The role of epistemic motivation in individuals’ response to decision complexity

Integrating findings on the effects of more alternatives with findings on the effects of more attributes, we offer a motivational decision-making model, suggesting that epistemic motivation moderates individuals’ responses to complex information. Study 1 empirically investigated the shared essence of four conceptualizations of epistemic motivation, further distinguishing it from the maximizing/satisficing motivation. A series of experiments indicate that epistemic motivation moderates the effect of complex information on one’s discomfort with a decision (Studies 2–4) and on the tendency to implement one’s choice in action (Study 3). Taken together, our findings indicate that individuals with low epistemic motivation experience more discomfort and are less likely to implement their decision when faced with complex information whereas those high on epistemic motivation portray a weaker or even an opposite effect. The consistent findings across conceptualizations (dispositional Need-for-Cognitive-Closure and manipulated Openness vs. Conservation values) indicate the robustness of the findings and the important role of epistemic motivation in complex decisions.     

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Abstract

Since the concept of imaginative elaboration of body functioning, which is essential to Winnicott's idea of psyche-soma, has rarely been investigated up to now, this article sets out to do this and tries to pursue the meaning and articulation of that concept in the corpus of Winnicott's theory. In this way, it contributes to bringing the body to the core of psychoanalytical theory.     

Personhood: Elusive But Not Illusory

Bioethics as a field has been fortunate that its values and concerns have mirrored the values and concerns of society. In light of the September 11th attacks, it is possible that we are witnessing the beginning of a transition in American culture, one fraught with implications for bioethics. The emphasis on autonomy and individual rights may come to be tempered by greater concern over the collective good. Increased emphasis on solidarity over autonomy could greatly alter public response to research abuses aimed at defense from bioterrorism, to privacy of genetic information, and to control of private medical resources to protect the public health.     

A Conversation between Theory,Methods, and Data

The 10 year anniversary of the COGITO Study provides an opportunity to revisit the ideas behind the Cattell data box. Three dimensions of the persons × variables × time data box are discussed in the context of three categories of researchers each wanting to answer their own categorically different question. The example of the well-known speed-accuracy tradeoff is used to illustrate why these are three different categories of statistical question. The 200 persons by 100 variables by 100 occasions of measurement COGITO data cube presents a challenge to integrate theories and methods across the dimensions of the data box. A conceptual model is presented for the speed-accuracy tradeoff example that could account for cross-sectional between persons effects, short-term dynamics, and long-term learning effects. Thus, two fundamental differences between the time axis and the other two axes of the data box include ordering and time scaling. In addition, nonstationarity in human systems is a pervasive problem along the time dimension of the data box. To illustrate, the difference in nonstationarity between dancing and conversation is discussed in the context of the interaction between theory, methods, and data. An information theoretic argument is presented that the theory-methods-data interaction is better understood when viewed as a conversation than as a dance. Entropy changes in the development of a theory-methods-data conversation provide one metric for evaluating scientific progress.     

The role of working memory in information acquisition and decision making: Lessons from the binary prediction task

The effects of memory constraints upon information acquisition and decision making were examined in two experiments using binary prediction tasks, where participants observe outcomes for two options before deciding which one to bet upon. Our studies extend previous investigations to the case where participants learn the structure of the task through observation, but where information acquisition is separated from the task of prediction. Participants with higher cognitive capacity (larger memory span or higher intelligence) were more likely to adopt the “maximizing” strategy (always selecting the more frequent alternative). This finding conflicts with some recent investigations of similar tasks, a contrast that implies that the presence of feedback on choices may be important in determining the strategic actions of high-capacity individuals. Participants selecting the optimal strategy were in turn more efficient in their data acquisition. The behaviour of participants adopting suboptimal choice strategies was consistent with prediction based upon a “narrow window of experience”—that is, seeking to match the characteristics of small samples of observations.     

Influences of credibility of testimony and strength of statistical evidence on children’s and adolescents’ reasoning

According to dual-process models that include analytic and heuristic modes of processing, analytic processing is often expected to become more common with development. Consistent with this view, on reasoning problems, adolescents are more likely than children to select alternatives that are backed by statistical evidence. It is shown here that this pattern depends on the quality of the statistical evidence and the quality of the testimonial that is the typical alternative to statistical evidence. In Experiment 1, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 64) were presented with scenarios in which solid statistical evidence was contrasted with casual or expert testimonial evidence. When testimony was casual, children relied on it but adolescents did not; when testimony was expert, both children and adolescents relied on it. In Experiment 2, 9- and 13-year-olds (N = 83) were presented with scenarios in which casual testimonial evidence was contrasted with weak or strong statistical evidence. When statistical evidence was weak, children and adolescents relied on both testimonial and statistical evidence; when statistical evidence was strong, most children and adolescents relied on it. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for dual-process accounts of cognitive development.     

Visual span and change detection in soccer: An expertise study

There is evidence to suggest that sports experts are able to extract more perceptual information from a single fixation than novices when exposed to meaningful tasks that are specific to their field of expertise. In particular, Reingold et al. (2001) showed that chess experts use a larger visual span including fewer fixations when compared to their less skilled counterparts. The aim of the present study was to examine whether also in a more complex environment, namely soccer, skilled players use a larger visual span and fewer fixations than less skilled players when attempting to recognise players’ positions. To this end, we combined the gaze-contingent window technique with the change detection paradigm. Results seem to suggest that skilled soccer players do not use a larger visual span than less skilled players. However, skilled soccer players showed significantly fewer fixations of longer duration than their less skilled counterparts, supporting the notion that experts may extract more information from a single glance.     

Are Bald‐Faced Lies Deceptive after All?

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However, philosophers have recently noted the existence of bald‐faced lies, lies which are not intended to deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is ‘an unhappy divorce’ because it precludes an obvious explanation of the prima facie wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald‐faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I argue that divorcing deception from lying may not be as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.     

Effects of exercise self-schema on reactions to self-relevant feedback

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was to test the influence of exercise self-schema on the processing of self-relevant information in the sport and exercise domain. It was hypothesized that exercise schematics would cognitively prefer consistent feedback over positive feedback (self-consistency principle), whereas affectively, participants without exercise self-schema would prefer positive feedback over consistent feedback (self-enhancement principle).DesignCross-sectional online study with a 2 × 3 mixed model design.Method472 subjects (52.54% female, M_age = 31.35, SD = 11.90) participated in an online-study providing them with bogus test results consistent with as well as positively and negatively deviating from their self-assessments in exercise-related aspects. To measure preference, affective and cognitive reactions were assessed after each feedback presentation.ResultsMixed-model ANOVAS (between-subject factor: exercise self-schema, within-subject factor: type of feedback) reveal significant interactions for both affective and cognitive reaction. However, these are not based on an interaction of the levels ‘consistent’ and ‘positive’ of type of feedback, but on an interaction of ‘negative’ and ‘consistent’ feedback. For exercise schematics, the gap between reactions to consistent and negative feedback is larger than for participants without exercise self-schema.ConclusionsThe original hypotheses could not be confirmed, indicating a general dominance of the self-enhancement principle. However, the unexpected interaction suggests that participants with exercise self-schema seem to devalue negative feedback more than those without exercise self-schema, which could be explained by self-consistency principles.