Manipulating number generation: Loud + long = large?

Humans make numerous choices every day and tend to perceive these choices as free. The present study shows how simple free choices are biased by experiencing unrelated auditory information. In two experiments, participants categorized tones according to their intensity on the dimensions volume and duration on the majority of trials. On some trials, however, they were to randomly generate a number, and we found these choices to be influenced by tone intensity. Particularly, if participants were cued toward volume, loud tones clearly biased participants to generate larger numbers. For tone duration, a similar effect only emerged if spatial information was reinforced by the motor context of the task. The findings extend previous findings relating to the ATOM framework (A Theory of Magnitude) by an explicit focus on auditory magnitude processing. As such, they also constrain ATOM by showing that the connections between different magnitude dimensions vary to a considerable degree.     

Vagal influence during worry and cognitive challenge

Abstract

The primary foci of the study were exploration of the linkage between cognitive and autonomic inflexibility of worry and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) and examination of the effects of an analog cognitive restructuring task on this relationship. Cardiac responses of GAD and non-GAD participants were measured to examine the sympathetic and parasympathetic effects of worry and cognitive challenge. Diagnostic groups of undergraduate students were determined via administration of a structured interview, yielding a GAD group (n=16) and a control group (n=19) of individuals without GAD, depression, or panic disorder diagnoses. Cardiac autonomic responses were acquired via electrocardiogram during rest, worry, and cognitive challenge conditions by an experimenter blind to diagnosis. Metrics were compared between the two groups and across the three conditions. Individuals diagnosed with GAD did not differ significantly from controls on autonomic indices. Worry was associated with significantly decreased parasympathetic influence and increased sympathetic activity. Cognitive challenge did not result in significant increased cardiac responsivity. The results indicate that worry behavior is associated with decreased vagal activity, suggest a linkage between autonomic and cognitive inflexibility, and provide further suggestions for improving protocols to assess the autonomic effects of cognitive therapy techniques.     

Statement Validity Analysis

Summary

All information regarding 103 Dutch sexual abuse cases was analyzed using the Validity Checklist, the second part of the Statement Validity Analysis procedure. The fulfillment of the VC items was compared for four different age groups. Only two VC items differed significantly between the age groups. The systematic summarization of content analysis and validity checks revealed only a weak relationship between the fulfillment of the CBCA criteria and the VC items together and the outcome of the cases. The results suggest that SVA cannot yet be used as a scientifically validated instrument for judging the truthfulness of allegations of child sexual abuse.     

Psychophysiological Reactivity to Abuse-Related Stimuli in Sexually Revictimized Women

Prior research shows discrepant findings in relation to psychophysiological reactivity to threat in women with histories of sexual victimization. Women ages 18 to 22 (N?=?123) with histories of sexual abuse were categorized into child sexual abuse (CSA), adult sexual victimization, revictimization, or nonvictimization groups. Low- and high-frequency heart rate variability were measured at baseline and during an Emotional Stroop task of abuse-related words. Revictimized women showed a significant decrease from baseline to task in both parasympathetic and sympathetic measures when compared to the CSA group. The CSA group demonstrated chronic sympathetic activation at both baseline and task, relative to the revictimization group. Groups did not differ on performance (i.e., reaction time) on the Emotional Stroop task (i.e., more threatening stimuli, slower performance). Cardiovascular responses reported might point to biological reactivity patterns needed for women with a history of sexual abuse to cope with abuse-related stimuli.     

Matching versus optimal data selection in the Wason selection task

It has been reported as a robust effect that people are likely to select a matching case in the Wason selection task. For example, they usually select the 5 case, in the Wason selection task with the conditional “if an E, then a not-5”. This was explained by the matching bias account that people are likely to regard a matching case as relevant to the truth of the conditional (Evans, 1998). However, because a positive concept usually constructs a smaller set than its negative one does (a rarity assumption), it is more effective to get information on the truth of the conditional in a positive set than in a negative set. Thus the optimal data selection account can also explain the effect. The set size of Q and matching by introducing negation were manipulated independently in four experiments. From the results it was inferred that the so-called matching bias was an amalgam of two different cognitive components—relevance judgement by matching and optimal data selection.     

