Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.     

Begging what is at issue in the argument

This paper objects to treating begging the question as circular reasoning. It argues that what is at issue in the argument is not to be confused with the claim or position that the arguer is adopting, and that logicians from Aristotle on give the wrong definition and have difficulty making sense of the fallacy because they try to define it in terms of how an argument is defined by logical theory - as a sequence consisting of premises followed by a conclusion. That the problematic about begging the question depends on treating an argument as a context-less sequence of statements seems to be anticipated by the pragma-dialectical approach. The paper offers a critique of this dialogical approach, as exemplified by Douglas Walton in his recent book on begging the question, on the grounds that it raises more problems than it solves. It concludes with the suggestion that what is really at issue in discussions of begging the question is the need for a theory of fallacy.     

Contexts of Begging the Question

In this paper a dialogical account of begging the question is applied to various contexts which are not obviously dialogues: - reading prose, working through a deductive system, presenting a legal case, and thinking to oneself. The account is then compared with that in chapter eight of D. Walton'sBegging the Question (New York; Greenwood, 1991).     

Contexts as switchmen: The variable effects of formal and informal instructional strategies on student achievement

This study presents an exploratory theoretical framework that analyzes the extent by which the contexts of classroom instruction mediate the effects of instructional strategies on achievement. The study first presents the two main tasks that teachers face in classrooms-teaching, and controlling the social order. The study then elaborates on formal and informal instructional strategies that teachers use to manage these tasks. The main foci of the study is to show that the effects of these different instructional strategies on student achievements vary by grade level. The results suggest that the contexts of instruction determine the magnitude and direction of the effects of instructional strategies on achievement. Positive effects on student achievement appear when a functional congruence occurs between teachers' instructional strategies and the contexts wherein they are used. The analyses suggest that changes in the cognitive, social, and institutional contexts of classrooms may change the relative efficacy of specific instructional strategies. Consequently, researchers should pay more attention to the changes in the sociology of classrooms during students' school careers. This study was supported by a post-doctoral fellowship from the Fulbright Foundation and by a small research grant from The Spencer Foundation. My wholehearted appreciation is given to the support I received from the Foundations. I am especially grateful to Charles Bidwell from the University of Chicago, who encouraged me to pursue this study during my post-doctoral visit in 1994–95. Discussions with Benjamin Wright and his warm support have been more than essential. The hospitality and the academic environment at the NORC and the University of Chicago have done wonders to the fruition of ideas advanced in this study. Yechezkel Dar and Ruth Butler made suggestions to the improvement of this article. Daniel Shalem and Rivka Berman assisted with editorial as well as substantive comments. The reviewers ofSocial Psychology of Education insightfully suggested ways to improve the final version.     

Urban American Indian Community Perspectives on Resources and Challenges for Youth Suicide Prevention

American Indian (AI) youth have some of the highest rates of suicide of any group in the United States, and the majority of AI youth live in urban areas away from tribal communities. As such, understanding the resources available for suicide prevention among urban AI youth is critical, as is understanding the challenges involved in accessing such resources. Pre‐existing interview data from 15 self‐identified AI community members and staff from an Urban Indian Health Organization were examined to understand existing resources for urban AI youth suicide prevention, as well as related challenges. A thematic analysis was undertaken, resulting in three principal themes around suicide prevention: formal resources, informal resources, and community values and beliefs. Formal resources that meet the needs of AI youth were viewed as largely inaccessible or nonexistent, and youth were seen as more likely to seek help from informal sources. Community values of mutual support were thought to reinforce available informal supports. However, challenges arose in terms of the community's knowledge of and views on discussing suicide, as well as the perceived fit between community values and beliefs and formal prevention models.     

Deductive schemas with uncertain premises using qualitative probability expressions

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning redirects the investigation of deduction conceptually and methodologically because the premises and the conclusion of the inferences are assumed to be uncertain. A probabilistic counterpart of the concept of logical validity and a method to assess whether individuals comply with it must be defined. Conceptually, we used de Finetti's coherence as a normative framework to assess individuals' performance. Methodologically, we presented inference schemas whose premises had various levels of probability that contained non-numerical expressions (e.g., “the chances are high”) and, as a control, sure levels. Depending on the inference schemas, from 60% to 80% of the participants produced coherent conclusions when the premises were uncertain. The data also show that (1) except for schemas involving conjunction, performance was consistently lower with certain than uncertain premises, (2) the rate of conjunction fallacy was consistently low (not exceeding 20%, even with sure premises), and (3) participants' interpretation of the conditional agreed with de Finetti's “conditional event” but not with the material conditional.     

Towards a pattern-based logic of probability judgements and logical inclusion “fallacies”

Probability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy (CF) if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic (BL) provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies (IFs). A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 uses data where BL makes dominant predictions; Experiment 2's predictions were less clear, and we additionally investigated judgements about the second-most probable hypotheses. The results corroborated a pattern-probability account and cannot be easily explained by other theories of CFs (e.g. inverse probability, confirmation). IFs were not limited to conjunctions, but rather occurred systematically for several logical connectives. Thus, pattern-based probability judgements about logical relations may constitute a basic class of intuitive but potentially rational probability judgements.     

Age and probabilistic reasoning: Biases in conjunctive,disjunctive and Bayesian judgements in early and late adulthood

Probabilistic reasoning plays an essential part in many aspects of our daily routine and it has been argued that as we grow older, the need to make judgements under uncertainty becomes increasingly important. Two studies were conducted to establish whether the propensity to commit probabilistic reasoning errors increased with age. Young (aged 16–24), middle aged (25–54), and older persons (55 years and above) were included. Study 1 revealed systematic biases and errors across a range of judgement tasks. However, no evidence of any age effect in Bayesian inference, the incidence of the conjunction fallacy, or in the number of disjunction errors was found. The results obtained in Study 1 were replicated in Study 2, where the potential mediating role of working memory processes and intellectual capacity were explicitly assessed. While some aspects of probabilistic reasoning performance were correlated with measures of intelligence and working memory functioning among young adults, this was much less evident in older persons. The present findings are discussed in relation to the evolution of the dualistic heuristic–analytical system over the adult lifespan. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Demarcation and the Scientistic Fallacy

Abstract. For many theologians and philosophers, scientism is among the greatest of intellectual sins. In its most commonly cited form, scientism consists in claiming that science is the only source of real knowledge and, therefore, that what science does not discover does not exist. Because the charge of scientism is frequently levied, it is important to be clear about what exactly is being claimed in its name. I argue that scientism can best be understood as a fallacy, specifically as a kind of category mistake. Being clear about this requires an examination of the relationship of scientism to the question of demarcation between science and nonscience, a question that has potential implications for theology.     

Reconsidering Contentious Argument: Augustus DeMorgan on Fallacy

This essay examines Augustus DeMorgan's chapter on fallacy in his Formal Logic (1847) in order to show how DeMorgan's treatment represents an expansion and advance upon Aristotle. It is important that Aristotle clearly distinguishes among dialectical, didactic, demonstrative, and contentious types of argument, based upon the acceptability of premises and the aims of participants. Appropriating Aristotle's list of fallacies, DeMorgan discusses examples that reveal how the charge and countercharge of fallacy function in contentious argument, which is more widespread than Aristotle imagined. DeMorgan's treatment of fallacy is in the spirit of Aristotle because of its focus on dialogue arguments, but it represents an advance because it expands the possible scenes of contention and shows how unshared premises and the will to win inform many argument situations. The emphasis on contention in natural-language argument puts DeMorgan in the company of his l9th century peers, Mill and Whately.