Secular and religious: the intrinsic doubleness of analytical psychology and the hegemony of naturalism in the social sciences

In recent years a number of prominent social theorists, including Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, have voiced concern about the hegemony of naturalistic, secular assumptions in the social sciences, and in their different ways have sought to address this by establishing greater parity between secular and religious perspectives. This paper suggests that C.G. Jung's analytical psychology, which hitherto has been largely ignored by social theory, may have something to contribute on this issue as it can be understood coherently both empirically, without reference to transcendent reality, and metaphysically, with reference to transcendent reality. It is argued that, despite his denials of any metaphysical intent, Jung does in fact engage in metaphysics and that together the empirical and metaphysical vectors of his thought result in a rich and distinctive double perspective. This dual secular and religious perspective can be seen as part of Jung's own critique of the hegemony of naturalism and secularism, which for Jung has profound social as well as clinical relevance. The concern and approach that Habermas and Taylor share with Jung on this issue may provide some grounds for increased dialogue between analytical psychology and the social sciences.     

Early discrimination among small object collections

Two studies are presented which examine the young child's ability to discriminate between two small object collections on the basis of numerosity and to maintain that discrimination across changes in number-related cues. A transfer procedure and counting tasks were also included. In Study 1, 2-, 3-, and 4-year-olds were reinforced for choosing either a two- or three-item array when length-density cues were manipulated across two training phases of 20 trials each. Training was followed by a transfer task in which one- and four-item arrays were displayed. Most 2-year-olds were able to learn the discrimination while at the same time displaying little quantitative ability. Further, their transfer responses were transpositional in nature. In Study 2, 2-year-olds were given a similar discrimination task in which numerosity was contrasted simultaneously with length-density and area-brightness cues. Again, most children learned the discrimination and transferred that learning on the basis of relational cues.     

Moral reasoning development and graduate education

The Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral reasoning development was administered to 20 advanced and 20 first-year graduate students, plus 40 college graduates matched to the graduate groups on sex, age, and verbal ability. A two-way ANOVA design was used to infer whether graduate education, selection, maturation, or a combination of these effects is (are) associated with group differences on the DIT. Results suggest that differences found between the graduate students and college graduates can be accounted for by a combination of maturational and selection effects, contrary to the hypothesized effects of formal education.     

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS A SHARED POLITICAL IDENTITY IMPOSSIBLE? NECESSARY? SUFFICIENT?

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity.