When the Solution Is on the Doorstep: Better Solving Performance,but Diminished Aha! Experience for Chess Experts on the Mutilated Checkerboard Problem

Insight problems are difficult because the initially activated knowledge hinders successful solving. The crucial information needed for a solution is often so far removed that gaining access to it through restructuring leads to the subjective experience of “Aha!”. Although this assumption is shared by most insight theories, there is little empirical evidence for the connection between the necessity of restructuring an incorrect problem representation and the Aha! experience. Here, we demonstrate a rare case where previous knowledge facilitates the solving of insight problems but reduces the accompanying Aha! experience. Chess players were more successful than non‐chess players at solving the mutilated checkerboard insight problem, which requires retrieval of chess‐related information about the color of the squares. Their success came at a price, since they reported a diminished Aha! experience compared to controls. Chess players’ problem‐solving ability was confined to that particular problem, since they struggled to a similar degree to non‐chess players to solve another insight problem (the eight‐coin problem), which does not require chess‐related information for a solution. Here, chess players and non‐chess players experienced the same degree of insight.     

Ego depletion improves insight

Initial acts of self-control can reduce effort and performance on subsequent tasks – a phenomenon known as ego depletion. Ego depletion is thought to undermine the capacity or willingness to engage executive control, an important determinant of success for many tasks. We examined whether ego depletion improves performance on a task that favours less executive control: insight problem solving. In two experiments, participants completed an ego-depletion manipulation or a non-depleting control condition followed by an insight problem-solving task (i.e., matchstick arithmetic). Participants in the depleting condition demonstrated greater insight problem-solving accuracy than those in the non-depleting control condition. Priming theories of willpower did not impact these results. Although ego depletion is widely regarded as a “state of impairment”, attendant decreases in executive control may foster insightful thinking.     

Loss of emotional insight in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia or "frontal anosodiaphoria"

Loss of insight is a prominent clinical manifestation of behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), but its characteristics are poorly understood. Twelve bvFTD patients were compared with 12 Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients on a structured insight interview of cognitive insight (awareness of having a disorder) and emotional insight (concern over having a disorder). Compared to the AD patients, the bvFTD patients were less aware and less concerned about their disorder, and they had less appreciation of its effects on themselves and on others. After corrective feedback (“updating”), the bvFTD patients were just as aware of their disorder as the AD patients but remained unconcerned and unappreciative of its effects. These findings suggest that lack of insight in bvFTD is not due to “anosognosia,” or impaired cognitive and executive awareness of disease, but to “frontal anosodiaphoria,” or lack of emotional concern over having bvFTD and its impact on themselves and others.     

Technical intelligence in animals: the kea model

The ability to act on information flexibly is one of the cornerstones of intelligent behavior. As particularly informative example, tool-oriented behavior has been investigated to determine to which extent nonhuman animals understand means-end relations, object affordances, and have specific motor skills. Even planning with foresight, goal-directed problem solving and immediate causal inference have been a focus of research. However, these cognitive abilities may not be restricted to tool-using animals but may be found also in animals that show high levels of curiosity, object exploration and manipulation, and extractive foraging behavior. The kea, a New Zealand parrot, is a particularly good example. We here review findings from laboratory experiments and field observations of keas revealing surprising cognitive capacities in the physical domain. In an experiment with captive keas, the success rate of individuals that were allowed to observe a trained conspecific was significantly higher than that of naive control subjects due to their acquisition of some functional understanding of the task through observation. In a further experiment using the string-pulling task, a well-probed test for means-end comprehension, we found the keas finding an immediate solution that could not be improved upon in nine further trials. We interpreted their performance as insightful in the sense of being sensitive of the relevant functional properties of the task and thereby producing a new adaptive response without trial-and-error learning. Together, these findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the distribution of higher cognitive skills in the animal kingdom by showing high levels of sensorimotor intelligence in animals that do not use tools. In conclusion, we suggest that the 'Technical intelligence hypothesis' (Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations, pp 289-211, 1997), which has been proposed to explain the origin of the ape/monkey grade-shift in intelligence by a selection pressure upon an increased efficiency in foraging behavior, should be extended, that is, applied to some birds as well.     

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use. (ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-year-old children solved the problem much faster than 6-7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children.     

Insight problem solving in individuals with high versus low schizotypy

Insight problem solving requires restructuring of a problem space by stepping out of the framework provided by the commonly activated cognitive schemas and acquiring a new perspective on the problem. Schizotypy has been linked with loosened associative and overinclusive thinking that may be advantageous for this process. The present study tested this hypothesis and found that individuals with a high degree of schizotypy show better performance on a set of insight problems relative to individuals with low schizotypy, but not on a set of incremental problems that required focused goal-related thinking. Results support the notion that schizotypy is associated not only with enhanced abilities in creative processes involved in divergent thinking but also in creative operations during analytical problem solving.     

