Ask me why,don't tell me why: Asking children for explanations facilitates relational thinking

Identifying abstract relations is essential for commonsense reasoning. Research suggests that even young children can infer relations such as “same” and “different,” but often fail to apply these concepts. Might the process of explaining facilitate the recognition and application of relational concepts? Based on prior work suggesting that explanation can be a powerful tool to promote abstract reasoning, we predicted that children would be more likely to discover and use an abstract relational rule when they were prompted to explain observations instantiating that rule, compared to when they received demonstration alone. Five- and 6-year-olds were given a modified Relational Match to Sample (RMTS) task, with repeated demonstrations of relational (same) matches by an adult. Half of the children were prompted to explain these matches; the other half reported the match they observed. Children who were prompted to explain showed immediate, stable success, while those only asked to report the outcome of the pedagogical demonstration did not. Findings provide evidence that explanation facilitates early abstraction over and above demonstration alone.     

Troubles with Theoretical Virtues: Resisting Theoretical Utility Arguments in Metaphysics

In this paper we examine theoretical utility arguments in metaphysics. While philosophers claim a procedural continuity with science when using such arguments, we argue that examining famous instances from the history of science expose their fundamental flaws. We find that arguments from theoretical utility invoke considerations that are not truth conducive and that justifications for claims that a theory possesses theoretical virtues often assume the truth of the theory such virtues are supposed to support. We conclude that theoretical utility arguments provide no epistemic grounds for metaphysical inquiry.     

The Effects of Regulatory Fit between Explanation Framing and Applicants’ Regulatory Foci on Applicant Reaction

Abstract

Drawing from regulatory fit theory and the literature on persuasion, the current study is the first to explore whether the fit between explanation framing and applicants’ regulatory foci could enhance applicant reaction. We hypothesized that a positively framed explanation fits with applicants’ promotion foci and that a negatively framed explanation fits with applicants’ prevention foci. Three studies were conducted in which participants with different regulatory foci rated their perceived procedural fairness and organizational attractiveness after reading differently framed recruitment advertisements, rejection letters, and job offer letters. The results supported our hypothesis by showing significant interactions between explanation framing and participants’ regulatory foci on procedural fairness and organizational attractiveness perception in the contexts of recruitment advertising and rejection letters. In these contexts, compared with receiving a negatively framed explanation, promotion-focused recipients reported higher levels of perceived fairness and organizational attractiveness after receiving a positively framed explanation, and promotion-focused recipients’ fairness and attractiveness perceptions were higher than prevention-focused recipients’, after receiving a positively framed explanation. Moreover, perceived procedural fairness mediated the relationship between regulatory fit and perceived organizational attractiveness. However, regulatory fit effects were not found in the context of job offer letters.     

Is backing grounding?

Separatists are grounding theorists who hold that grounding relations and metaphysical explanations are distinct, yet intimately connected in the sense that grounding relations back metaphysical explanations, just as causal relations back causal explanations. But Separatists have not elaborated on the nature of the ‘backing’ relation. In this paper, I argue that backing is a form of (partial) grounding. In particular, backing has many of the properties commonly attributed to grounding, and taking backing to be partial grounding allows Separatists to make the most of their position vis-à-vis their Unionist opponents.     

Is the brain a memory box?

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.     

Explanation and the Hard Problem

This paper argues that the form of explanation at issue in the hard problem of consciousness is scientifically irrelevant, despite appearances to the contrary. In particular, it is argued that the ‘sense of understanding’ that plays a critical role in the form of explanation implicated in the hard problem provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition on satisfactory scientific explanation. Considerations of the actual tools and methods available to scientists are used to make the case against it being a necessary condition, and work by J.D. Trout that exploits psychological research on the hindsight and overconfidence biases is used to show that it is not a sufficient condition. It is argued, however, that certain intellectual and moral concerns give us good reason to still try to meet the hard problem’s explanatory challenge, despite its extrascientific nature.     

合作数学问题解决与心理模型建构关系研究

合作学习研究者很早就开始关注合作互动中解释的作用。Chi关于自我解释的研究表明解释是一种非常有效果的学习现象,能够起到修补和建立学习者的心理模型的作用。本研究以28名高一学生为被试,采取了两种程序的合作学习任务,研究中虽然没有发现两种程序在问题解决结果上的显著差异,但是却表现出在心理模型建构方面互动效果上的差异,或表现为同等效果下的互动次数有显著性差异。     

THE MODERN STUDY OF MYTH AND ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE

The history of the modern study of myth can be divided into two main categories: that which sees myth as the primitive counterpart to natural science, itself considered overwhelmingly modern, and that which sees myth as almost anything but the primitive counterpart to natural science. The first category constitutes the nineteenth‐century approach to myth. The second category constitutes the twentieth‐century approach. Tylor and Frazer epitomize the nineteenth‐century view. Malinowski, Eliade, Bultmann, Jonas, Camus, Freud, and Jung epitomize the twentieth‐century approach. The question for the twenty‐first century is whether myth can be brought back to the physical world, but in a way compatible with science. The case of the myth of Gaia will be considered as a possible way of doing so.     

Teaching Early Modern Philosophy as a Bridge between Causal or Naturalistic and Conceptual Thought

It is a challenge in teaching early modern philosophy to balance historical faithfulness to the arguments and concerns of early modern philosophers and interpreting them as relevant to the kinds of thinking that contemporary undergraduate students find plausible. Early modern philosophy is unique, however, in applying modern scientific method directly to problems concerning nonphysical aspects of reality that our contemporary scientific thought, and with it mainstream contemporary culture, no longer find amenable in their own, independent right to reliable reasoned approaches. At the same time, early modern philosophy often also takes seriously purely conceptual or logically consequential thought in the investigation of these topics, as our mainstream contemporary culture does not. This kind of thought, we argue, is distinctive of philosophy in general and appropriate to nonphysical aspects of reality. Early modern philosophy, then, offers a bridge between the kind of reasoned, objective thought our mainstream culture finds plausible and thought about nonphysical reality or, in general, the thought that characterizes philosophy.