.” Larson and Witham compared the results of their 1996 survey of one thousand randomly selected American scientists regarding their religious beliefs with a similar survey published eighty years earlier by Leuba. Leuba's original studies are themselves problematical. Nonetheless, his notion that different fields of science have different impacts on the religion‐science relationship remains valid. Especially significant is his appreciation of religion as a dynamic, compelling force in human life: any waning of traditional beliefs does not mean a decrease in religious commitment but calls for a new spirituality in harmony with modern scientific teachings. Leuba's studies, placed in proper context, offer a broad historical perspective from which to interpret data about religious beliefs of scientists and the impact of science and scientists on public beliefs, and opportunity to develop new insight into the religion‐science relationship.     

A Letter to Mom During CPE

This article is a fictional letter. A seminarian writes to his mother during his Clinical Pastoral Education internship at a mental hospital, and the letter raises a number of issues, including the nature of the Bible, the essence of salvation (and Hell), the role of evangelism, and the sexual dynamics of the counseling relationship. William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience is mentioned, and cultural questions regarding psychology are raised. There are other avenues to be explored, but the reader might start by reflecting on the issues noted.Nathan S. Carlin has been a graduate student at Princeton Seminary and has worked closely with Donald Capps and Robert Dykstra, leading scholars in the field of pastoral psychology. Carlin has published numerous articles as a Master of Divinity student. He is now a graduate student in Religious Studies at Rice University. Correspondence to Nathan Steven Carlin, 1515 Bissonnet Street, Unit 186, Houston, TX 77005-1629, USA; e-mail: Nathan.Carlin@rice.edu     

Recent Debates Over Structural Realism

Summary  In recent years Structural Realism has been revived as a compromise candidate to resolve the long-standing question of scientific realism. Recent debate over structural realism originates with Worrall’s (1989) paper “Structural Realism: The best of Both Worlds”. However, critics such as Psillos contend that structural realism incorporates an untenable distinction between structure and nature, and is therefore unworkable. In this paper I consider three versions of structural realism that purport to avoid such criticism. The first is Chakravartty’s “semirealism” which proceeds by trying to show that structural realism and entity realism entail one another. I demonstrate that this position will not work, but follow Chakravartty’s contention that structural realism need not imply that scientific knowledge can only be of mathematical structure. I advance from this conclusion to sketch a version of structural realism that is consistent with recent deflationary approaches to the scientific realism question. Finally, I consider a third approach to structural realism Ladyman’s “metaphysical structural realism” which tries to avoid the difficulties of earlier versions by taking structure to be ontologically primary. I show that the deflationary approach to structural realism undermines the rationale behind Ladyman’s approach.     

Public, Social, and Individual Perspectives on Religious Education. Voices from the Past and the Present

Inspired by Charles Taylor’s recent quest for the meaning of religion today, this article concentrates on the question of the meaning of religious education (RE) today. The focus is not so much on the ‘what’ but instead more on the ‘where’ (the locus) and the ‘how’ (the function) of RE. The view on what is held to be a pedagogically tenable position regarding RE is build up by methodologically using a differentiated practical–theological three-course model that distinguishes between the public, the social and the private domain. Developments and tendencies within the three domains are shown in respect with religion as such and RE in particular. It is made clear what this may mean for religious educators and philosophers of religious education today, who conceptualize religious education as an impossible possibility. Miedema is full professor of Educational Foundations, Endowed professor of Christian Education in and Dean of the Faculty of Psychology and Education, and full professor of Religious Education in the Faculty of Theology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands. His research is focusing now on pragmatism, history of education, the philosophy of religious education, and early childhood education.