全文获取类型
收费全文 | 200篇 |
免费 | 9篇 |
国内免费 | 4篇 |
专业分类
213篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 3篇 |
2021年 | 2篇 |
2020年 | 11篇 |
2019年 | 7篇 |
2018年 | 6篇 |
2017年 | 11篇 |
2016年 | 9篇 |
2015年 | 7篇 |
2014年 | 1篇 |
2013年 | 31篇 |
2012年 | 3篇 |
2011年 | 4篇 |
2010年 | 6篇 |
2009年 | 10篇 |
2008年 | 11篇 |
2007年 | 16篇 |
2006年 | 14篇 |
2005年 | 11篇 |
2004年 | 9篇 |
2003年 | 9篇 |
2002年 | 6篇 |
2001年 | 2篇 |
2000年 | 5篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 3篇 |
1994年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有213条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
71.
The current renewal of interest in empathy is closely connected to the recent neurobiological discovery of mirror neurons. Although the concept of empathy has been widely deployed, we shall focus upon one main psychological function it serves: enabling us to understand other peoples’ intentions. In this essay we will draw on neuroscientific, psychological, and philosophical literature in order to investigate the relationships between mirror neurons and empathy as to intention understanding. Firstly, it will be explored whether mirror neurons are the neural basis of our empathic capacities: a vast array of empirical results appears to confirm this hypothesis. Secondly, the higher level capacity of reenactive empathy will be examined and the question will be addressed whether philosophical analysis alone is able to provide a foundation for this more abstract level of empathy. The conclusion will be drawn that both empirical evidence and philosophical analysis can jointly contribute to the clarification of the concept of empathy. 相似文献
72.
Mark Makin 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(2):136-150
While extant replies to Jonathan Schaffer’s putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding have made significant strides against the charge of transitivity failure, the replies pay insufficient attention to the common structure of the counterexamples, overlooking a deeper structural feature that contributes to their prima facie plausibility. Putative counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding, I argue, trade on the distinction between what I call ‘rigid’ and ‘non-rigid’ grounding, and confusion over how rigid and non-rigid grounding react when combined pumps the intuition that the counterexamples’ chained conclusions are false. The rigid/non-rigid grounding distinction also reveals plausible weakening inference rules that have been overlooked in treatments of the logic of grounding. 相似文献
73.
Justin Zylstra 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(8):859-876
In this paper, I develop a truthmaker semantics for essence and use the semantics to investigate the explanatory role of essence. 相似文献
74.
Marius Baumann 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):511-527
The paper explores a new interpretation of the consequentializing project. Three prominent interpretations are criticized for neglecting the explanatory dimension of moral theories. Instead, it is argued that consequentializing leads to a phenomenon that is structurally analogous to one in science—the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This provides important insights into the consequentializing debate, and advances our general understanding of the moral domain. 相似文献
75.
It's not uncommon for scientists to give different explanations of the same phenomenon, but we currently lack clear guidelines for deciding whether to treat such accounts as competitors. This article discusses how science studies can help create tools and guidelines for thinking about whether explanations compete. It also specifies how one family of discourse rules enables there to be differing accounts that appear to compete but don't. One hopes that being more aware of the linguistic mechanisms making compatible accounts appear to compete will prevent people from wasting resources trying to show which account is right. 相似文献
76.
Harjit Bhogal 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):447-460
There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I argue that this view has a variety of advantages that could make it attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations. 相似文献
77.
Timothy O'Connor 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(4):436-448
Abstract: Daniel Dennett's Freedom Evolves is a rhetorically powerful but philosophically unconvincing attempt to show that a deterministic and ontologically reductionist, but epistemologically pluralist, outlook may peacefully coexist with a robust acceptance of human freedom and moral responsibility. The key to understanding the harmony rests in recognizing that freedom is not a metaphysical or physical condition but is instead a product of deeply embedded social practices. I argue that Dennett's project rests on an unargued and implausible deflationary stance toward basic metaphysics. 相似文献
78.
WILLIAM RAMSEY 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(1):53-73
A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition‐based version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting functionalism. 相似文献
79.
Keld Stehr Nielsen 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2006,37(1):139-163
Summary Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence. 相似文献
80.
William C. Wimsatt 《Synthese》2006,151(3):445-475
Methodological reductionists practice ‘wannabe reductionism’. They claim that one should pursue reductionism, but never propose how. I integrate two strains in prior work to do so. Three kinds of activities are pursued as “reductionist”. “Successional reduction” and inter-level mechanistic explanation are legitimate and powerful strategies. Eliminativism is generally ill-conceived. Specific problem-solving heuristics for constructing inter-level mechanistic explanations show why and when they can provide powerful and fruitful tools and insights, but sometimes lead to erroneous results. I show how traditional metaphysical approaches fail to engage how science is done. The methods used do so, and support a pragmatic and non-eliminativist realism. 相似文献