Metaphilosophical Criteria for Worldview Comparison

Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill this gap, this essay introduces nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in three broad categories: objective criteria (objective consistency, scientificity, scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency, personal utility, emotionality), and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, collective utility, narrativity). The essay first defines what a worldview is and exposes the heuristic used in the quest for criteria. After describing each criterion individually, it shows what happens when each of them is violated. From the criteria, it derives assessment tests to compare and improve different worldviews. These include the is‐ought, ought‐act, and is‐act first‐order tests; the critical and dialectical second‐order tests; the mixed‐questions and first‐second‐order third‐order tests; and the we‐I, we‐it, and it‐I tests. The essay then applies these criteria and tests to a concrete example, comparing the Flying Spaghetti Monster deity with Intelligent Design. For another application, it draws more general fruitful suggestions for the dialogue between science and religion.     

Skookumchuck,Kiidk'yaas,Gibbard: normativity,meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard's characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard's understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.     

Theologians Wanted! Some Reflections about the Creation/Evolution Debate

I plead here in favor of more frequent recourse to and input from theologians, in debates about the creationist crisis, not only in order to develop new aspects of theology concerning creation, but also to undertake a real theological diagnosis of this crisis. The task of theology is not simply to write catechisms or Summae, but it is much more to do with incompleteness, light and shade. Theologians must confront themselves with reality—like secular theology at the seventeenth century, but also natural theologies—without forgetting to pose limits: absolute power of God, reality of the evil, scientific discoveries that are negative for theology, etc. Theology is a work of revelation (apocalypse).     

Ringing the changes: In tribute to Arthur R. Peacocke1

Justin Barrett's consideration of some challenges for religious belief raised by evolutionary and cognitive theories of religion was criticized by Howard Van Till for overstating tensions, mischaracterizing the most important epistemological issues, and proposing a solution that perpetuates war on evolution. We argue that each of these claims is untrue, and is not conducive to dialogue that constructively engages and attempts to resolve tensions between science and religion where they do exist.     

Subjective judgements influencing Christian beliefs about biological origins

Christians hold divergent views about cosmological and biological origins. Creationists read the early chapters of the Biblical book of Genesis literally, postulating a young earth and a limited role for mutation and natural selection in the development of biological diversity. Theistic Evolutionists accept current scientific accounts of biological evolution, seeing these processes as the mechanisms of God’s creative purpose. Advocates of Intelligent Design doubt whether the complexity and fitness-for-purpose of many aspects of the physical and biological world could have come about without the intervention of a Designer.

Examining the basis of these positions could help their adherents to be less zealous and divisive. Creationists could accept that their beliefs arise not principally from science, but from their hermeneutic stance, and that this stance is not necessarily correct, nor integral to receiving the Bible's theological teaching. Theistic Evolutionists could accept that excluding the possibility of God directly intervening at points in prehistory is illogical, given their belief in the incarnation, miracles and the efficacy of prayer.

The Creationist and Theistic Evolution positions share a strong desire to defend God’s honour and a sense that they more comfortably fit an authentic picture of God. These powerful affective judgements, while not irrational, do not constitute compelling logical arguments. A dispassionate evaluation of their validity and strength could be of much benefit. Advocates of Intelligent Design could admit that scepticism about the adequacy of current scientific explanations does not logically entail an insistence that direct intervention by a designer must have occurred: the explanatory power of science has been underestimated before. All parties are encouraged to accept that a detailed account of biological history is inaccessible and likely to remain so. A due humility is commended.     

AN ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY CHALLENGE TO INTELLIGENT DESIGN

William Dembski claims to have established a decision process to determine when highly unlikely events observed in the natural world are due to Intelligent Design. This article argues that, as no implementable randomness test is superior to a universal Martin‐Löf test, this test should be used to replace Dembski's decision process. Furthermore, Dembski's decision process is flawed, as natural explanations are eliminated before chance. Dembski also introduces a fourth law of thermodynamics, his “law of conservation of information,” to argue that information cannot increase by natural processes. However, this article, using algorithmic information theory, shows that this law is no more than the second law of thermodynamics. The article concludes that any discussions on the possibilities of design interventions in nature should be articulated in terms of the algorithmic information theory approach to randomness and its robust decision process.     

道德决策快的智能机器让人更信任：能力感知的中介作用

本研究旨在探究智能机器的道德决策速度是否以及如何影响人们对其的信任程度。研究分别以智能机器与人类为道德决策主体,采用2（决策速度）×2（决策内容）的被试间设计进行研究发现,对于智能机器和人类,道德性决策均会使人们对其信任,而快速道德决策提高了人们对智能机器的信任程度;此外,研究发现能力感知是智能机器道德决策速度影响人们对其信任程度的中介机制。研究表明人们对智能机器与人类的道德决策速度知觉存在差异。     

Structural and functional information—an evolutionary approach to pragmatic information

The paper starts with a critics of the potential information which is related to the statistical entropy. In order to include the syntactic and semantic aspects of information, we propose a distinction between structural and functional information, instead. Structural information represents the structural determination of a system state, it measures the content of information, as given by the material structure. Functional information, on the other hand, represents the operational closure of the system, it could be e.g. an algorithm which activates and interprets the existing structural information.

From an evolutionary point of view, pragmatic information is generated by an interplay of structural and functional information. This leads to a new insight into the concept of pragmatic information, which is not an invariant of evolution, but must be steadily re‐generated.

The active role of information in a self‐organization process is demonstrated in a model of artificial agents. It is shown by means of computer simulations that the feedback of already existing information on the generation of new information performs analogies to the creation of a collective memory.     

Cities as Collective Beings

This article introduces the concepts of System, Autonomous System, Intelligent System, Multiple System, and Collective Being. It deals with issues related to managing these different levels of systemic aggregation. The author then discusses applications related to Architecture and design with particular reference to cities.     

Setting the bar for cognitive agency: Or,how minimally autonomous can an autonomous agent be?

Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However, whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and, arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life.