Book Reviews

Using a latent variable modelling strategy we study individual differences in patterns of answers to the selection task and to the truth table task. Specifically we investigate the prediction of mental model theory according to which the individual tendency to select the false consequent card (in the selection task) is negatively correlated with the tendency to judge the false antecedent cases as irrelevant (in the truth table task). We fit a psychometric model to two large samples (N = 486, twice), and find no evidence for this negative correlation. We examine which of the assumptions of the model theory must be amended to accommodate our findings.     

To do or not to do? A cognitive consistency model for drawing conclusions from conditional instructions and advice

This paper investigates a cognitive consistency model of the directionality of conditional instructions and advice that use probability expressions to express uncertainty about the antecedent p. The proposed model combines world knowledge (conveyed by causal direction) with linguistic information (conveyed by polarity and negation), and predicts whether the complex sentence antecedent has a positive or negative directionality, which in turn predicts whether a positive or negative conclusion q will be drawn. The first experiment uses Do q if p conditionals to show that given a consequent q participants complete antecedents p with a probability expression in line with expected sentence directionality. The second experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show similar effects in a reverse direction. A third experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show that participants draw conclusions predicted by the cognitive consistency model but not by a decision-theoretic approach to reasoning.     

Does “putting on your thinking cap” reduce myside bias in evaluation of scientific evidence?

Abstract

The desire to maintain current beliefs can lead individuals to evaluate contrary evidence more critically than consistent evidence. We test whether priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduces this often-observed myside bias, when people evaluate scientific evidence about which they have prior positions. We conducted three experiments in which participants read a news-style article about a study that either supported or opposed their attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. We manipulated whether participants completed a test posing scientific reasoning problems before or after reading the article and evaluating the evidence that it reported. Consistent with previous research, we found that participants were biased in favor of evidence consistent with their prior attitudes regarding the Affordable Care Act. Priming individuals’ scientific reasoning skills reduced myside bias only when accompanied by direct instructions to apply those skills to the task at hand. We discuss the processes contributing to biased evaluation of scientific evidence.     

Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for counterfactual reasoning?

In most developmental studies the only error children could make on counterfactual tasks was to answer with the current state of affairs. It was concluded that children who did not show this error are able to reason counterfactually. However, children might have avoided this error by using basic conditional reasoning (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010 Perner, J. and Rafetseder, E. 2010. “Counterfactual and other forms of conditional reasoning: Children lost in the nearest possible world”. In Understanding counterfactuals/Understanding causation, Edited by: Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Beck, S. R. New York: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar]). Basic conditional reasoning takes background assumptions represented as conditionals about how the world works. If an antecedent of one of these conditionals is provided by the task, then a likely conclusion can be inferred based only on background assumptions. A critical feature of counterfactual reasoning is that the selection of these additional assumptions is constrained by actual events to which the counterfactual is taken to be counterfactual. In contrast, in basic conditional reasoning one enriches the given antecedent with any plausible assumptions, unconstrained by actual events. In our tasks basic conditional reasoning leads to different answers from counterfactual reasoning. For instance, a doctor, sitting in the park with the intention of reading a paper, is called to an emergency at the swimming pool. The question, “If there had been no emergency, where would the doctor be?” should counterfactually be answered “in the park”. But by ignoring the doctor's intentions, and just reasoning from premises about the default location of a hospital doctor who has not been called out to an emergency, one might answer: “in the hospital”. Only by 6 years of age did children mostly give correct answers.     

Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity,instructions, thinking styles,and relevant knowledge

In three experiments we explored developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning, taking into account the effects of cognitive capacity, thinking styles, and instructions. Normative responding increased with grade levels and cognitive capacity in all experiments, and it showed a negative relationship with superstitious thinking. The effect of instructions (in Experiments 2 and 3) was moderated by level of education and cognitive capacity. Specifically, only higher-grade students with higher cognitive capacity benefited from instructions to reason on the basis of logic. The implications of these findings for research on the development of probabilistic reasoning are also discussed.