Learning from experience in case conference: A Bionian approach to teaching and consulting

In case conferences as well as didactic seminars, the power of the group can bring psychoanalytic education to life. However, primitive anxieties activated by group dynamics may also interfere with teaching and learning. The authors offer the example of a stalemated private practice case conference that had unconsciously organized against learning as the members began to read Bion's work. The case conference leader, an analyst, presented her case conference, which was mired in basic assumption dependency dynamics, to our peer consultation group. Drawing upon Bion's early contributions on groups, as well as his later ideas about thinking and mental growth, the peer group facilitated the case conference's return to work-group functioning and learning from experience. Activated in the peer group, commensal container↔contained processes gradually spread throughout the entire relational system of peer group, case-conference leader, case-conference members, and patients. This example underscores the importance of promoting within our institutes a culture in which faculty view themselves as part of an evolving intersubjective matrix that works to foster the containing capacities of candidates, patients, and faculty alike.     

BION'S THINKING ABOUT GROUPS: A STUDY OF INFLUENCE AND ORIGINALITY

One of Bion's least‐acknowledged contributions to psychoanalytic theory is his study of the relationship between the mind of the individual (the ability to think), the mentalities of groups of which the individual is a member, and the individual's bodily states. Bion's early work on group therapy evolved into a study of the interplay between mind and bodily instincts associated with being a member of a group, and became the impetus for his theory of thinking. On the foundation of Bion's ideas concerning this interaction among the thinking of the individual, group mentality, and the psyche‐soma, the author presents his thoughts on the ways in which group mentality is recognizable in the analysis of individuals.     

Philosophical Method and Intuitions as Assumptions

Many philosophers claim to employ intuitions in their philosophical arguments. Others contest that no such intuitions are used frequently or at all in philosophy. This article suggests and defends a conception of intuitions as part of the philosophical method: intuitions are special types of philosophical assumptions to which we are invited to assent, often as premises in argument, that may serve an independent function in philosophical argument and that are not formed through a purely inferential process. A series of philosophical case studies shows that intuitions in these arguments contain the relevant features. The view has implications for philosophical method, offering a compromise between opponents on the divisive debate of the merits of experimental philosophy: experimental philosophy provides an especially useful role in philosophical assumption analysis.     

Rejoinder: Remaining Challenges in Investigating Grade-Retention Effectiveness

This rejoinder, in response to the commentaries of Steiner, Park, and Kim (this issue) and Reshetnyak, Cham, and Hughes (this issue), discusses remaining challenges in grade retention research. First, a same-age comparison assumes that the instruments used in different grades measure ability equally well. We discuss the importance of evaluating the properties of the scaling process to address whether this assumption has been met. Second, we discuss issues in the selection of covariates to be included in the weights. Third, we discuss the unconfoundedness assumption and the problem of remaining imbalance. Finally, we provide an empirical illustration showing that studying grade-retention effectiveness comes with multiple methodological decisions that are rooted in a bias–variance trade-off.     

The psychological puzzle of Sudoku

Sudoku puzzles, which are popular worldwide, require individuals to infer the missing digits in a 9 × 9 array according to the general rule that every digit from 1 to 9 must occur once in each row, in each column, and in each of the 3-by-3 boxes in the array. We present a theory of how individuals solve these puzzles. It postulates that they rely solely on pure deductions, and that they spontaneously acquire various deductive tactics, which differ in their difficulty depending on their “relational complexity”, i.e., the number of constraints on which they depend. A major strategic shift is necessary to acquire tactics for more difficult puzzles: solvers have to keep track of possible digits in a cell. We report three experiments corroborating this theory. We also discuss their implications for theories of reasoning that downplay the role of deduction in everyday reasoning.     

Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness

Phenomenal conservatism (PC) is the internalist view that non-inferential justification rests on appearances. PC’s advocates have recently argued that seemings are also required to explain inferential justification. The most developed view to this effect is Michael Huemer ’s theory of inferential seemings (ToIS). Luca Moretti has recently shown that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness, which makes PC open to sceptical challenges. In this paper I argue that ToIS is afflicted by a version of the same problem and it is thus hostage to inferential scepticism. I also suggest a possible response on behalf of ToIS’s advocates.     

Testing unidimensionality in polytomous Rasch models

A fundamental assumption of most IRT models is that items measure the same unidimensional latent construct. For the polytomous Rasch model two ways of testing this assumption against specific multidimensional alternatives are discussed. One, a marginal approach assuming a multidimensional parametric latent variable distribution, and, two, a conditional approach with no distributional assumptions about the latent variable. The second approach generalizes the Martin-Löf test for the dichotomous Rasch model in two ways: to polytomous items and to a test against an alternative that may have more than two dimensions. A study on occupational health is used to motivate and illustrate the methods.The authors would like to thank Niels Keiding, Klaus Larsen and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments to a previous version of this paper. This research was supported by a grant from the Danish Research Academy and by a general research grant from Quality Metric, Inc.     

Inferences by exclusion in the great apes: the effect of age and species

This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347–362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.This contribution is part of the special issue “Animal Logics” (Watanabe and Huber 2006).     

Professor Fisher on suppositions

I first support Alec Fisher's thesis that premises and conclusions in arguments can be unasserted first by arguing in its favor that only it preserves our intuition that it is at least possible that two arguments share the same premises and the same conclusion although not everything that is asserted in the one is also asserted in the other and second by answering two objections that might be raised against it. I then draw from Professor Fisher's thesis the consequence that in suppositional arguments the falsity (or unacceptability) of a supposition does not tell unfavorably in the evaluation of the argument, because the falsity (or unacceptability) of a (nonredundant) premise counts against an argument if and only if that premise is asserted. Finally, I observe that, despite the fact that they are neither expressed nor even alluded to, implicit assumptions in arguments are always asserted, unless the conclusion, but none of the explicit premisses, is unasserted. Hence, apart from an exceptional case of the kind just mentioned, the falsity (or unacceptability) of implicit assumptions always counts against an argument.I am indebted to Thomas E. Gilbert and Alec Fisher for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.     

记叙文时间转换机制

采用实时窗口阅读技术和再认探测技术,探讨了间断性时间短语与场景跨度的关系对时间转换的影响,对Zwaan提出的强印象假设与Anderson提出的场景模型进行检验。实验1探讨在与Zwaan实验材料相似长度的场景中人们是否会忽略对较短的非连续性时间标记的处理;实验2探讨在时间跨度较大的场景中,与Zwaan实验材料相似长度的间断性时间标记是否会引起时间的转换。结果表明时间信息的间断性只是产生时间转换的必要条件之一,而不是充分条件;读者在处理间断性的时间短语进行时间转换时还会参照时间短语的跨度与场景跨度的比例。