The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).     

Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based on Moral Judgment

Past research has identified a number of asymmetries based on moral judgments. Beliefs about (a) what a person values, (b) whether a person is happy, (c) whether a person has shown weakness of will, and (d) whether a person deserves praise or blame seem to depend critically on whether participants themselves find the agent's behavior to be morally good or bad. To date, however, the origins of these asymmetries remain unknown. The present studies examine whether beliefs about an agent's “true self” explain these observed asymmetries based on moral judgment. Using the identical materials from previous studies in this area, a series of five experiments indicate that people show a general tendency to conclude that deep inside every individual there is a “true self” calling him or her to behave in ways that are morally virtuous. In turn, this belief causes people to hold different intuitions about what the agent values, whether the agent is happy, whether he or she has shown weakness of will, and whether he or she deserves praise or blame. These results not only help to answer important questions about how people attribute various mental states to others; they also contribute to important theoretical debates regarding how moral values may shape our beliefs about phenomena that, on the surface, appear to be decidedly non‐moral in nature.     

A threatening exchange: Gender and life history strategy predict perceptions and reasoning about sexual harassment

Sexual harassment is a serious societal issue, with extensive economic and psychological consequences, yet it is also an ill-defined construct fundamentally defined in terms of subjective perception. The current work was designed to examine the ways in which individual differences between people are systematically related to different perceptions of sexual harassment scenarios, as well as reasoning about those harassment situations. Participants (N = 460) read several possible harassment scenarios and rated how uncomfortable they would find them. They then also evaluated a quid pro quo sexual harassment situation in terms of their interpretation of it as a threat or a social exchange and completed a deductive reasoning task about the same situation. Females and individuals with slow life history strategies were more uncomfortable with potential harassment situations and were more likely to interpret the quid pro quo scenario as a threat. Further, interpreting the scenario as a threat was associated with poorer performance on the deductive logic task, compared to those who interpreted the scenario as a social exchange.     

The effect of force-controlled biting on human posture control

Several studies have confirmed the neuromuscular effects of jaw motor activity on the postural stability of humans, but the mechanisms of functional coupling of the craniomandibular system (CMS) with human posture are not yet fully understood. The purpose of our study was, therefore, to investigate whether submaximum biting affects the kinematics of the ankle, knee, and hip joints and the electromyographic (EMG) activity of the leg muscles during bipedal narrow stance and single-leg stance. Twelve healthy young subjects performed force-controlled biting (FB) and non-biting (NB) during bipedal narrow stance and single-leg stance. To investigate the effects of FB on the angles of the hip, knee, and ankle joints, a 3D motion-capture system (Vicon MX) was used. EMG activity was recorded to enable analysis of the coefficient of variation of the muscle co-contraction ratios (CVR) of six pairs of postural muscles. Between FB and NB, no significant differences were found for the mean values of the angles of the ankle, knee, and hip joints, but the standard deviations were significantly reduced during FB. The values of the ranges of motion and the mean angular velocities for the three joints studied revealed significant reduction during FB also. CVR was also significantly reduced during FB for five of the six muscle pairs studied. Although submaximum biting does not change the basic strategy of posture control, it affects neuromuscular co-contraction patterns, resulting in increased kinematic precision.     

Motor imagery ability and internal representation of movement in children with probable developmental coordination disorder

It has been hypothesised that deficits in the functioning of the mirror neuron system (MNS) and internal modelling may contribute to the motor impairments associated with DCD. These processes can be explored behaviourally through motor imagery paradigms. Motor imagery proficiency of children with and without probable DCD (pDCD) was examined using a complex hand rotation task to explore whether motor imagery strategies could be used during more complex tasks. Forty-four boys aged 7–13 years participated, 22 with pDCD (mean = 9.90 years ± 1.57) and 22 controls (mean = 9.68 years ± 1.53). Participants completed the task twice: with and without motor imagery instructions. Stimuli were presented in two rotational axes – palm/back, and eight 45° rotational steps. Both groups showed evidence of following the biomechanical and postural constraints of actual movements. Responses of children with pDCD were slower and less accurate than controls, with group differences increasing alongside task complexity. A greater impact of biomechanical constraints for accuracy was observed in the DCD group. The response characteristics of children with pDCD likely reflects a reduced capacity to mentally manipulate a body schema and reduced visuo-motor processing capabilities. Behaviourally, these processes are linked to MNS and internal modelling function, suggesting deficits in these systems may contribute to the movement difficulties characteristic of DCD.     

