On simulating one-trial learning using morphological neural networks

“Learning once, remembering forever”, this wonderful cognitive phenomenon sometimes occurs in the learning process of human beings. Psychologists call this psychological phenomenon “one-trial learning”. The traditional artificial neural networks can simulate the psychological phenomenon of “implicit learning”, but can’t simulate the cognitive phenomenon of “one-trial learning”. Therefore, cognitive psychology gives a challenge to the traditional artificial neural networks. From two aspects of theory and practice in this paper, the possibility of simulating this kind of psychological phenomenon was explored by using morphological neural networks. This paper takes advantage of morphological associative memory networks to realize the simulation of “one-trial learning” for the first time, and gives 5 simulating practical examples. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments show that the morphological associative memory networks are a higher effective machine learning method, and can better simulate the cognitive phenomenon of “one-trial learning”, therefore provide a theoretical basis and technological support for the study of intelligent science and cognitive science.     

Unsuccessful suppression is associated with increased neuroticism,intrusive thoughts,and rumination

Studies of thought suppression, the reduction in accessibility for intentionally unrehearsed and actively avoided thoughts, vary dramatically in the level of suppression reported. The purpose of our research was to explore individual differences associated with self-reports of the success, failure, or avoidance of thought suppression in everyday life. Participants completed a survey measuring intrusive thoughts, neuroticism, rumination, and autobiographical knowledge of suppression tendencies and capabilities. Individuals who reported successful suppression were less neurotic, ruminative, and experienced less thought intrusion than individuals who reported unsuccessful suppression attempts. Our findings suggest that the high-ends of the neuroticism and intrusive thought spectrums are occupied by individuals who unsuccessfully attempt to suppress undesirable information, while successful suppressors differ minimally from non-suppressors.     

Consistency of adults’ earliest memories across two years

ABSTRACT

The consistency of earliest memories in content, dating, and memory qualities was investigated. A total of 84 (27 males; M_age?=?24.93, SD?=?1.36) adults reported earliest memories, estimated ages, and rated their recollections on memory qualities with a two-year time lag. At Time 2, their original reports at Time 1 were presented and they were asked to report whether the earliest memories they recalled at Time 2 were the same. Fifty-six per cent of the participants reported the same earliest memories and those remembering the same events had earlier memories than those remembering different ones. Although no significant differences were observed in estimated ages on the basis of mean ages, a predating bias of later memories and a tendency to postdate earlier memories were observed on the basis of a 48-month cut-off point. Thus, how the data is analysed is critical in detecting dating biases or errors affecting conclusions and interpretations about the dating consistency of earliest memories. Finally, memory qualities of earliest memories displayed a high level of consistency with a two-year time lag regardless of remembering the same versus different event.     

Manipulating the reported age in earliest memories

ABSTRACT

Previous work suggests that the estimated age in adults’ earliest autobiographical memories depends on age information implied by the experimental context [e.g., Kingo, O. S., Bohn, A., & Krøjgaard, P. (2013). Warm-up questions on early childhood memories affect the reported age of earliest memories in late adolescence. Memory, 21(2), 280–284. doi:10.1080/09658211.2012.729598] and that the age in decontextualised snippets of memory is younger than in more complete accounts (i.e., event memories [Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L. A., Robinson, J. A., Phillips-Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. C. (2005). Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 567–576. doi:10.3758/BF03195324]). We examined the malleability of the estimated age in undergraduates’ earliest memories and its relation with memory quality. In Study 1 (n?=?141), vignettes referring to events happening at age 2 rendered earlier reported ages than examples referring to age 6. Exploratory analyses suggested that event memories were more sensitive to the age manipulation than memories representing a single, isolated scene (i.e., snapshots). In Study 2 (n?=?162), asking self-relevant and public-event knowledge questions about participants’ preschool years prior to retrieval yielded comparable average estimated ages. Both types of semantic knowledge questions rendered earlier memories than a no-age control task. Overall, the reported age in snapshots was younger than in event memories. However, age-differences between memory types across conditions were not statistically significant. Together, the results add to the growing literature indicating that the average age in earliest memories is not as fixed as previously thought.     

The development of our sense of self as a defense against invading thoughts: From Buddhist psychology to psychoanalysis

In interdisciplinary debates on the nature of the self, no-self accounts often refer to Buddhist psychology, arguing that the self is an illusion arising from our identification with mental content. What is often missing, however, is a developmentally, motivationally and emotionally plausible reason why this identification happens in the first place. It is argued that directing attention to our ongoing thought activities and their effect on our mind reveals their often invasive character. This is supported by psychoanalytic accounts on the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of thinking. On an experiential level, invading thoughts have similarities to attacks and provoke defensive reactions. The defense mechanism described as identification with the aggressor is used as a model in order to better grasp how we deal with invading thoughts, namely, by identifying with them and thus generating a sense of self as an agent of thoughts which provides an illusion of control.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).