Obsessive-compulsive disorder with comorbid major depression: what is the role of cognitive factors?

Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) commonly experience comorbid mood disturbances such as major depressive disorder (MDD). Previous studies that have compared OCD patients with and without MDD have revealed differences in demographic characteristics, clinical severity, and symptom presentation between these two patient groups. Previous studies have not, however, examined whether there are differences with respect to cognitive processes. The present study therefore aimed to address this gap in the literature. Eighty patients with OCD and no unipolar mood disorders were compared with 34 OCD patients with comorbid major depression on measures of OCD symptoms, cognitions, and insight, as well as on measures of depression and functional impairment. Whereas depressed OCD patients evidenced higher scores than non-depressed OCD patients on semi-idiographic measures of OCD symptoms and cognitions, this was not the case for nomothetic measures. Functional impairment and the tendency to misinterpret innocuous intrusive thoughts as significant emerged as unique predictors of depression within the entire sample of OCD patients. Results are discussed in terms of (a) the importance of semi-idiographic assessment of OCD, (b) possible explanations for the relationship between OCD symptoms, depression, and cognitive processes, and (c) the psychological treatment of comorbid OCD and MDD.     

Working Wonders? Investigating insight with magic tricks

We propose a new approach to differentiate between insight and noninsight problem solving, by introducing magic tricks as problem solving domain. We argue that magic tricks are ideally suited to investigate representational change, the key mechanism that yields sudden insight into the solution of a problem, because in order to gain insight into the magicians’ secret method, observers must overcome implicit constraints and thus change their problem representation. In Experiment 1, 50 participants were exposed to 34 different magic tricks, asking them to find out how the trick was accomplished. Upon solving a trick, participants indicated if they had reached the solution either with or without insight. Insight was reported in 41.1% of solutions. The new task domain revealed differences in solution accuracy, time course and solution confidence with insight solutions being more likely to be true, reached earlier, and obtaining higher confidence ratings. In Experiment 2, we explored which role self-imposed constraints actually play in magic tricks. 62 participants were presented with 12 magic tricks. One group received verbal cues, providing solution relevant information without giving the solution away. The control group received no informative cue. Experiment 2 showed that participants’ constraints were suggestible to verbal cues, resulting in higher solution rates. Thus, magic tricks provide more detailed information about the differences between insightful and noninsightful problem solving, and the underlying mechanisms that are necessary to have an insight.     

Dispositional mindfulness as a positive predictor of psychological well-being and the role of the private self-consciousness insight factor

The current study explored relationships among dispositional mindfulness, the private self-consciousness (PrSC) insight factor, and psychological well-being. Several mindfulness studies indicate that dispositional mindfulness is a positive predictor of psychological well-being. In a distinctly different area of consciousness research, Grant, Franklin, and Langford’s (2002) PrSC insight factor shows similar predictive results. Here it is hypothesized that these two seemingly independent dispositional consciousness constructs have overlapping variance and that insight can serve as a partial mediator for dispositional mindfulness when it predicts psychological well-being. Participants were 184 university students who were administered a self-report measure of dispositional mindfulness, insight, and psychological well-being. Correlational analyses revealed that mindfulness and insight were significantly and positively correlated with each other and with psychological well-being. Bootstrap regression analyses supported the model of insight as a partial mediator of the mindfulness–psychological well-being predictive relationship.     

The Aha! moment: Is insight a different form of problem solving?

In everyday life, we mainly solve problems with a conscious solution search (non-insight). However, sometimes a perplexing problem is resolved by a quantum leap in understanding. This phenomenon is known as the Aha! experience (insight). Although insight has a distinct phenomenological and behavioral signature, its driving mechanism remains debated. Weisberg (2015) proposed an integrated theory of insight arguing that insight, like non-insight, mainly depends on conscious, cognitive operations with restructuring as a distinguishing feature of insight. However, only if those operations lead to an impasse, insight is achieved through unconscious processes. We assessed some of the premises of this theory by asking participants (N = 42) to solve 70 word puzzles (CRAT) that can either be solved with insight or non-insight. For each puzzle, participants indicated word puzzle difficulty, solution confidence, solution suddenness, and the experiences of impasse and restructuring. As expected, participants reported higher suddenness of and confidence in insight solutions than non-insightful ones. Surprisingly, we could not corroborate the otherwise consistently reported higher solution accuracy and faster solution speed for insight. Crucially, as suggested by the integrated theory of insight, impasse was not a prerequisite for insight to occur. Although restructuring, indeed, preceded insight solutions more often, it seemed a more general problem-solving skill also applied for non-insight solutions. Moreover, early on, participants reported an increased experience of problem difficulty for puzzles later solved with insight. This ability to report on the solution search of insight demonstrates that, as proposed by the theory, insight involves conscious, cognitive operations.