The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

Can subsidies promote Pareto‐optimum coordination? We found that partially subsidizing the cooperative actions for two out of six players in a laboratory coordination game usually produced better coordination and higher total social welfare with both deterministic and stochastic payoffs. Not only were the subsidized players more likely to cooperate (choose the Pareto‐optimum action), but the unsubsidized players increased their expectations on how likely others would cooperate, and they cooperated more frequently themselves. After removal of the subsidy, high levels of coordination continued in most groups with stochastic payoffs but declined in deterministic ones. This carry‐over disparity between the deterministic and stochastic settings was consistent with the economic theories that agents were more likely to keep the status quo option under uncertainty than without uncertainty. Hence, players with stochastic payoffs were more likely to keep the high coordination level (status quo) brought by the subsidy in the previous subsidy session. A post‐game survey also indicated that with stochastic payoffs, players focused on risk reduction. Temporary subsidies promoted lasting coordination because even after subsidy was removed, players still assumed that others players would prefer reduced risks from cooperation. With deterministic payoffs, however, the subsidy might crowd out other rationales for coordination, with many players indicating that the subsidy was the only reason for anyone to cooperate. Hence, the coordination level dropped when the subsidy was removed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A 21st century cognitive portrait of the Himba,a remote people of Namibia

This research sketches the cognitive portrait of the Himba, a remote population from Northern Namibia living in a non-industrial society almost completely devoid of modern artefacts. We compared the Himba sample to a French sample, exploring cognitive reflection, moral judgement, cooperative behaviour, paranormal beliefs, and happiness. We looked for both differences and similarities across cultures, and for the way cognitive functioning is associated with a range of demographic variables. Results showed some important group differences, with the Himba being more intuitive, more religious, happier, and less utilitarian than the French participants. Further, the predictors of these beliefs and behaviours differed between the two groups. The present results provide additional support to the recent line of research targeting cultural variations and similarities, and call for the need to expand psychology research beyond the Western world.     

Equilibrium and Harmony of Emotional Conflicts in Cooperation: Between Chinese Traditional Culture and Modern Artificial Intelligence

Equilibrium and harmony elevate human emotions like pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy to the highest ontological level. We are puppets of our emotions and feelings, without the possibility of parole. By implanting complex emotional reactions in the operating system of sex robots, we have created a virtual relationship that mimics human intimacy. In this way, a thing—in this case, a machine—takes on human characteristics. This could be called the humanization of things. Not only can things be humanized, humans can also be reified. If, by imitating neural networks and deep learning, intelligent robots are to make great strides in their ability to think, they may come into the possession of emotions and feelings. In traditional Chinese culture, equilibrium and harmony form the highest and most pervasive principle, value, and morality for nature, society, and life. The state of equilibrium (zhong 中 ) and harmony (he 和 ) is the fundamental root from which springs the world and the universal path that it must pursue. When we view emotional equilibrium and harmony in light of the theoretical doctrine of harmony and cooperation, the emotional lives of humans and machines are integrated and combined with the state of equilibrium and harmony to achieve the greatest good. Moreover, this can resolve all kinds of crises amid the emotions and feelings of humanoids created by humans, notably by leveraging the outstanding intelligence of humans to maintain the emotions of humanoids in a state of equilibrium and harmony. To this end, we must perform regulatory actions in several aspects. First, we must modulate emotions and feelings. Second, we must achieve a state of equilibrium, which can put all things in the right positions, allowing them to be nourished and flourish. Third, we must strive for mutual empathy between humans and machines, which can pave the way for collaborative creation in harmony, as well as their integration, camaraderie, emotional understanding, mutual respect and harmonious love.     

中西医结合临床思路浅谈——论辨证与辨病的关系

辨证与辨病是两种不同的思维方式,西医辨病又辨证,中医辨证又辨病,辨病与辨证是中医与西医都遵循的诊治过程,在临床中辩证运用中医与西医有利于中西医结合临床思路的建立     

公共物品困境中的突显身份效应及合作动机对合作行为影响

从合作动机的激发与破坏的角度探讨公共物品困境中突显身份对合作行为的影响,同时考察社会价值取向与突显身份之间的关系。结果表明：突显合作者与突显不合作者两种方式都会提高被试的合作水平;两种突显方式的作用机制不同。突显合作者条件下,被试的合作行为受内在动机和外在动机的共同影响。而突显不合作者则会破坏被试合作的内在动机,外在动机对提高合作行为起主要作用;突显合作者条件下,合作取向的被试更多受内在动机的影响,而非合作取向的被试则更多受外在动机的影响。在突显不合作者的条件下,合作取向和非合作取向被试的合作行为都受外在动机的影响较大。     