Pluralism and values in education in Hungary – changes between 1990 and 2012

Value transmission is a fundamental task of schools. However, the question arises as to how far prevailing political and social conditions shape the functioning of a country or a region’s school system. In other words: what effect do they have on the choice of values to be transmitted at schools? Are there any fundamental social values that are shared by different cultures at different times? Are there values that exist independently of social and political systems? These questions have a special relevance in Eastern and Central European countries like Hungary where political and social changes in the twentieth century had a crucial effect on the set of values that were transmitted by the school system. The aim of this study is to describe how the value transmitting role of the Hungarian school system has changed as a consequence of political transformations in recent decades.     

Identifying expectations about the strength of causal relationships

When we try to identify causal relationships, how strong do we expect that relationship to be? Bayesian models of causal induction rely on assumptions regarding people’s a priori beliefs about causal systems, with recent research focusing on people’s expectations about the strength of causes. These expectations are expressed in terms of prior probability distributions. While proposals about the form of such prior distributions have been made previously, many different distributions are possible, making it difficult to test such proposals exhaustively. In Experiment 1 we used iterated learning—a method in which participants make inferences about data generated based on their own responses in previous trials—to estimate participants’ prior beliefs about the strengths of causes. This method produced estimated prior distributions that were quite different from those previously proposed in the literature. Experiment 2 collected a large set of human judgments on the strength of causal relationships to be used as a benchmark for evaluating different models, using stimuli that cover a wider and more systematic set of contingencies than previous research. Using these judgments, we evaluated the predictions of various Bayesian models. The Bayesian model with priors estimated via iterated learning compared favorably against the others. Experiment 3 estimated participants’ prior beliefs concerning different causal systems, revealing key similarities in their expectations across diverse scenarios.     

Functional explanation and the function of explanation

Teleological explanations (TEs) account for the existence or properties of an entity in terms of a function: we have hearts because they pump blood, and telephones for communication. While many teleological explanations seem appropriate, others are clearly not warranted--for example, that rain exists for plants to grow. Five experiments explore the theoretical commitments that underlie teleological explanations. With the analysis of [Wright, L. (1976). Teleological Explanations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press] from philosophy as a point of departure, we examine in Experiment 1 whether teleological explanations are interpreted causally, and confirm that TEs are only accepted when the function invoked in the explanation played a causal role in bringing about what is being explained. However, we also find that playing a causal role is not sufficient for all participants to accept TEs. Experiment 2 shows that this is not because participants fail to appreciate the causal structure of the scenarios used as stimuli. In Experiments 3-5 we show that the additional requirement for TE acceptance is that the process by which the function played a causal role must be general in the sense of conforming to a predictable pattern. These findings motivate a proposal, Explanation for Export, which suggests that a psychological function of explanation is to highlight information likely to subserve future prediction and intervention. We relate our proposal to normative accounts of explanation from philosophy of science, as well as to claims from psychology and artificial intelligence.     

Diversity and unity of modularity

Since the publication of Fodor's (1983) The Modularity of Mind, there have been quite a few discussions of cognitive modularity among cognitive scientists. Generally, in those discussions, modularity means a property of specialized cognitive processes or a domain-specific body of information. In actuality, scholars understand modularity in many different ways. Different characterizations of modularity and modules were proposed and discussed, but they created misunderstanding and confusion. In this article, I classified and analyzed different approaches to modularity and argued for the unity of modularity. Modularity is a multidimensional property consisting of features from several dimensions specifying different aspects of cognition. Among those, there are core features of modularity, and these core features form a cross-dimensional unity. Despite the diverse and liberal characterizations, modularity contributes to cognitive science because of the unity of the core features.