The Method of Socratic Proofs for Modal Propositional Logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4F,S4R,S4M and G

The aim of this paper is to present the method of Socratic proofs for seven modal propositional logics: K5, S4.2, S4.3, S4M, S4F, S4R and G. This work is an extension of [10] where the method was presented for the most common modal propositional logics: K, D, T, KB, K4, S4 and S5. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Believing one’s reasons are good

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called “Inferential Internalist” principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper (1) articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, (2) motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, (3) defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and (4) shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility.     

Kinesis and Energeia—and What Follows. Outline of a Typology of Human Actions

This paper presents a typology of human actions, based on Aristotle’s kinesis–energeia dichotomy and on a formal elaboration (with some refinement) of the Vendler–Kenny classificatory schemes for action types (or action verbs). The types introduced are defined throughout by inferential criteria, in terms of what here are referred to as “modal-temporal expressions” (‘MT-terms’). Examples of familiar categories analysed in this way are production and maintenance, but the procedure is meant to offer a basis for defining various other commonsense categories. Among the more theoretical categories introduced are “Aristotelian projects”, i.e. actions defined in terms of Aristotle’s conceptions of movement/change, as well as “abstract projects”, in which the agent ensures that something changes from not being a fact to being a fact, and “conditional agency”, which involves actions that are to be performed when/if certain conditions come to be fulfilled. A category like “starting an action” is itself inferentially defined here in MT-terms, and so, inter alia, are proceeding with, finishing, stopping and interrupting an action. There is also a demonstration of how actions of one type may be converted into those of other types, where this is a matter of the way they are “seen” or described. There is also an implication to the effect that some of these distinctions may be useful for formulating certain critical insights regarding modern life.

Lost in dissociation: The main paradigms in unconscious cognition

Contemporary studies in unconscious cognition are essentially founded on dissociation, i.e., on how it dissociates with respect to conscious mental processes and representations. This is claimed to be in so many and diverse ways that one is often lost in dissociation. In order to reduce this state of confusion we here carry out two major tasks: based on the central distinction between cognitive processes and representations, we identify and isolate the main dissociation paradigms; we then critically analyze their key tenets and reported findings.     

The Development of an Analytic Perspective in the Group Leader: Some Basic Thoughts

Previous experience working with individuals on a one-to-one basis along with previous analytic therapy are important prerequisites for analytic group training. Training must emphasize understanding of group-as-a-whole processes, such as basic assumption life, complex transference manifestations, as well as awareness of one's countertransference toward individuals, subgroups and the group-as-a-whole. Specific concepts derived from object-relations theory such as projective identification are crucial to master. Personal analytic group therapy is recommended.     

行为金融学与心理学

由于理性经济人假设与实际的偏差,经典现代金融学遇到了一些被称为“未解之谜”的现实问题。行为金融学是从人们的实际决策行为出发来研究和解释金融市场的相关问题。因此,心理学的研究成果就成为行为金融学研究必不可少的基础。与投资者信念、偏好以及决策相关的情感心理学、认知心理学和社会心理学的研究成果在行为金融学各领域得到了广泛的应用。金融学与心理学两个领域的密切合作将推动行为金融学的进一步发展。     

On the minimal relative motion principle—lateral displacement of a contracting bar

Xausa, Beghi, and Zanforlin (J. Math. Psychol. 45(4) (2001) 635) provide an account of perceptual organization based on their ‘minimal relative motion’ principle. They claim that this principle can account for the percept generated by a contracting bar that is simultaneously translating laterally. We critique the mathematical analysis provided in the aforementioned paper. We conclude that the ‘minimal relative motion’ principle, in the form presented, cannot adequately explain the percept reported by observers.     

Communicative impairment in traumatic brain injury: a complete pragmatic assessment

The aim of the present study was to examine the communicative abilities of traumatic brain injury patients (TBI). We wish to provide a complete assessment of their communicative ability/disability using a new experimental protocol, the Assessment Battery of Communication, (ABaCo) comprising five scales—linguistic, extralinguistic, paralinguistic, context and conversational—which investigate all the main pragmatic elements involved in a communicative exchange. The ABaCo was administered to 21 TBI subjects and to a control group. The results showed that performance by TBI patients was worse than that of controls on all scales; moreover they showed a trend of increasing difficulty in understanding and producing different pragmatic phenomena, i.e., standard communication acts, deceits and ironies, whether such phenomena are expressed through the linguistic or extralinguistic modality.     

Cognitive bias modification for inferential style

In this study, we developed a cognitive bias modification procedure that targets inferential style, and tested its effect on hope, mood, and self-esteem. Participants were randomly assigned to training conditions intended to encourage either a negative or a positive inferential style. Participants’ inferences for their failure on a cognitive challenge were congruent with their training condition. Moreover, compared to participants in the positive training condition, those in the negative condition reported less hope and exhibited lower mood and self-esteem following the failure. Finally, the training affected mood and self-esteem indirectly via its effect on participants’ inferences for their failure. These findings provide support for the causal role of inferential style in depressed affect.     

Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition?

Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct.