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Sheldon Chow 《Philosophical Psychology》2016,29(2):157-178
This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent to which everyday cognition is like scientific inference. In the end, I propose that quotidian cognition is indeed like scientific inference, but not precisely in the way Fodor claims it is. 相似文献
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We evaluate the hypothesis that children's diagnostic causal reasoning becomes more sophisticated as their understanding of uncertainty advances. When the causal status of candidate causes was known, 3- and 4-year-olds were capable of diagnostic inference (Experiment 1) and could revise their beliefs when told their initial diagnosis was incorrect (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, only 4-year-olds made successful inferences when the causal status of candidate causes was uncertain. The results suggest that by age 3, children appreciate that an effect can have multiple candidate causes, but it is not until age 4 that they begin to reason correctly when the causal status of candidate causes is unknown. 相似文献
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Kevin Scharp 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(1):43-61
The recent exchange between Robert Brandom and Jürgen Habermas provides an opportunity to compare and contrast some aspects of their systems. Both present broadly inferential accounts of meaning, according to which the content of an expression is determined by its role in an inferential network. Several problems confront such theories of meaning - one of which threatens the possibility of communication because content is relative to an individual's set of beliefs. Brandom acknowledges this problem and provides a solution to it. The point of this paper is to argue that it arises for Habermas's theory as well. I then present several solutions Habermas could adopt and evaluate their feasibility. The result is that Habermas must alter his theory of communicative action by contextualizing the standards for successful communication. 相似文献
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José Antonio Ruiz-Ballesteros Sergio Moreno-Ríos 《Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006)》2017,70(7):1140-1150
The present research evaluates how people integrate factual ‘if then’ and semifactual ‘even if’ conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: ‘A & B’ is conjectured and ‘not-A & B’ is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information. In Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, we evaluated each of these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants make inferences from two conditionals: two factual conditionals or one factual and one semifactual, with different representations. In Experiment 2, participants make inferences with a factual conditional followed by two different semifactual conditionals that share the same representations but differ in their epistemic status. Accuracy and latency data suggest that people think of both the conjectured and the presupposed situations, but do not codify the epistemic status of either when the task does not require it. The results are discussed through theoretical predictions about how people make inferences from different connected conditionals. 相似文献
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This study used fMRI to examine individual differences in the neural basis of causal inferencing. Participants with varying language skill levels, as indexed by scores on the vocabulary portion of the Nelson-Denny Reading Test, read four types of two-sentence passages in which causal relatedness (moderate and distant) and presence or absence of explicit clause connectives were orthogonally varied to manipulate coherence and cohesion during inference generation. Skilled readers showed better neural efficiency (less activation) during all context sentences and during all inference conditions. Increased activation in less-skilled readers was most extensively distributed in the right hemisphere (RH) homologues of left hemisphere (LH) language areas, especially in the most difficult passage types. Skilled readers also showed greater sensitivity to coherence (greater activation and synchronization in moderately related than distantly related passages) whereas less-skilled readers showed sensitivity to cohesion (greater activation and synchronization when clause connectives were present than when they were not). These finding support the hypothesis that skilled reading comprehension requires recruitment of the RH on an “as needed” basis. We describe the dynamic spillover hypothesis, a new theoretical framework that outlines the conditions under which RH language contributions are most likely evoked. 相似文献
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Why more can be less: An inference-based explanation for hyper-subadditivity in bundle valuation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Peter T.L. Popkowski Leszczyc John W. Pracejus Yingtao Shen 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2008,105(2):233-246
We conceptualize, develop, and test a multiple-item bundle valuation model through which decision makers are able to make inferences about the value of uncertain items based on the value of certain items. Results of four experiments indicate that bundling a low-value certain item with a high-value uncertain item, which are not substitutes, results in a bundle valuation lower than the value of the uncertain item alone. We refer to this highly unexpected and previously unexplained phenomenon as “hyper-subadditivity.” In addition we find that bundling a high-value certain item with a low-value uncertain item leads to superadditivity, even though the items are not complements. Hence, we find that when two objects are bundled together, and one has a more certain value, decision makers use the value of the certain item to infer the value of the less certain item. They might infer that the other (less certain) object must be worth an amount similar to the item with which they are paired. We further demonstrate that reducing uncertainty eliminates these effects, and that direct value inferencing (not simple numeric priming, nor inferences about quality) is the most likely mechanism driving these effects. 相似文献
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Owen Anderson 《Sophia》2008,47(2):201-222
In ‘The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology’ I argue that there are four important presuppositions
behind John Hick’s form of religious pluralism that successfully support it against what I call fideistic exclusivism. These
are i) the ought/can principle, ii) the universality of religious experience, iii) the universality of redemptive change,
and iv) a view of how God (the Eternal) would do things. I then argue that if these are more fully developed they support
a different kind of exclusivism, what I call rational exclusivism, and become defeaters for pluralism. In order to explain
rational exclusivism and its dependence on these presuppositions I consider philosophers J.P. Moreland, William Lane Craig,
and Alvin Plantinga, who offer arguments for their forms of exclusivism but I maintain that they continue to rely on fideism
at important points. I then give an example of how knowledge of the Eternal can be achieved.
相似文献
Owen AndersonEmail: |
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The thesis of underdetermination presents a major obstacle to the epistemological claims of scientific realism. That thesis
is regularly assumed in the philosophy of science, but is puzzlingly at odds with the actual history of science, in which
empirically adequate theories are thin on the ground. We propose to advance a case for scientific realism which concentrates
on the process of scientific reasoning rather than its theoretical products. Developing an account of causal–explanatory inference
will make it easier to resist the thesis of underdetermination. For, if we are not restricted to inference to the best explanation
only at the level of major theories, we will be able to acknowledge that there is a structure in data sets which imposes serious
constraints on possible theoretical alternatives. We describe how Differential Inference, a form of inference based on contrastive
explanation, can be used in order to generate causal hypotheses. We then go on to consider how experimental manipulation of
differences can be used to achieve Difference Closure, thereby confirming claims of causal efficacy and also eliminating possible
confounds. The model of Differential Inference outlined here shows at least one way in which it is possible to ‘reason from
the phenomena’. 相似文献