Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.     

The ‘conjunction fallacy’ revisited: how intelligent inferences look like reasoning errors

Findings in recent research on the ‘conjunction fallacy’ have been taken as evidence that our minds are not designed to work by the rules of probability. This conclusion springs from the idea that norms should be content‐blind—in the present case, the assumption that sound reasoning requires following the conjunction rule of probability theory. But content‐blind norms overlook some of the intelligent ways in which humans deal with uncertainty, for instance, when drawing semantic and pragmatic inferences. In a series of studies, we first show that people infer nonmathematical meanings of the polysemous term ‘probability’ in the classic Linda conjunction problem. We then demonstrate that one can design contexts in which people infer mathematical meanings of the term and are therefore more likely to conform to the conjunction rule. Finally, we report evidence that the term ‘frequency’ narrows the spectrum of possible interpretations of ‘probability’ down to its mathematical meanings, and that this fact—rather than the presence or absence of ‘extensional cues’—accounts for the low proportion of violations of the conjunction rule when people are asked for frequency judgments. We conclude that a failure to recognize the human capacity for semantic and pragmatic inference can lead rational responses to be misclassified as fallacies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Otto did not extend his mind,but might have: Dynamic systems theory and social-cultural group selection

Proponents of cognitive Situationism argue that the human mind is embodied, embedded in both natural and social-cultural environments and extended creating both extended and distributed cognition. Anti-situationists reject all or some of these claims. I argue that four major objections to extended cognition: (1) the mark of the cognitive, (2) the function-identity fallacy, (3) cognitive bloat, and (4) scientific irrelevance lose much of their sting in the case of distributed cognition, the extension of cognitive agency to a group of cognitive agents, such as a scientific research team. However, I claim that a crucial fifth challenge, that advocates of the extended mind commit the causal-constitution fallacy, has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. I focus on Spyridon Palermos’ use of dynamic systems theory to refute this charge and I argue that his appeal to dynamic systems theory as a way of understanding system-constitution fails. Instead, I suggest a social-cultural group selection hypothesis for understanding system-constitution. But, I leave it for another day to elaborate that hypothesis’ empirical plausibility.     

The illusion of replacement in research into the development of thinking biases: the case of the conjunction fallacy

The conjunction fallacy is a violation of a very basic rule of probability. Interestingly, although committing the fallacy seems irrational, adults are no less susceptible to the fallacy than young children. In Experiment 1, by employing tasks where the conjunctive response option involved two non-representative items, we found a large reduction in fallacy rates as compared to traditional conjunction fallacy problems. Nevertheless, fallacy rates remained relatively high in both adolescents and adults, although adults showed more consistency in their normative responses. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that children’s relatively good performance on the task was not the consequence of their missing knowledge of social stereotypes. Additionally, children were more strongly affected by explicitly presented frequency information than adults. Indeed, adults only took frequency information into account when frequencies were made relevant by a training in probabilistic reasoning. Overall, the results suggest that whereas the potential for normative reasoning increases with development, this potential is often overshadowed by a pervasive tendency in adolescence and adulthood to rely on contextual information, knowledge, and beliefs, even when conflicting information is available. By contrast, children are more strongly influenced by explicitly presented information than relevant knowledge cued by the tasks.     

A belief in trend reversal requires access to cognitive resources

There are two research traditions studying people's reactions to random binary events: one concerns serial choice reaction times, the other concerns predictions of events in a series. The present studies focused on comparing expectations between these two approaches. We formed and tested a general hypothesis that, regardless of the type of task, when an individual faces a sequence of events they initially expect trend continuation. Only when people assume that a sequence is random might they override the default and expect trend reversal instead. In a series of experiments we found that limitation of access to cognitive resources enhances expectations of trend continuation. Our interpretation of this finding is that an expectation of trend continuation is the default for the human cognitive system and that a belief in trend reversal requires access to cognitive resources to overcome the tendency to expect trend continuation.     

