On classifying abduction

We can witness the recent surge of interest in classifying different patterns or types of abduction. Many philosophers have suggested their own classifications emphasizing different aspects of abduction. Such a development is remarkable, in view of the fact that until quite recently the focus of the research on Peircean abduction was to identify its logical form. Another agenda in the recent attempts to classify abduction is whether to allow non-explanatory abductions. In order to resolve these two closely related issues, I propose to examine how Peirce would have responded to them. In particular, I suggest to do this in connection with Peirce's another life-long project, the classification of sciences. In this examination, it will be shown that Peirce struggled with the problem of conflating induction and abduction. I shall discuss how this problem influenced both Peirce's views on the interrelationship between abduction, deduction, and induction on the one hand, and his many classifications of sciences on the other. Also, the implication of the fundamental change in Peirce's views of abduction, deduction, and induction to the problem of the classification of sciences will be uncovered. Finally, I shall discuss whether inference to the best explanation is abduction. Insofar as this problem has bearing on the two controversial issues in classifying abduction, my negative answer will demonstrate that classifying abduction is yet to get off the ground.     

Viciousness and Circles of Ground

Metaphysicians of a certain stripe are almost unanimously of the view that grounding is necessarily irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and well‐founded. They deny the possibility of circles of ground and, therewith, the possibility of species of metaphysical coherentism. But what's so bad about circles of ground? One problem for coherentism might be that it ushers in anti‐foundationalism: grounding loops give rise to infinite regresses. And this is bad because infinite grounding regresses are vicious. This article argues that circles of ground do not necessarily give rise to infinite regresses, and where they do, those regresses are not necessarily vicious.     

Consistent Treatment of Variables and Causation Poses a Challenge for Behavioral Research Methods: A Commentary on Nesselroade and Molenaar (2016)

Nesselroade and Molenaar presented the ideographic filter as a proposal for analyzing lawful regularities in behavioral research. The proposal highlights an inconsistency that poses a challenge for behavioral research more generally. One can distinguish a broadly Humean approach from a broadly non-Humean approach as they relate to variables and to causation. Nesselroade and Molenaar rejected a Humean approach to latent variables that characterizes them as nothing more than summaries of their manifest indicators. By contrast, they tacitly accepted a Humean approach to causes characterized as nothing more than summaries of their manifest causal effects. A non-Humean treatment of variables coupled with a Humean treatment of causation creates a theoretical tension within their proposal. For example, one can interpret the same model elements as simultaneously representing both variables and causes. Future refinement of the ideographic filter proposal to address this tension could follow any of a number of strategies.     

Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology that focuses almost exclusively on questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers’ arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical inquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.     

The points of concepts: their types,tensions, and connections

ABSTRACT

In the literature seeking to explain concepts in terms of their point, talk of ‘the point’ of concepts remains under-theorised. I propose a typology of points which distinguishes practical, evaluative, animating, and inferential points. This allows us to resolve tensions such as that between the ambition of explanations in terms of the points of concepts to be informative and the claim that mastering concepts requires grasping their point; and it allows us to exploit connections between types of points to understand why they come apart, and whether they do so for problematic ideological reasons or for benignly functional reasons.     

Is understanding reducible?

ABSTRACT

Despite playing an important role in epistemology, philosophy of science, and more recently in moral philosophy and aesthetics, the nature of understanding is still much contested. One attractive framework attempts to reduce understanding to other familiar epistemic states. This paper explores and develops a methodology for testing such reductionist theories before offering a counterexample to a recently defended variant on which understanding reduces to what an agent knows.     

Toward a cumulative science of emotion: a functional-cognitive framework for emotion research

ABSTRACT

Definitions of emotion and emotional phenomena are often infused with intuitions and theoretical ideas about what is “truly” emotional. Although these intuitions and ideas motivate people to study emotion, their prominence at the conceptual level can hamper progress in emotion research. In this paper, we argue that there is merit in defining emotional phenomena as much as possible in terms of behavioural principles that have been developed outside of emotion research. We clarify that such a functional approach is compatible with, and can even strengthen, cognitive approaches to emotion research. This functional-cognitive perspective reveals ways to increase the cumulative nature of emotion research and to surpass initial intuitions and theoretical ideas.     

PALEY'S iPOD: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT WITHIN NATURAL THEOLOGY

The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Creator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume's critique and Darwin's theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as conclusive evidence for God's existence but rather as an abductive, probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley's watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for disagreement.     

Führt die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie in einen Relativismus?

This essay is a discussion of Eve-Marie Engels' view on Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). In the first part two of the main doctrines of EE are criticized: (1.) that validity of human knowledge is to be explained as the result of evolutionary adaptation; yet (2.), that human cognitive capacities had been adequate to our ancestors life conditions but fail in relevant situations of modern world. In the second part the concept of reality underlying EE's adaptational view is discussed and compared with Jean Piaget's concept of reality. Finally, it is held that some of the questions recently raised by proponents of EE, far from being new, have been dealt with already in historical epistemology.

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Diese Arbeit entstand im Rahmen des Projekts Nr. 11-2224.87 des Schweizerischen Nationalfonds.     

《老子》美学意蕴的现象学解读

借助现象学存在论阐释，《老子》的美学意蕴展现为：“观”的审美态度，“有无相生”的生存体验，以语言悖论为特征的美学话语。它们奠定了中国美学尤其道家美学的基本形态。