The Global Scope of Justice

In this paper, I examine the question of the scope of justice, in a not unusual distributive, egalitarian, and universalistic framework. Part I outlines some central features of the egalitarian theory of justice I am proposing. According to such a conception, justice is – at least prima facie – immediately universal, and therefore global. It does not morally recognize any judicial boundaries or limits. Part II examines whether, even from a universalistic perspective, there are moral or pragmatic grounds for rejecting or limiting the global scope of justice. In particular, I scrutinize five universalistic objections: (1) the principle of "moral division of labor"; (2) the connection between cooperation and distributive justice; (3) the primacy of democracy; (4) the dangers of a world state; and (5) political-pragmatic reasons. I intend to show that these objections cannot undermine the strong normative claims of global justice. At the most, political-pragmatic reasons speak in favor of initially striving for somewhat less, in order to receive more general backing.     

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

Drug Use History, Drug Test Consequences, and the Perceived Fairness of Organizational Drug Testing Programs

We explored the effects of drug use history (current/recent user of drugs, used/tried drugs, never tried drugs) and a measure of drug test consequences (termination versus rehabilitation) on the perceived fairness of organizational drug testing (DT). Data were collected as part of a statewide telephone survey of the general adult population. Personal drug use history and DT consequences interacted such that DT consequences were related to DT fairness only for nonusers who had past drug use experience. The importance of past drug use in understanding reactions to DT are discussed.     

Citizens' Sense of Justice and the Legal System

When an actor commits a wrong action, citizens have perceptions of the kind of responsibility the actor incurs, the degree to which the act was mitigated or justified, and the appropriate punishment for the actor. The legislatively mandated law of criminal courts, statutes, and criminal codes deals with the same issues. Experimental evidence shows that there are important discrepancies between the principles that people and legal codes use to assign responsibility. That is, the moral retributive-justice principles that people use are sometimes in conflict with the directions in which modern code drafters are taking criminal law. These discrepancies may cause citizens to feel alienated from authority, and to reduce their voluntary compliance with legal codes.     

环境公正:和谐社会的基本前提

人与人的和谐是和谐社会的“底线要求”,人与社会的和谐是和谐社会的核心所在,而人与自然的和谐是和谐社会的基本前提。人与自然和谐集中体现为环境公正。它首先是指人与自然物种之间的种际公正,具体体现为两个维度的公正：在空间维度上,要促进国际公正、族际公正、域际公正、群际公正;在时间维度上具有代际公正意识。     

GLOBAL JUSTICE AFTER THE FALL Christian Realism and the "Law of Peoples"

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls casts his proposals as an argument against what he calls “political realism.” Here, I contend that a certain version of “Christian political realism” survives Rawls's polemic against political realism sans phrase and that Rawls overstates his case against political realism writ large. Specifically, I argue that Rawls's dismissal of “empirical political realism” is underdetermined by the evidence he marshals in support of the dismissal and that his rejection of “normative political realism” is in tension with his own normative concessions to political reality as expressed in The Law of Peoples. That is, I contend that Rawls, himself, needs some form of political realism to render persuasive the full range of normative claims constituting the argument of that work.     

Gratuity,Embodiment, and Reciprocity

Protestant Christian ethicist Timothy Jackson and secular feminist philosopher Eva Feder Kittay each explore the relationship between love or care and justice through the lens of human dependency. Jackson sharply prioritizes agape over justice, whereas Kittay articulates a more complex and integrated understanding of the relationship of care and distributive justice. An account of Christian love and its relation to justice must account for the gratuity, mutuality, and reciprocity that pervade human existence. Such an account must integrate provision for another's basic needs, a feature of agape, with a distributive justice that fairly allocates the material prerequisites of care and the burden of caring labor. Kittay's treatment of care and justice is more adequate to the realities of human embodiment and the social organization of care than Jackson's, but neither offers a fully adequate ground for the moral personhood of all human beings, including deeply dependent persons.     

自我损耗对利他惩罚的影响:愤怒与公正敏感性的作用

采用2个行为实验探讨了自我损耗对利他惩罚的影响。实验1采用“Stroop”任务操纵被试的自我损耗，并考察愤怒情绪在其中的中介作用；实验2使用公正敏感性量表选出高低两组被试后采用“划e”任务操纵被试的自我损耗。两个实验均用最后通牒博弈考察被试的利他惩罚行为。结果发现：高损耗组被试对不公平分配方案的拒绝比例显著高于低损耗组；愤怒情绪在两者间起部分中介作用；高公正敏感组中出现了明显了自我损耗促进效应，低公正敏感组不存在。证实了自我损耗对利他惩罚促进作用。     

Des raisons d'être d'une argumentation rhétorique selon Aristote

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons Aristotle gives for being able to use rhetorical argumentation, which is obviously not a scientific mode of expression. This faculty which was condemned by Plato as lacking morality, is paradoxically regarded by Aristotle as necessary on moral grounds. For, according to him, it would be blameworthy to keep silent when being verbally assailed. The necessity of rhetoric is, however, more deeply founded. First, because justice has to be saved from its enemies in the City's courts of law. Secondly, because everyone has to be convicted to follow in practice the rules of the City's laws and such a conviction, in the case of the multitude, cannot be obtained by the means of scientific arguments. Thirdly and above all, because, in forensic disputes, characteristics of free political societies, the demagogic power, which regularly leads to tyrannical regimes, can only be avoided by the weapons of rhetoric. From these explanations, one does see that rhetoric, for Aristotle, seems to be the necessary substitute for ancient and traditional instruments securing obedience to legal justice, i.e. myths and pure constraint or coercion. In civilized and free political communities, rhetoric is required for civilization and freedom.

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Des raisons d'être d'une argumentation rhétorique selon Aristote