Body-size stigmatization by preschool girls: In a doll's world,it is good to be “Barbie”

A number of studies have measured body size stigmatization, that is, the assigning of negative characteristics to individuals who are considered fat, in samples of children as young as preschool-age. The results of such studies are fairly consistent, but may be criticized for the abstract nature of the line drawings typically used as test stimuli. In the present study the utility of using toy dolls to gauge young girls’ views toward different body shapes was assessed. Forty girls ages 3½–5½ were asked to assign various traits to one of three dolls (thin, average, and fat). As with previous work, responses fell out in a stereotypical pattern, with the positive characteristics attributed most often to the thin or average doll and all of the negative characteristics most often to the fat doll. The strengths and weaknesses of this doll paradigm in studies of body-size stigmatization by young children are discussed.     

Biased generalization of newly learned phonological alternations by 12-month-old infants

Previous work has suggested that learners are sensitive to phonetic similarity when learning phonological patterns (e.g.,  and ). We tested 12-month-old infants to see if their willingness to generalize newly learned phonological alternations depended on the phonetic similarity of the sounds involved. Infants were exposed to words in an artificial language whose distributions provided evidence for a phonological alternation between two relatively dissimilar sounds ([p ∼ v] or [t ∼ z]). Sounds at one place of articulation (labials or coronals) alternated whereas sounds at the other place of articulation were contrastive. At test, infants generalized the alternation learned during exposure to pairs of sounds that were more similar ([b ∼ v] or [d ∼ z]). Infants in a control group instead learned an alternation between similar sounds ([b ∼ v] or [d ∼ z]). When tested on dissimilar pairs of sounds ([p ∼ v] or [t ∼ z]), the control group did not generalize their learning to the novel sounds. The results are consistent with a learning bias favoring alternations between similar sounds over alternations between dissimilar sounds.     

Syntax and intentionality: An automatic link between language and theory-of-mind

Three studies provided evidence that syntax influences intentionality judgments. In Experiment 1, participants made either speeded or unspeeded intentionality judgments about ambiguously intentional subjects or objects. Participants were more likely to judge grammatical subjects as acting intentionally in the speeded relative to the reflective condition (thus showing an intentionality bias), but grammatical objects revealed the opposite pattern of results (thus showing an unintentionality bias). In Experiment 2, participants made an intentionality judgment about one of the two actors in a partially symmetric sentence (e.g., “John exchanged products with Susan”). The results revealed a tendency to treat the grammatical subject as acting more intentionally than the grammatical object. In Experiment 3 participants were encouraged to think about the events that such sentences typically refer to, and the tendency was significantly reduced. These results suggest a privileged relationship between language and central theory-of-mind concepts. More specifically, there may be two ways of determining intentionality judgments: (1) an automatic verbal bias to treat grammatical subjects (but not objects) as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful consideration of the events typically described by a sentence.     

Uncovering unknown unknowns: Towards a Baconian approach to management decision-making

Bayesian decision theory and inference have left a deep and indelible mark on the literature on management decision-making. There is however an important issue that the machinery of classical Bayesianism is ill equipped to deal with, that of “unknown unknowns” or, in the cases in which they are actualised, what are sometimes called “Black Swans”. This issue is closely related to the problems of constructing an appropriate state space under conditions of deficient foresight about what the future might hold, and our aim is to develop a theory and some of the practicalities of state space elaboration that addresses these problems. Building on ideas originally put forward by Bacon (1620), we show how our approach can be used to build and explore the state space, how it may reduce the extent to which organisations are blindsided by Black Swans, and how it ameliorates various well-known cognitive biases.     

There are at least two kinds of probability matching: evidence from a secondary task

Probability matching is a suboptimal behavior that often plagues human decision-making in simple repeated choice tasks. Despite decades of research, recent studies cannot find agreement on what choice strategies lead to probability matching. We propose a solution, showing that two distinct local choice strategies—which make different demands on executive resources—both result in probability-matching behavior on a global level. By placing participants in a simple binary prediction task under dual- versus single-task conditions, we find that individuals with compromised executive resources are driven away from a one-trial-back strategy (utilized by participants with intact executive resources) and towards a strategy that integrates a longer window of past outcomes into the current prediction. Crucially, both groups of participants exhibited probability-matching behavior to the same extent at a global level of analysis. We suggest that these two forms of probability matching are byproducts of the operation of explicit versus implicit systems.     

