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141.
人类行为的进化论解释及其特征 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
董国安 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2005,26(6):2-4
进化论用于解释人类行为的合理性依赖于对进化论结构的理解,而不能通过直接肯定或否定人类行为有无某种生物学的结构基础来回答.如果进化论是对现象系统的描述,那它在原则上就不能用于对人类行为进化的研究.进化论应被看作是对一类物理系统的定义,理论定义系统与现象系统也只能在现象层面上同构.人类行为进化解释的恰当性,就在于人类行为系统与进化论定义系统在经验上的适合达到了期望的程度. 相似文献
142.
Bechtel W 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2005,84(3):313-325
Neuroscience and cognitive science seek to explain behavioral regularities in terms of underlying mechanisms. An important element of a mechanistic explanation is a characterization of the operations of the parts of the mechanism. The challenge in characterizing such operations is illustrated by an example from the history of physiological chemistry in which some investigators tried to characterize the internal operations in the same terms as the overall physiological system while others appealed to elemental chemistry. In order for biochemistry to become successful, researchers had to identify a new level of operations involving operations over molecular groups. Existing attempts at mechanistic explanation of behavior are in a situation comparable to earlier approaches to physiological chemistry, drawing their inspiration either from overall psychology activities or from low-level neural processes. Successful mechanistic explanations of behavior require the discovery of the appropriate component operations. Such discovery is a daunting challenge but one on which success will be beneficial to both behavioral scientists and cognitive and neuroscientists. 相似文献
143.
We examined whether participants could differentiate between explanations of attitude-consistent behavior related to EU membership given from two perspectives (EU supporter and EU opponent) by means of three perspective taking modes (the explainer's own perspective, imagined in-group members' perspective, and imagined out-group members' perspective). Participants were presented with explanations provided from different perspectives and perspective taking modes, and they were asked to judge the extent to which they agreed with each explanation, to guess the attitude of the provider of each explanation, and to rate the quality of each explanation in various respects. Participants could not differentiate between explanations given by in-group members and out-group members who imagined the same perspective. They responded more favorably to explanations given from own perspective than from the imagined perspectives. The results suggest that there exists a shared understanding about how both sides should explain attitude-consistent behavior, but this understanding is measurably different from the actual explanations. 相似文献
144.
Kennedy CH 《Journal of applied behavior analysis》2004,37(4):539-553
The job of a researcher is to explain the phenomenon that he or she is seeking to understand. To do this requires the accumulation of facts. These facts are then interpreted to arrive at explanations. However, individual researchers often interpret facts in different ways and arrive at disparate explanations. In her book, Making Sense of Life, Evelyn Fox Keller (2002) outlines various approaches used by developmental biologists to understand the animate systems we call life. In this review, I note several parallels between biology and behavior analysis in how facts are discovered, what is an acceptable interpretation of data, and how explanations are arrived at. 相似文献
145.
Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of composition. But this presupposes that contents have constituent structure, and this cannot be taken for granted. However, it can be proved that if a certain principle of substitutivity is valid for a particular language, then the meanings expressed by its sentences can justifiably be treated as structured. In its simplest form, this principle says that if in a complex expression a constituent is replaced by another constituent with a different meaning, the new complexhas a meaning different from the original. This principle is again inversely related to the normal compositional principle of substitutivity. The combination of ordinary and inverse compositionality is here called strong compositionality. The proof is carried out in the algebraic framework developed by Wilfrid Hodges and Dag Westerståhl. 相似文献
146.
Tobias Wilsch 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(1):1-23
The paper explores a deductive-nomological account of metaphysical explanation: some truths metaphysically explain, or ground, another truth just in case the laws of metaphysics determine the latter truth on the basis of the former. I develop and motivate a specific conception of metaphysical laws, on which they are general rules that regulate the existence and features of derivative entities. I propose an analysis of the notion of ‘determination via the laws’, based on a restricted form of logical entailment. I argue that the DN-account of ground can be defended against the well-known objections to the DN-approach to scientific explanation. The goal of the paper is to show that the DN-account of metaphysical explanation is a well-motivated and defensible theory. 相似文献
147.
构成理论认为,读者在阅读记叙文篇章时,试图构成一个有意义的情景参照模式以表达读者的目标、篇章连贯性以及解释文中为何提到所描述的行为、事件及情景,其中推论生成是一个重要环节。而推论可分为十三类,有六类属线上生成,五类属脱线生成,有两类难以确定.需考虑语用因素,其中有些推论因读者目标不同而有特殊性。构成理论还认为,除了局部推论和整体推论外,其它推论都与读者的世界知识有关。该者目标满足,局部与整体连贯实现,以及外显信息解释决定着对记叙文篇章的理解。 相似文献
148.
A tacit assumption in the field of consciousness studies is that the more empirical evidence a theory can explain, the better it fares when weighed against competitors. If one wants to take seriously the potential for empirical evidence to move forward debates in consciousness studies, there is a need to gather, organize, validate, and compare evidence. We present an inference to the best explanation (IBE) process on the basis of empirical support that is applicable in debates between competing theories of consciousness. Our proposed IBE process consists in four steps: Assimilate, Compile, Validate, and Compare. Until now, the vast majority of the work in the field has consisted in gathering empirical evidence for theories i.e., the assimilation step. To illustrate the feasibility of our proposed IBE process, and what it may look like when applied in practice, we deliver a complete collection (the compilation step) of empirical support for the distinction between A-Consciousness and P-Consciousness and the overflow hypothesis. Finally, we offer an example of the validation step, by scrutinizing the interpretation of aphantasics’ performance on retro-cue paradigms offered in the literature in support of the overflow hypothesis. The compilation we deliver here is the first effort in the IBE process, the end result of which — hopefully — will be the ability of the research community to carry out side-by-side comparisons of theories and the empirical phenomena they claim to explain, i.e., the comparison step. 相似文献
149.
G. R. Mayes 《Argumentation》2000,14(4):361-380
Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality. 相似文献
150.
Steve Clarke 《Sophia》2009,48(2):127-142
There is overwhelming agreement amongst naturalists that a naturalistic ontology should not allow for the possibility of supernatural
entities. I argue, against this prevailing consensus, that naturalists have no proper basis to oppose the existence of supernatural
entities. Naturalism is characterized, following Leiter and Rea, as a position which involves a primary commitment to scientific
methodology and it is argued that any naturalistic ontological commitments must be compatible with this primary commitment.
It is further argued that properly applied scientific method has warranted the acceptance of the existence of supernatural
entities in the past and that it is plausible to think that it will do so again in the future. So naturalists should allow
for the possibility of supernatural entities.
相似文献
Steve ClarkeEmail: |