Reviews

Books reviewed:
Irving Kirsch (Ed.) How Expectancies Shape Experience
David F. Marks, Michael Murray, Brian Evans and Carla Willig Health Psychology, Theory, Research and Practice     

Evidence-based treatment and therapist drift

Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) has a wide-ranging empirical base, supporting its place as the evidence-based treatment of choice for the majority of psychological disorders. However, many clinicians feel that it is not appropriate for their patients, and that it is not effective in real life-settings (despite evidence to the contrary). This paper addresses the contribution that we as clinicians make to CBT going wrong. It considers the evidence that we are poor at implementing the full range of tasks that are necessary for CBT to be effective - particularly behavioural change. Therapist drift is a common phenomenon, and usually involves a shift from ‘doing therapies’ to ‘talking therapies’. It is argued that the reason for this drift away from key tasks centres on our cognitive distortions, emotional reactions, and use of safety behaviours. A series of cases is outlined in order to identify common errors in clinical practice that impede CBT (and that can make the patient worse, rather than better). The principles behind each case are considered, along with potential solutions that can get us re-focused on the key tasks of CBT.     

Gait symmetric adaptation: Comparing effects of implicit visual distortion versus split-belt treadmill on aftereffects of adapted step length symmetry

Understanding gait adaptation is essential for rehabilitation, and visual feedback can be used during gait rehabilitation to develop effective gait training. We have previously shown that subjects can adapt spatial aspects of walking to an implicitly imposed distortion of visual feedback of step length. To further investigate the storage benefit of an implicit process engaged in visual feedback distortion, we compared the robustness of aftereffects acquired by visual feedback distortion, versus split-belt treadmill walking. For the visual distortion trial, we implicitly distorted the visual representation of subjects’ gait symmetry, whereas for the split-belt trial, the speed ratio of the two belts was gradually adjusted without visual feedback. After adaptation, the visual feedback or the split-belt perturbation was removed while subjects continued walking, and aftereffects of preserved asymmetric pattern were assessed. We found that subjects trained with visual distortion trial retained aftereffects longest. In response to the larger speed ratio of split-belt walking, the subjects showed an increase in the size of aftereffects compared to the smaller speed ratio, but it steeply decreased over time in all the speed ratios tested. In contrast, the visual distortion group showed much slower decreasing rate of aftereffects, which was evidence of longer storage of an adapted gait pattern. Visual distortion adaptation may involve the interaction and integration of the change in motor strategy and implicit process in sensorimotor adaptation. Although it should be clarified more clearly through further studies, the findings of this study suggest that gait control employs distinct adaptive processes during the visual distortion and split-belt walking and also the level of reliance of an implicit process may be greater in the visual distortion adaptation than the split-belt walking adaptation.     

Mnemonic emotion regulation: a three-process model

Emotion regulation comprises attempts to influence when and how emotions are experienced and expressed. It has mostly been conceived of as proactive (e.g. situation selection) or reactive (e.g. attentional distraction), but it may also be retroactive and involve memory. I term such past-oriented activity mnemonic emotion regulation and propose that it involves increasing or decreasing access to or altering the characteristics of a memory. People may increase access to a memory and make it more likely that it will be retrieved in the future, for example by rehearsing a pleasant memory. They may decrease access to a memory and make it less likely that intrusions will be experienced in the future, for example by repeatedly trying to stop an unpleasant memory from being retrieved. Finally, people may alter the characteristics of a memory and change its content or context, for example by replacing a negative impression with a productive interpretation. I discuss how mnemonic emotion regulation may be instigated (e.g. via elaborate rehearsal) as well as the different motives (e.g. hedonic motives) people may have for engaging in regulation. Also, I discuss possible benefits of, variations in, and improvements of mnemonic emotion regulation.     

Correcting the misinformation effect

Decades of memory research have demonstrated a dire need for effective methods of correcting misinformation, particularly once it has been encoded. However, much of this research has exposed participants to misinformation first then provided a correction, and used indirect memory questions. Using a misinformation effect (ME) paradigm, in which participants' memory is distorted by misleading postevent information, we examine whether corrections can combat memory distortion on direct memory tests. Experiment 1 showed corrections greatly reduced the ME. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a longer lag time (3 min) between exposure to misinformation and its correction, except for participants that read only the misinformation and its correction. Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that participants reported the most recent information they read, suggesting participants evaluate the correction's veracity. Finally, a meta‐analysis of the three experiments reiterates that corrections may be effective in combating misinformation.     

Information distortion in self-other decision making

In both organizational and social arenas, individuals make decisions for themselves and for other individuals. But research in decision making has provided little input into whether or how these decisions are psychologically different. In this paper, I propose that decisions—depending on whom they are for—vary according to the extent of information distortion, such that, individuals who choose for themselves demonstrate more postdecisional distortion, yet less predecisional distortion than individuals who choose on behalf of others. To test this hypothesis, participants in an experiment made a decision between two restaurants. Attributes about each restaurant were presented sequentially, and preferences were measured following each attribute. As expected, participants who chose for themselves experienced more postdecisional distortion. However, among participants who chose on behalf of others, greater distortion of predecisional attribute information was observed. These findings shed light on the differences in self-other decision making, as well as on research concerning information distortion.     

对解释伪忽视机制的两种理论的初步检验

以视野因素对伪忽视的影响为切人点来考察注意的右半球优势理论与表征的空间变形理论对伪忽视机制的解释。使用灰度标尺任务和三视野速示迫选的实验方法研究视野和操作用手因素对伪忽视的影响。结果显示,只有将两种理论结合起来才能对伪忽视机制作出更好的解释。     

Eye Movements in Strategic Choice

In risky and other multiattribute choices, the process of choosing is well described by random walk or drift diffusion models in which evidence is accumulated over time to threshold. In strategic choices, level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models have been offered as accounts of the choice process, in which people simulate the choice processes of their opponents or partners. We recorded the eye movements in 2 × 2 symmetric games including dominance‐solvable games like prisoner's dilemma and asymmetric coordination games like stag hunt and hawk–dove. The evidence was most consistent with the accumulation of payoff differences over time: we found longer duration choices with more fixations when payoffs differences were more finely balanced, an emerging bias to gaze more at the payoffs for the action ultimately chosen, and that a simple count of transitions between payoffs—whether or not the comparison is strategically informative—was strongly associated with the final choice. The accumulator models do account for these strategic choice process measures, but the level‐k and cognitive hierarchy models do not. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.