A real‐world rational agent: unifying old and new AI

Explanations of cognitive processes provided by traditional artificial intelligence were based on the notion of the knowledge level. This perspective has been challenged by new AI that proposes an approach based on embodied systems that interact with the real‐world. We demonstrate that these two views can be unified. Our argument is based on the assumption that knowledge level explanations can be defined in the context of Bayesian theory while the goals of new AI are captured by using a well established robot based model of learning and problem solving, called Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC). In our analysis we consider random foraging and we prove that minor modifications of the DAC architecture renders a model that is equivalent to a Bayesian analysis of this task. Subsequently, we compare this enhanced, “rational,” model to its “non‐rational” predecessor and a further control condition using both simulated and real robots, in a variety of environments. Our results show that the changes made to the DAC architecture, in order to unify the perspectives of old and new AI, also lead to a significant improvement in random foraging.     

Drivers’ self-reported responses to a potentially realistic fabricated road sign message

This article seeks to understand the potential response of drivers when they encounter compromised Dynamic Message Signs (DMS). The findings are built on the self-reported response of 4,706 participants in a Stated Preference (SP) survey conducted between November 2018 and December 2018 in the United States. The findings show the response of drivers to the “Downtown Under Terrorist Attack” message falls into route divergence, speed change, and distraction, and the likelihood of route divergence, distraction, and a slowdown is significantly more than either stopping or speeding up. The possibility of a response, however, varies depending on socioeconomic characteristics, attitudinal characteristics, and driving behavior. It is highlighted (1) female and young drivers are more probable to detour, to change speed, or to be distracted, (2) drivers who are familiar with DMS, encounter it frequently, or pay attention to its content, have a higher chance of detouring or changing speed, while they are less likely to be distracted, and (3) technology-friendly drivers are likely to detour or slow down. From the distraction model, it is further inferred that drivers are distracted cognitively, visually, and manually. The findings have implications for researchers and federal, state, and local agencies who are aware of the consequences of cybersecurity threats for the operation and profitability of the transport network. They, for example, assist transport planners in prioritizing equipment security efforts and resource allocation to the areas of greatest risk, and help to prepare contingency plans based on drivers’ behavioral response.     

Ethical Calibration for an Intelligent Analysis Society

With the widespread application of data-driven intelligent technologies, data is increasingly used to record and influence the behavior of the world and people. Although the value rationality of dataism behind the dataization of the world has yet to be thoroughly analyzed, the new data analysis society which is characterized by an intelligent social form has quietly arrived. From a phenomenological point of view, the foundation of the operation and governance of a data analysis society is to analyze human behavior by using data and intelligent algorithms, but this kind of intelligent surveillance is speculative cognition, which may misread and improperly interfere with the agency of observed. There is an urgent need to set boundaries for possible technological abuse. At the same time, in view of the fact that data-driven social computing attempts to influence human behavior through the calculation of human behavior, the value of human behavior itself should be questioned as a problem to be solved. Further, in the face of the potential challenges of machine cognition and engineering thinking to human nature in the construction of an intelligent society, it is urgent to construct an ethical reflection arc that can restrict and correct its abuse.     

道德决策快的智能机器让人更信任：能力感知的中介作用

本研究旨在探究智能机器的道德决策速度是否以及如何影响人们对其的信任程度。研究分别以智能机器与人类为道德决策主体,采用2（决策速度）×2（决策内容）的被试间设计进行研究发现,对于智能机器和人类,道德性决策均会使人们对其信任,而快速道德决策提高了人们对智能机器的信任程度;此外,研究发现能力感知是智能机器道德决策速度影响人们对其信任程度的中介机制。研究表明人们对智能机器与人类的道德决策速度知觉存在差异。     

IN ALGORITHMS WE TRUST: MAGICAL THINKING,SUPERINTELLIGENT AI AND QUANTUM COMPUTING

This article analyzes current attitudes toward artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing and argues that they represent a modern-day form of magical thinking. It proposes that AI and quantum computing are thus excellent examples of the ways that traditional distinctions between religion, science, and magic fail to account for the vibrancy and energy that surround modern technologies.     

