Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

What Do We Compare When We Compare Religions? Philosophical Remarks on the Psychology of Studying Comparative Religion Abroad

The issue of comparison is a vexing one in religious and theological studies, not least for teachers of comparative religion in study abroad settings. We try to make familiar ideas fresh and strange, in settings where students may find it hard not to take “fresh” and “strange” as signs of existential threat. The author explores this delicate pedagogical situation, drawing on several years' experience directing a study abroad program and on the thought of figures from the Western existentialist tradition and Chinese Confucian philosophy. The article focuses particularly on “oh events” – defined as moments when one learns one has something to learn and something to unlearn. The author argues that the experience of shame that is typical of oh events can become a valuable resource for cross‐cultural learning and personal transformation, if teachers assist students to reflect on the experience as a sign of differing, but potentially harmonizable, cultural expectations. This essay is published alongside of six other essays, including a response from John Barbour, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

From Empathetic Understanding to Engaged Witnessing: Encountering Trauma in the Holocaust Classroom

A commitment to empathetic understanding shaped the field of religious studies; although subject to critique, it remains an important teaching practice where students are charged with the task of recognizing, and perhaps even appreciating, a worldview that appears significantly different from their own. However, when the focus of the course is historical trauma there are significant epistemological and ethical reasons empathetic understanding may not be our best pedagogical strategy. Drawing primarily on my experience teaching a general education class “The Holocaust and Its Impact” at California State University, Bakersfield, I advocate replacing empathetic understanding with engaged witnessing as a pedagogical framework and strategy for teaching traumatic knowledge. To make this case, I delineate four qualities of engaged witnessing and demonstrate their use in teaching about the Holocaust.     

Towards a common processing architecture underlying Simon and SNARC effects

It has been shown repeatedly that relatively small numbers are responded to faster with the left hand and relatively large numbers are responded to faster with the right hand. This so-called SNARC effect (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993) is thought to arise through activation of irrelevant spatial codes associated with the magnitude of the number. This conflict between irrelevant magnitude information and the response is conceptually similar to the well-known Simon effect. Recently, both Mapelli, Rusconi, and Umiltà (2003) and Keus and Schwarz (in press) directly compared both effects in a single task within the framework of the additive factor method (Sternberg, 1969). While Mapelli et al. found additive effects of SNARC and Simon levels, suggesting different processing stages, Keus and Schwarz found that the SNARC effect depended on the compatibility level of the Simon task leading them to propose a common origin at the response selection stage. In the present study we demonstrate in 2 experiments that the relationship between Simon and SNARC depends on the relevance of the magnitude code, thereby violating one of the core assumptions of the AFM. Instead we propose a temporal overlap model to interpret the relationship between these effects which allows to commensurate apparently divergent outcomes.     

Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.     

The effects of prediction,understanding, and control: A test of the stress antidote model

Abstract

A study was undertaken to examine further the effects of perceived work control on employee adjustment. On the basis of the stress antidote model, it was proposed that high levels of prediction, understanding, and control of work-related events would have direct, indirect, and interactive effects on levels of employee adjustment. These hypotheses were tested in a short-term longitudinal study of 137 employees of a large retail organization. The stress antidote measures appeared to be indirectly related to employee adjustment, via their effects on perceptions of work stress. There was weak evidence for the proposal that prediction, understanding, and control would buffer the negative effects of work stress. Additional analyses indicated that the observed effects of prediction, understanding, and control were independent of employees' generalized control beliefs. However, there was no support for the proposal that the effects of the stress antidote measures would be dependent on employees' generalized control beliefs.     

Toddlers’ Understanding of Peers’ Emotions

The second year of life sees dramatic developments in infants’ ability to understand emotions in adults alongside their growing interest in peers. In this study, the authors used a social-referencing paradigm to examine whether 12-, 18-, and 24-month-old children could use a peer's positive or negative emotion messages about toys to regulate their own behavior with the toys. They found that 12-month-olds decreased their play with toys toward which a peer had expressed either positive or negative emotion compared with play following a peer's neutral attention toward a toy. Also, 18-month-olds did not respond systematically, but 24-month-old children increased their toy play after watching a peer display negative affect toward the toy. Regardless of their age, children with siblings decreased their play with toys toward which they had seen a peer display fear, the typical social-referencing response. The authors discuss results in the context of developmental changes in social understanding and peer interaction over the second year of life.     

Intentional binding as a marker of agency across the lifespan

The feeling of control over actions and their external effects is known as Sense of Agency (SoAg). People usually have a distinctive SoAg for events caused by their own actions. However, if the agent is a child or an older person, this feeling of being responsible for the consequences of an action may differ from what an adult would feel. The idea would be that children and elderly may have a reduced SoAg since their frontal lobes are developing or have started to loose their efficiency. The aim of this study was to elucidate whether the SoAg changes across lifespan, using the Intentional Binding (i.e., the temporal attraction between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence) as implicit measure. Data show that children and elderly are characterized by a reduced SoAg as compared to adults. These findings provide a fundamental step in the characterization of SoAg dynamics throughout individuals’ lifetime.