A Bayesian Model of Biases in Artificial Language Learning: The Case of a Word‐Order Universal

In this article, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian model of learning in a general type of artificial language‐learning experiment in which learners are exposed to a mixture of grammars representing the variation present in real learners’ input, particularly at times of language change. The modeling goal is to formalize and quantify hypothesized learning biases. The test case is an experiment ( Culbertson, Smolensky, & Legendre, 2012 ) targeting the learning of word‐order patterns in the nominal domain. The model identifies internal biases of the experimental participants, providing evidence that learners impose (possibly arbitrary) properties on the grammars they learn, potentially resulting in the cross‐linguistic regularities known as typological universals. Learners exposed to mixtures of artificial grammars tended to shift those mixtures in certain ways rather than others; the model reveals how learners’ inferences are systematically affected by specific prior biases. These biases are in line with a typological generalization—Greenberg's Universal 18—which bans a particular word‐order pattern relating nouns, adjectives, and numerals.     

Attentional bias toward waiting time information among individuals with high and low trait self-control when making intertemporal choices

ABSTRACT

The present study aimed to explore whether the modulation effects of attentional biases toward time information representing immediate rewards and delayed rewards differ between individuals with high and low trait self-control. Forty participants with high trait self-control and 40 with low trait self-control were selected based on their responses to the Chinese version of the self-control scale, and they were asked to complete an intertemporal choice task and dot probe task first and then a cue-target task a week later. The results showed that the participants with low trait self-control were more likely to choose immediate rewards than participants with high trait self-control. Furthermore, facilitated attention and difficulty in attention disengagement toward present-related words were found among participants with low trait self-control with higher frequency than among those with high trait self-control. Finally, facilitated attention toward present-related words moderated the indifference points among the participants with low trait self-control.     

How do people learn from negative evidence? Non-monotonic generalizations and sampling assumptions in inductive reasoning

A robust finding in category-based induction tasks is for positive observations to raise the willingness to generalize to other categories while negative observations lower the willingness to generalize. This pattern is referred to as monotonic generalization. Across three experiments we find systematic non-monotonicity effects, in which negative observations raise the willingness to generalize. Experiments 1 and 2 show that this effect emerges in hierarchically structured domains when a negative observation from a different category is added to a positive observation. They also demonstrate that this is related to a specific kind of shift in the reasoner’s hypothesis space. Experiment 3 shows that the effect depends on the assumptions that the reasoner makes about how inductive arguments are constructed. Non-monotonic reasoning occurs when people believe the facts were put together by a helpful communicator, but monotonicity is restored when they believe the observations were sampled randomly from the environment.     

PALEY'S iPOD: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF THE DESIGN ARGUMENT WITHIN NATURAL THEOLOGY

The argument from design stands as one of the most intuitively compelling arguments for the existence of a divine Creator. Yet, for many scientists and philosophers, Hume's critique and Darwin's theory of natural selection have definitely undermined the idea that we can draw any analogy from design in artifacts to design in nature. Here, we examine empirical studies from developmental and experimental psychology to investigate the cognitive basis of the design argument. From this it becomes clear that humans spontaneously discern purpose in nature. When constructed theologically and philosophically correctly, the design argument is not presented as conclusive evidence for God's existence but rather as an abductive, probabilistic argument. We examine the cognitive basis of probabilistic judgments in relationship to natural theology. Placing emphasis on how people assess improbable events, we clarify the intuitive appeal of Paley's watch analogy. We conclude that the reason why some scientists find the design argument compelling and others do not lies not in any intrinsic differences in assessing design in nature but rather in the prior probability they place on complexity being produced by chance events or by a Creator. This difference provides atheists and theists with a rational basis for disagreement.