A Religious Diversity Tale: A Multi-Faith Case Study

This article examines the creation of a network of diverse religious leadership in a Midwest suburb where the intersection of religion and national pride fomented a community-wide conflict. Activated during a heated controversy over displaying a Christmas tree in a public school, the Network became a laboratory for testing viable strategies for community healing. The case of a Jewish student suspended for fighting when taunted for not singing Christmas Carols became a catalyst for debating what is religious, what is secular, and what is culturally American. The interaction of the key players is noted; educators, religious leaders, students and their families, particularly the mothers who regularly interacted across religious boundaries. The article describes the Network's experiment with deploying resources that accommodated diverse experiences of religion and patriotism, historically and culturally, within an American context.     

Phenomenological Argumentative Structure

The nontechnical ability to identify or match argumentative structure seems to be an important reasoning skill. Instruments that have questions designed to measure this skill include major standardized tests for graduate school admission, for example, the United States-Canadian Law School Admission Test (LSAT), the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE), and the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Writers and reviewers of such tests need an appropriate foundation for developing such questions – they need a proper representation of phenomenological argumentative structure – for legitimacy, and because these tests affect people's lives. This paper attempts to construct an adequate and appropriate representation of such structure, that is, the logical structure that an argument is perceived to have by mature reasoners, albeit ones who are untrained in logic.     

事件时间估计偏差理论述

人们总是倾向低估完成某一任务的时间。计划谬误理论认为,时间低估倾向的原因是人们估计时间时忽视过去完成类似任务的经验,过于关注理想的任务计划和任务情景,从而导致乐观的时间估计。但是基于该理论的一些提高时间估计精确性的策略没有达到预期效果。针对这种不足,记忆偏差理论认为,人们利用的时间记忆带有偏差,从而导致偏差的时间估计。两个理论之间引起一些争论,但如果从解释水平理论的角度可以找到其相通之处     

Informal versus formal mathematics

We discuss Kunen’s algorithmic implementation of a proof for the Paris–Harrington theorem, and the author’s and da Costa’s proposed “exotic” formulation for the P = NP hypothesis. Out of those two examples we ponder the relation between mathematics within an axiomatic framework, and intuitive or informal mathematics. The author is Visiting Researcher at IEA/USP, Professor of Communications, Emeritus, at the Federal University in Rio de Janeiro, and a full member of the Brazilian Academy of Philosophy.     

Deductivism and the Informal Fallacies

This essay proposes and defends a general thesis concerning the nature of fallacies of reasoning. These in distinctive ways are all said to be deductively invalid. More importantly, the most accurate, complete and charitable reconstructions of these species and specimens of the informal fallacies are instructive with respect to the individual character of each distinct informal fallacy. Reconstructions of the fallacies as deductive invalidities are possible in every case, if deductivism is true, which means that in every case they should be formalizable in an expressively comprehensive formal symbolic deductive logic. The general thesis is illustrated by a detailed examination of Walter Burleigh's paradox in his c. 1323 work, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior (Longer Treatise on the Purity of Logic), as a challenge to the deductive validity of hypothetical syllogism. The paradox has the form, ‹If I call you a swine, then I call you an animal; if I call you an animal, then I speak truly; therefore, if I call you a swine, then I speak truly'. Several solutions to the problem are considered, and the inference is exposed as an instance of the common deductive fallacy of equivocation.     

Arguments,Meta-arguments,and Metadialogues: A Reconstruction of Krabbe,Govier, and Woods

Krabbe (2003, in F.H. van Eemeren, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 641–644) defined a metadialogue as a dialogue about one or more dialogues, and a ground-level dialogue as a dialogue that is not a metadialogue. Similarly, I define a meta-argument as an argument about one or more arguments, and a ground-level argument as one which is not a meta-argument. Krabbe (1995, in F.H van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck Henkemans (eds.), Proceedings of the Third ISSA Conference on Argumentation, Sic Sat, Amsterdam, pp. 333–344) showed that formal-fallacy criticism (and more generally, fallacy criticism) consists of metadialogues, and that such metadialogues can be profiled in ways that lead to their proper termination or resolution. I reconstruct Krabbe’s metadialogical account into monolectical, meta-argumentative terminology by describing three-types of meta-arguments corresponding to the three ways of proving formal invalidity he studied: the trivial logic-indifferent method; the method of counterexample situation; and the method of formal paraphrase. A fourth type of meta-argument corresponds to what Oliver (1967, Mind 76, 463–478), Govier (1985, Informal Logic 7, 27–33), and Copi (1986) call refutation by logical analogy. A fifth type of meta-argument represents my reconstruction of arguments by parity of reasoning studied by Woods and Hudak (1989, Informal Logic 11, 125–139). Other particular meta-arguments deserving future study are Hume’s critique of the argument from design in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and Mill’s initial argument in The Subjection of Women about the importance of established custom and general feeling vis-à-vis argumentation.     

The Willingness of Military Members to Seek Help: The Role of Social Involvement and Social Responsibility

Anchored in the social organization theory of action and change, we use data from a large sample of active‐duty Air Force members to examine the direct and indirect influence of social involvement and social responsibility on willingness to seek help in times of need via trust in formal systems and informal supports. Group comparisons are conducted between junior male, junior female, senior male, and senior female service members. The key mediational path in the model for all groups is the connection between social involvement and willingness to seek help via trust in formal systems. These results can inform both unit‐ and community‐level interventions intended to increase the likelihood that active‐duty AF members will seek help in times of need.     

Two types of debunking arguments

Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories as products of confabulatory post hoc rationalization. Through my discussion of Greene and Singer’s empirically informed debunking of deontology, I introduce the distinction between two different types of debunking arguments. The first type of debunking argument operates through regular undercutting defeat, whereas the second type relies on higher-order evidence. I argue that the latter type of debunking argument, of which the argument from confabulation is an example, is objectionably sloppy and therefore inadmissible in academic discussion.     

Self‐Compassion as a Facet of Neuroticism? A Reply to the Comments of Neff,Tóth‐Király,and Colosimo (2018)

In this paper, we respond to comments by Neff et al. (2018) made about our finding that the negative dimensions of self‐compassion were redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ 0.85; Pfattheicher et al., 2017) and not incrementally valid. We first provide epistemological guidance for establishing psychological constructs, namely, three hurdles that new constructs must pass: theoretically and empirically sound measurement, discriminant validity, and incremental validity—and then apply these guidelines to the self‐compassion scale. We then outline that the critique of Neff et al. (2018) is contestable. We question their decisions concerning data‐analytic methods that help them to circumvent instead of passing the outlined hurdles. In a reanalysis of the data provided by Neff et al. (2018), we point to several conceptual and psychometric problems and conclude that self‐compassion does not overcome the outlined hurdles. Instead, we show that our initial critique of the self‐compassion scale holds and that its dimensions are best considered facets of neuroticism. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology