Can faith move mountains? How implicit theories about willpower moderate the adverse effect of daily emotional dissonance on ego-depletion at work and its spillover to the home-domain

Recent findings have demonstrated that implicit theories about willpower (the belief whether willpower relies on a limited vs. nonlimited resource) moderate the ego-depletion-effect. This study examines this moderating mechanism in occupational settings where employees increasingly have to deal with the unpleasant state of emotional dissonance, which requires the exertion of volitional self-control. By integrating findings on implicit theories about willpower, arguments brought up by the strength model of self-control, and notions from the spillover literature, we propose that believing in a nonlimited resource theory of willpower buffers the effect of emotional dissonance on ego-depletion at work and diminishes the spillover of ego-depletion from the work- to the home-domain. In a diary study covering 10 working days (N = 71), we examine a moderated mediation model in which ego-depletion at work mediates the relation between emotional dissonance and ego-depletion at home and analyse whether implicit theories about willpower moderate both paths (a and b) of the proposed mediation model. Our results provide support for the mediation hypothesis and show that endorsing a nonlimited resource theory buffers the effect of emotional dissonance on ego-depletion at work, thereby disrupting the indirect effect of emotional dissonance on ego-depletion at home. Subsequently, we discuss implications of holding a nonlimited resource theory.     

Can the Mind Command the Body?

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.     

To share or not to share: The place of personal disclosure in scholarly writing

The norms of scholarly discourse have traditionally excluded personal disclosures in conceptual articles, as if the subjective nature of such revelations would be inconsistent with the scientific/objective stature of these works. Based on the author's experience with a recent publication, based on recent studies of researcher projection and bias in case studies, and using a framework of organizational communication, it is suggested here that there is indeed a contribution such disclosures can make. It is not recommended that sharing on a personal level become a new norm, but rather that the choice to share be considered as viable in a scholarly context. Five specific benefits of such sharing are listed, including unearthing and revealing bias, demystifying the process of discovery, and avoiding the trap of defensive reasoning.     

Theorienreduktion in den Sozialwissenschaften. Eine Fallstudie am Beispiel der Balancetheorien

Theory Reduction in the Social Sciences. The example of balance theories. A central topic both in philosophy of science as well as in the empirical sciences is the reconstruction of the relations between theories. In the past comparisons of theories by means of traditional linguistic methods have proved to be extremely difficult and complicated. In this article the reconstruction of intertheoretical relations based on model-theoretical terms is propagated, as formulated within the structuralist view of theories. The efficiency of a model theoretical based comparison of theories is demonstrated by two theory elements from the social science research program of balance theories: The basic element by Heider and the transitivity theory by Holland and Leinhardt. First of all both theory elements are introduced informally and reconstructed in the structuralist format. On the basis of these reconstructions can be shown, that the Heider theory can be formally reduced to the Holland-Leinhardt theory and that the theory younger in history means an improvement. However, an integration of all balance theoretical elements into a theory net is not possible. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Classifying ℵo-Categorical Theories II: The Existence of Finitely Axiomatizable Proper Class II Theories

Clark and Krauss [1977] presents a classification of complete, satisfiable and _o-categorical theories in first order languages with finite non-logical vocabularies. In 1988 the first author modified this classification and raised three questions about the distribution of finitely axiomatizable theories. This paper answers two of those questions.     

Positive and negative contrast as a function of component duration for key pecking and treadle pressing

Pigeons responded on several multiple schedules for food reinforcers. The duration of the components varied from four seconds to 16 minutes. The absolute size of positive (Experiment 1) and negative (Experiment 2) behavioral contrast varied inversely with component duration when key pecks produced the reinforcers. The absolute size of negative contrast varied directly with component duration, when treadle presses produced the reinforcers (Experiment 3). These results conform to theories that suggest that positive and negative contrast are symmetrical when pigeons peck keys. They also conform to theories that suggest that the same principles do not govern contrast when pigeons peck keys as when they press treadles. Finally, the results support the measurement of behavioral contrast by the differences between baseline rates of responding and the rates emitted when contrast is present.     

The Insufficiency of the Dutch Book Argument

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.