Old Wine in New Bottles? The Case of Self‐compassion and Neuroticism

Research on self‐compassion, which is defined as being understanding and kind to oneself when confronted with negative experiences, has produced an impressive number of articles in recent years. This research shows that individual differences in self‐compassion, as measured by the Self‐Compassion Scale (SCS), are positively related to life satisfaction, health and social functioning. However, a critical and systematic test of self‐compassion from a personality perspective has not yet conducted so far. In the present study (N = 576), we (i) tested the factor structure of the SCS, (ii) examined the distinctiveness of self‐compassion with regard to the five‐factor model of personality, focusing on neuroticism, and (iii) tested the incremental predictive power of self‐compassion beyond the five‐factor model in the context of life satisfaction. Confirmatory factor analyses supported a two‐factor plus six facets solution of self‐compassion (a positive factor and a negative factor). Additional analyses revealed that the negative factor was redundant with facets of neuroticism (rs ≥ .85), whereas the positive factor had some unique variance left. However, neither the negative factor nor the positive factor could explain substantial incremental variance in life satisfaction beyond neuroticism. Recommendations for how to use the SCS are provided, and the future of research on self‐compassion is discussed. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Disjunction and conjunction fallacies in episodic memory

It has recently been found that episodic memory displays analogues of the well-known disjunction and conjunction fallacies of probability judgement. The aim of the present research was, for the first time, to study these memory fallacies together under the same conditions, and test theoretical predictions about the reasons for each. The focus was on predictions about the influence of semantic gist, target versus context recollection, and proactive versus retroactive interference. Disjunction and conjunction fallacies increased in conditions in which subjects were able to form semantic connections among list words. In addition, disjunction fallacies were increased by manipulations that minimised proactive interference, whereas conjunction fallacies were increased by manipulations that minimised retroactive interference. That pattern suggests that disjunction fallacies are more dependent on target recollection, whereas conjunction fallacies are more dependent on context recollection.     

Paranormal belief and errors of probabilistic reasoning: The role of constituent conditional relatedness in believers' susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy

The present study examines the extent to which stronger belief in either extrasensory perception, psychokinesis or life-after-death is associated with a proneness to making conjunction errors (CEs). One hundred and sixty members of the UK public read eight hypothetical scenarios and for each estimated the likelihood that two constituent events alone plus their conjunction would occur. The impact of paranormal belief plus constituents’ conditional relatedness type, estimates of the subjectively less likely and more likely constituents plus relevant interaction terms tested via three Generalized Linear Mixed Models. General qualification levels were controlled for. As expected, stronger PK beliefs and depiction of a positively conditionally related (verses conditionally unrelated) constituent pairs predicted higher CE generation. ESP and LAD beliefs had no impact with, surprisingly, higher estimates of the less likely constituent predicting fewer - not more - CEs. Theoretical implications, methodological issues and ideas for future research are discussed.     

Psychics,aliens, or experience? Using the Anomalistic Belief Scale to examine the relationship between type of belief and probabilistic reasoning

A growing body of research has shown people who hold anomalistic (e.g., paranormal) beliefs may differ from nonbelievers in their propensity to make probabilistic reasoning errors. The current study explored the relationship between these beliefs and performance through the development of a new measure of anomalistic belief, called the Anomalistic Belief Scale (ABS). One key feature of the ABS is that it includes a balance of both experiential and theoretical belief items. Another aim of the study was to use the ABS to investigate the relationship between belief and probabilistic reasoning errors on conjunction fallacy tasks. As expected, results showed there was a relationship between anomalistic belief and propensity to commit the conjunction fallacy. Importantly, regression analyses on the factors that make up the ABS showed that the relationship between anomalistic belief and probabilistic reasoning occurred only for beliefs about having experienced anomalistic phenomena, and not for theoretical anomalistic beliefs.     

A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF PLURALISM IN TEXT INTERPRETATION

Abstract: I take a pragmatic approach to what interpreters do when they interpret and argue that critical pluralists have focused almost exclusively on one aspect of interpretation: the fact that it is an event taking place in a historical and cultural milieu that influences the many ways interpreters approach a given text. However, there is also in interpretation a pragmatic aspect: the fact that it is an act performed by individuals who, through the utterance of their statements, implicitly make claims, for example, regarding the truth of their interpretation. In the first part I explain what critical pluralists overlook and the consequences of such oversight. In the second part I indicate how the validity of interpretation can be assessed.