社会公正与政治信任：民众对政府的合作行为机制

胡锦涛在中共十八大上提出：必须坚持维护社会公平正义。对社会公正的认知直接决定着民众的政治信任, 进而影响民众对政府的合作。近年来频发的群体性事件即是非合作行为的典型表征。然而, 国内外研究中至今没有直接探讨社会公正与政治信任影响合作行为的实证支持, 更无法进一步揭示其作用于合作行为的过程和条件。鉴于此, 本研究将社会公正分为分配公正和程序公正, 将政治信任分为工具信任和情感信任, 采用实验室研究、现场研究和问卷调查研究相结合的方法, 探讨社会公正对合作行为的过程机制, 建立其通过工具信任和情感信任作用于合作行为的双路径模型; 并进一步分析结果依赖性对这一路径模型的调节作用。本研究有望提出社会公正与政治信任影响合作行为的双路径模型及其调节变量, 一方面在理论上深化和拓展本领域的研究, 另一方面实践中通过提升公正感、强化过程变量(政治信任)、干预调节变量(结果依赖性)等策略促进合作行为。     

Social Context and the Dynamics of Cooperative Choice

Recent work using decontextualized economic games suggests that cooperation is a dynamic decision‐making process: Automatic responses typically support cooperation on average, while deliberation leads to increased selfishness. Here, we performed two studies examining how these temporal effects generalize to games with richer social context cues. Study 1 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games played with in‐group members and out‐group members. Study 2 found that time pressure increased cooperation to a similar extent in games described as competitions and games described as collaborations. These results show that previous positive effects of time pressure on cooperation are not unique to neutrally framed games devoid of social context and are not driven by implicit assumptions of shared group membership or cooperative norms. In doing so, our findings provide further insight into the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

公共物品困境中自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的影响

本研究分别操纵被试稳定的权力（实验1）和不稳定的权力（实验2）,并与不同权力个体进行公共物品困境任务,以考察了自我权力和他人权力对初中生合作行为的交互作用及其权力稳定性在其中的作用。结果发现,在权力稳定情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平低于低权力组和控制组,而在权力不稳定的情境下,高权力的初中生合作水平高于低权力组。无论权力稳定与否,与低权力同伴合作时,低权力者的合作水平均显著高于与高权力同伴合作时。     

同伴特点如何影响人们的合作与冲突行为?

人类的生存繁衍依赖于人们之间的相互合作,合作与冲突行为的研究近年来成为心理学的研究热点。本研究通过实验程序操纵Chicken Game中博弈同伴的特点,考察个体在社会困境中面对不同特点同伴时的合作行为。结果发现：(1)同伴道义论组和功利论组总和解率没有显著差异,同伴竞争组和合作组的总和解率也没有显著差异。(2)在与道义论以及合作型的同伴互动时,个体的行为没有明显受到上次博弈反馈的影响。(3)当同伴为功利论时,相比于上次博弈个体选择和解而同伴选择进攻,双方都选择和解时个体在当前博弈中更倾向于和解;(4)在同伴竞争组中,相比于上次博弈个体选择进攻而同伴选择和解,双方都选择和解时被试在当前博弈中会更倾向于和解。实验结果表明个体在博弈任务中会受到同伴特点的影响,并且同伴在博弈中的行为特点的影响更为显著。本研究从同伴特点来考察个体的合作行为,揭示了影响个体博弈行为的一种因素。     

价值取向与社会距离影响经济决策的合作与冲突行为：Chicken Game的证据

采用Chicken Game博弈任务,考察了不同社会价值取向个体（亲社会者与亲自我者）在面对不同社会距离的博弈对手（朋友和陌生人）时表现出的合作与冲突行为。研究结果发现：（1）社会价值取向与社会距离交互影响个体的合作与冲突行为;（2）社会价值取向影响选择策略的反应时,亲社会者选择合作的反应时长于选择冲突的反应时,亲自我者选择合作与选择冲突的反应时没有显著差异;（3）无论对亲社会者还是亲自我者,反馈类型都显著影响个体的合作与冲突行为的选择率以及随后决策的反应时。上述结果表明,个体的合作或冲突行为,并非单一地受到社会价值取向的影响,更可能是受到个人因素（社会价值取向）与其他社会因素（比如,社会距离）的共同调节,并且在这一过程中个体会根据决策后反馈信息不断的调整自己的行为策略。     

合作指数与描述方式对儿童囚徒困境博弈中合作行为的影响

本研究采用囚徒困境任务,考察了91名10~12岁儿童和101名成人在博弈决策中合作行为的特点。并分别考察合作指数和描述方式这两个变量对个体合作性的影响。结果表明:(1)描述方式对儿童的合作行为有显著影响,表现为"回避"描述中较之"趋向"描述有更多合作行为,而描述方式对成人则无影响。(2)儿童对合作指数不敏感,平均合作率显著高于成人,表现出合作倾向;成人平均合作率随合作指数的升高而升高,但始终处于几率水平之下,表现出竞争倾向。     

A Plea for Internormative Ethics

Plurality of life forms and value systems is a given (almost) everywhere on earth. Imposing on them a value system or individual values and virtues from an exterior position is rather counterproductive. Value systems are normative for individual communities but not the same. They are to relate to each other and to interact, negotiating with each other common goals and the validity and limits of values involved in their relationships and shared action. Anything else leads to tensions and violence. Internormative ethics reflect on such interaction of value systems.     

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.     

The effect of decision timing on the willingness to costly reward cooperation and punish noncooperation: Sanctioning the past,the present,or the future

Numerous studies have demonstrated that sanctions can promote cooperation. However, it is important to know not only that sanctions can work but also under what conditions people are actually willing to sanction cooperation positively (i.e., reward) or noncooperation negatively (i.e., punish). In this article, we demonstrate that people use sanctions less often and sanction more mildly when they decide about sanctioning before (instead of after) the occurrence of others' (non)cooperation (Experiments 1 and 2), regardless of whether they decide directly afterwards or after a time delay (Experiment 2). Moreover, we reveal that beforehand (as compared with afterwards) people have not yet formed clear sanctioning preferences (Experiment 3). These findings corroborate our reasoning that the decision environment beforehand induces nonconsequential reasoning and thereby hampers people's willingness to sanction. We discuss the theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of our work.     

Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology