In Defence of the Open Question Argument

The purpose of this paper is to defend G. E. Moore's open question argument, understood as an argument directed against analytic reductionism, the view that moral properties are analytically reducible to non-moral properties. In the first section I revise Moore's argument in order to make it as plausible and resistant against objections as possible. In the following two sections I develop the argument further and defend it against the most prominent objections raised against it. The conclusion of my line of reasoning is that the open question argument offers the best explanation of our responses to the questions put in the argument, namely that analytic reductionism is mistaken. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

判断与决策中的规划谬误

规划谬误是指人们在估计未来任务的完成时间时, 倾向于过度乐观, 低估任务完成时间的一种现象。规划谬误的心理机制主要包括规划谬误理论和记忆偏差理论。规划谬误的影响因素主要有认知因素、动机因素、个体的经验水平、目标任务的性质等。规划谬误的应对策略主要有与过去的经验相联系、从第三人称视角进行估计、任务分解及时间分配。未来的研究主要从规划谬误与策略性误解、乐观偏差、过分自信的关系, 规划谬误的产生根源、规划谬误的跨文化研究、规划谬误的研究范围及应用领域等方面进一步探讨。     

The conjunction fallacy and the many meanings of and

According to the conjunction rule, the probability of A and B cannot exceed the probability of either single event. This rule reads and in terms of the logical operator wedge, interpreting A and B as an intersection of two events. As linguists have long argued, in natural language "and" can convey a wide range of relationships between conjuncts such as temporal order ("I went to the store and bought some whisky"), causal relationships ("Smile and the world smiles with you"), and can indicate a collection of sets rather than their intersection (as in "He invited friends and colleagues to the party"). When "and" is used in word problems researching the conjunction fallacy, the conjunction rule, which assumes the logical operator wedge, therefore cannot be mechanically invoked as a norm. Across several studies, we used different methods of probing people's understanding of and-conjunctions, and found evidence that many of those respondents who violated the conjunction rule in their probability or frequency judgments inferred a meaning of and that differs from the logical operator wedge. We argue that these findings have implications for whether judgments involving ambiguous and-conjunctions that violate the conjunction rule should be considered manifestations of fallacious reasoning or of reasonable pragmatic and semantic inferences.     

Testing boundary conditions for the conjunction fallacy: effects of response mode, conceptual focus, and problem type

Two experiments used within-subject designs to examine how conjunction errors depend on the use of (1) choice versus estimation tasks, (2) probability versus frequency language, and (3) conjunctions of two likely events versus conjunctions of likely and unlikely events. All problems included a three-option format verified to minimize misinterpretation of the base event. In both experiments, conjunction errors were reduced when likely events were conjoined. Conjunction errors were also reduced for estimations compared with choices, with this reduction greater for likely conjuncts, an interaction effect. Shifting conceptual focus from probabilities to frequencies did not affect conjunction error rates. Analyses of numerical estimates for a subset of the problems provided support for the use of three general models by participants for generating estimates. Strikingly, the order in which the two tasks were carried out did not affect the pattern of results, supporting the idea that the mode of responding strongly determines the mode of thinking about conjunctions and hence the occurrence of the conjunction fallacy. These findings were evaluated in terms of implications for rationality of human judgment and reasoning.     

An Invitation to Behavior Analysts: Review of in Search of Memory: The Emergence of A New Science of Mind by Eric R. Kandel

This fascinating autobiography and multifaceted case history in neuroscience research is accessible to laymen and potentially instructive to working scientists. Kandel takes the reader through his thought processes as he describes experiments that led to some of the past decades'' major neuroscience discoveries (some highlights of which are summarized in the review''s Appendix), and eventually to his Nobel Prize. The review analyzes some of the terminological and conceptual issues that have often inhibited communication between behavior analysts and neuroscientists, with special attention to some of Bennett and Hacker''s admonitions viewed from the perspective of language evolution and linguistics. The review then discusses opportunities for behavior analysts to collaborate with neuroscientists by applying behavioral contingency analysis to help specify the independent variables of neuroscience experiments described by Kandel. Finally, it examines Kandel''s provocative heuristics for locating important research problems, and the lessons that can be gleaned from the book regarding the attributes of potentially great achievers.     

Poisoning the Well

In this paper it is shown is that although poisoning the well has generally been treated as a species of ad hominem fallacy, when you try to analyze the fallacy using ad hominem schemes, even by supplementing with related schemes like argument from position to know, the analysis ultimately fails. The main argument of the paper is taken up with proving this negative claim by applying these schemes to examples of arguments associated with the fallacy of poisoning the well. Although there is a positive finding in this quest, in that poisoning the well is shown to be based on and associated with these forms of argument in interesting ways, the paper in the end is led to the conclusion that the fallacy is irreducibly dialectical. Poisoning the well is thus analyzed as a tactic to silence an opponent violating her right to put forward arguments on an issue both parties have agreed to discuss at the confrontation stage of a critical discussion. It is concluded that it is a special form of strategic attack used by one party in the argumentation stage of a critical discussion to improperly shut down the capability of the other party for putting forward arguments of the kind needed to properly move the discussion forward.     

Strategic Maneuvering: A Synthetic Recapitulation

As an introduction to the special issue on Perspectives on Strategic Maneuvering, this article provides a synthetic recapitulation of the various steps that were taken in developing the pragma-dialectical theory of strategic maneuvering. First, the concept of strategic maneuvering is described as a means to reconcile the simultaneous pursuit of dialectical and rhetorical aims. Second, strategic maneuvering is related to the various kinds of argumentative activity types in which it takes place. Third, the concept of dialectical profiles is discussed and the parameters that are pertinent to distinguishing between different types of strategic maneuvering. Fourth, the fallacies are viewed as derailment of strategic maneuvering. Fifth, as a case in point, strategic maneuvering with inconsistency is examined. This contribution brings together insights that earlier were put forward in a number of separate publications.     

From Figure to Argument: <Emphasis Type="Italic">Contrarium</Emphasis> in Roman Rhetoric

In Roman rhetoric, contrarium was variably considered either a figure of speech or an argument. The paper examines the logical pattern of this type of argument, which according to Cicero is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged ‹incompatibility’ forming its major premiss. Yet this appears to be the argument’s weak point, as the ‹incompatibilities’ employed generally hold for the most part only, and are reducible to topical argument schemes. This is why in practical usage such arguments are most often phrased as rhetorical questions, the persuasive force of which, enhanced by certain strategical maneuverings and fallacies, makes the audience swallow the argument.     

Naturalistic Explanations of Apodictic Moral Claims: Brentano’s Ethical Intuitionism and Nietzsche’s Naturalism

In this article (1) I extract from Brentano’s works (three) formal arguments against “genealogical explanations” of ethical claims. Such explanation can also be designated as “naturalism” (not his appellation); (2) I counter these arguments, by showing how genealogical explanations of even apodictic moral claims are logically possible (albeit only if certain unlikely, stringent conditions are met); (3) I show how Nietzsche’s ethics meets these stringent conditions, but evolutionary ethics does not. My more general thesis is that naturalism and intuitionism in ethics need not be mutually incompatible.