“Seeing is believing”: The effects of facial expressions of emotion and verbal communication in social dilemmas

In social dilemmas, verbal communication of one's intentions is an important factor in increasing cooperation. In addition to verbal communication of one's intentions, also the communication of emotions of anger and happiness can influence cooperative behavior. In the present paper, we argue that facial expressions of emotion moderate verbal communication in social dilemmas. More specifically, three experiments showed that if the other person displayed happiness he or she was perceived as honest, trustworthy, and reliable, and cooperation was increased when verbal communication was cooperative rather than self‐interested. However, if the other person displayed anger, verbal communication did not influence people's decision behavior. Results also showed interactive effects on people's perceptions of trustworthiness, which partially mediated decision behavior. These findings suggest that emotion displays have an important function in organizational settings because they are able to influence social interactions and cooperative behavior. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of Gender on Costly Punishment

Women are often believed to be more cooperative and less egoistic than men. In the present study, we examined whether people punish women for failing to live up to these benevolent gender stereotypes. Participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with female and male partners who either cooperated or defected. Participants were offered a costly punishment option. They could spend money to decrease the payment of their partners. In Experiment 1, participants spent more money to punish the defection of female in comparison to male partners, but this effect of partner gender on punishment was indirect rather than direct: Participants were more likely to cooperate with female partners than with male partners, which gave them more opportunity for moralistic punishment. In Experiments 2 and 3, we examined the effects of the participants' own gender on cooperation and punishment of female and male partners. Female participants cooperated more with female partners than with male partners while male participants treated female and male partners equally. We conclude that the effect of facial gender on punishment are indirect rather than direct. The results also showed that women, in contrast to men, tended to make decisions that can be considered more social and less rational from an economic point of view, consistent with social‐role theory and evolutionary accounts. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

社会距离与合作指数对不同年龄青少年合作行为影响的差异

本研究采用重复囚徒困境实验范式,考察了社会距离和合作指数对不同年龄青少年（初中生、高中生和大学生,且每个年龄段的被试数为40名）在博弈决策中的合作行为的影响。结果发现：（1）随着年龄的增加,青少年合作行为的总体趋势表现为下降;（2）社会距离对大学生的合作行为的正向作用显著,而中学生的合作行为却不受其影响;（3）个体合作率会受到合作指数的促进作用,但这种促进作用在大学生中表现的更为显著。即随年龄增长,个体会更少的采取合作行为,并且个体是否采取合作在更大程度上基于当前博弈中的收支情况和与博弈对象之间的社会距离。     

第三方惩罚对合作的溢出效应：基于社会规范的解释

第三方惩罚对合作的维系可能来自经济功能或规范提示功能。先前研究没有区分这两种功能, 因而未能回答：当惩罚不足以影响违规收益时, 是否还能促进合作?实验1 (N = 252)发现即使第三方惩罚无法降低违规收益, 依然能抑制自利行为。实验2 (N = 179)发现受过惩罚的违规者在其后的独裁者博弈表现出了更高的合作水平。2(是否旁观惩罚)×2(旁观前后)设计的实验3 (N = 179)显示, 旁观惩罚后被试的合作水平显著高于旁观前, 也高于未旁观惩罚的被试。后两个实验中, 社会规范在惩罚与合作之间均起中介作用。这进一步证实惩罚对合作的促进在很大程度上是通过规范激活来实现的, 并存在两种溢出效应：惩罚抑制了曾经的违规者(纵向溢出效应)和旁观者(横向溢出效应)在新博弈情境下的自私行为。这两种溢出效应的发现补充了文献中占主导地位的经济学解释, 并为理解人类社会长时间、大规模的合作提供了新视角。     

Preschoolers affect others' reputations through prosocial gossip

Providing evaluative information to others about absent third parties helps them to identify cooperators and avoid cheaters. Here, we show that 5‐year‐olds, but not 3‐year‐olds, reliably engage in such prosocial gossip. In an experimental setting, 5‐year‐old children spontaneously offered relevant reputational information to guide a peer towards a cooperative partner. Three‐year‐old children offered such evaluative information only rarely, although they still showed a willingness to inform in a non‐evaluative manner. A follow‐up study revealed that one component involved in this age difference is children's developing ability to provide justifications. The current results extend previous work on young children's tendency to manage their own reputation by showing that preschoolers also influence others' reputations via gossip.