Metaphilosophical Criteria for Worldview Comparison

Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill this gap, this essay introduces nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in three broad categories: objective criteria (objective consistency, scientificity, scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality), and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narrativity). The essay first defines what a worldview is and exposes the heuristic used in the quest for criteria. After describing each criterion individually, it shows what happens when each of them is violated. From the criteria, it derives assessment tests to compare and improve different worldviews. These include the is‐ought, ought‐act, and is‐act first‐order tests; the critical and dialectical second‐order tests; the mixed‐questions and first‐second‐order third‐order tests; and the we‐I, we‐it, and it‐I tests. The essay then applies these criteria and tests to a concrete example, comparing the Flying Spaghetti Monster deity with Intelligent Design. For another application, it draws more general fruitful suggestions for the dialogue between science and religion.     

Subjective judgements influencing Christian beliefs about biological origins

Christians hold divergent views about cosmological and biological origins. Creationists read the early chapters of the Biblical book of Genesis literally, postulating a young earth and a limited role for mutation and natural selection in the development of biological diversity. Theistic Evolutionists accept current scientific accounts of biological evolution, seeing these processes as the mechanisms of God’s creative purpose. Advocates of Intelligent Design doubt whether the complexity and fitness-for-purpose of many aspects of the physical and biological world could have come about without the intervention of a Designer.

Examining the basis of these positions could help their adherents to be less zealous and divisive. Creationists could accept that their beliefs arise not principally from science, but from their hermeneutic stance, and that this stance is not necessarily correct, nor integral to receiving the Bible's theological teaching. Theistic Evolutionists could accept that excluding the possibility of God directly intervening at points in prehistory is illogical, given their belief in the incarnation, miracles and the efficacy of prayer.

The Creationist and Theistic Evolution positions share a strong desire to defend God’s honour and a sense that they more comfortably fit an authentic picture of God. These powerful affective judgements, while not irrational, do not constitute compelling logical arguments. A dispassionate evaluation of their validity and strength could be of much benefit. Advocates of Intelligent Design could admit that scepticism about the adequacy of current scientific explanations does not logically entail an insistence that direct intervention by a designer must have occurred: the explanatory power of science has been underestimated before. All parties are encouraged to accept that a detailed account of biological history is inaccessible and likely to remain so. A due humility is commended.     

AN ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY CHALLENGE TO INTELLIGENT DESIGN

William Dembski claims to have established a decision process to determine when highly unlikely events observed in the natural world are due to Intelligent Design. This article argues that, as no implementable randomness test is superior to a universal Martin‐Löf test, this test should be used to replace Dembski's decision process. Furthermore, Dembski's decision process is flawed, as natural explanations are eliminated before chance. Dembski also introduces a fourth law of thermodynamics, his “law of conservation of information,” to argue that information cannot increase by natural processes. However, this article, using algorithmic information theory, shows that this law is no more than the second law of thermodynamics. The article concludes that any discussions on the possibilities of design interventions in nature should be articulated in terms of the algorithmic information theory approach to randomness and its robust decision process.     

Theologians Wanted! Some Reflections about the Creation/Evolution Debate

I plead here in favor of more frequent recourse to and input from theologians, in debates about the creationist crisis, not only in order to develop new aspects of theology concerning creation, but also to undertake a real theological diagnosis of this crisis. The task of theology is not simply to write catechisms or Summae, but it is much more to do with incompleteness, light and shade. Theologians must confront themselves with reality—like secular theology at the seventeenth century, but also natural theologies—without forgetting to pose limits: absolute power of God, reality of the evil, scientific discoveries that are negative for theology, etc. Theology is a work of revelation (apocalypse).     

Ringing the changes: In tribute to Arthur R. Peacocke1

Justin Barrett's consideration of some challenges for religious belief raised by evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion was criticized by Howard Van Till for overstating tensions, mischaracterizing the most important epistemological issues, and proposing a solution that perpetuates war on evolution. We argue that each of these claims is untrue, and is not conducive to dialogue that constructively engages and attempts to resolve tensions between science and religion where they do exist.