Beliefs as signals: A new function for belief

Beliefs serve at least two broad functions. First, they help us navigate the world. Second, they serve as signals to manipulate others. Philosophers and psychologists have focused on the first function while largely overlooking the second. This article advances a conception of signals and makes a prima facie case for a social signaling function for at least some beliefs. Truth and rational support are often irrelevant to the signaling function. If some beliefs evolved for a signaling function, then we should expect various biases that aid in the manipulation of others.     

Visualising mental representations: A primer on noise-based reverse correlation in social psychology

With the introduction of the psychophysical method of reverse correlation, a holy grail of social psychology appears to be within reach – visualising mental representations. Reverse correlation is a data-driven method that yields visual proxies of mental representations, based on judgements of randomly varying stimuli. This review is a primer to an influential reverse correlation approach in which stimuli vary by applying random noise to the pixels of images. Our review suggests that the technique is an invaluable tool in the investigation of social perception (e.g., in the perception of race, gender and personality traits), with ample potential applications. However, it is unclear how these visual proxies are best interpreted. Building on advances in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that these proxies are visual reflections of the internal representations that determine how social stimuli are perceived. In addition, we provide a tutorial on how to perform reverse correlation experiments using R.     

The cognitive reflection test revisited: exploring the ways individuals solve the test

Individuals’ propensity not to override the first answer that comes to mind is thought to be a crucial cause behind many failures in reasoning. In the present study, we aimed to explore the strategies used and the abilities employed when individuals solve the cognitive reflection test (CRT), the most widely used measure of this tendency. Alongside individual differences measures, protocol analysis was employed to unfold the steps of the reasoning process in solving the CRT. This exploration revealed that there are several ways people solve or fail the test. Importantly, 77% of the cases in which reasoners gave the correct final answer in our protocol analysis, they started their response with the correct answer or with a line of thought which led to the correct answer. We also found that 39% of the incorrect responders reflected on their first response. The findings indicate that the suppression of the first answer may not be the only crucial feature of reflectivity in the CRT and that the lack of relevant knowledge is a prominent cause of the reasoning errors. Additionally, we confirmed that the CRT is a multi-faceted construct: both numeracy and reflectivity account for performance. The results can help to better apprehend the “whys and whens” of the decision errors in heuristics and biases tasks and to further refine existing explanatory models.     

Individual differences in working memory capacity and resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning

In two experiments, we investigated the possibility that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) would provide resistance to belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. In Experiment 1 (N?=?157), participants showed a belief bias effect in that they had longer response times and decreased accuracy on syllogisms with conflict between the validity and believability of the conclusion than on syllogisms with no such conflict. However, this effect did not differ as a function of individual differences in WMC. Experiment 2 (N?=?122) replicated this effect with the addition of decontextualized (i.e., nonsense) syllogisms as a different means of measuring the magnitude of the belief bias effect. Although individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence were related to better reasoning overall, the magnitude of the belief bias effect was not smaller for participants with greater WMC. The present study offers two novel findings: (a) The belief bias effect is independent of individual differences in WMC and fluid intelligence, and (b) resolving conflict in verbal reasoning is not a type of conflict resolution that correlates with individual differences in WMC, further establishing boundary conditions for the role of WMC in human cognitive processes.     

Infant‐holding biases in mothers and affective symptoms during pregnancy and after delivery

Several authors have reported that participants have a leftward bias when holding a newborn or young infant. Our study of mothers met before and after their infant's birth sought to ascertain whether particular combinations of affective symptoms (depression, anxiety) and holding positions (horizontal versus vertical) were related to holding‐side biases. Our results showed that (a) mothers displayed a significant leftward (71%) holding bias, (b) mothers with affective symptoms held their newborn on the right side and more frequently in the vertical position, and (c) hemispheric specialization for perceiving visual emotions had no significant effect on the holding‐side biases of new mothers. These results suggest that maternal affective symptoms have a dominant effect on the determination of holding‐side preferences, when associated with a particular holding position. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The paradox of Alypius and the pursuit of unwanted information

Prior work has found that people occasionally seek useless information, a violation of strict rationality. The present work examined whether and why curiosity can also cause individuals to seek predictably harmful information. In four studies, participants were given the opportunity to gain knowledge of questionable personal value. In each case, participants focused on their curiosity about the information and underweighted its consequences. As a result, participants tended to seek knowledge that they themselves believed they would be better off without. Consistent with Loewenstein’s [Loewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272–292] analysis of visceral factors in decision making, these effects diminished with a time delay and when deciding whether to expose someone else to unpleasant information. These results shed light on a common yet paradoxical aspect of human behavior that presents a counterpoint to traditional hedonistic models of human motivation.     

When misconduct goes unnoticed: The acceptability of gradual erosion in others’ unethical behavior

Four laboratory studies show that people are more likely to accept others’ unethical behavior when ethical degradation occurs slowly rather than in one abrupt shift. Participants served in the role of watchdogs charged with catching instances of cheating. The watchdogs in our studies were less likely to criticize the actions of others when their behavior eroded gradually, over time, rather than in one abrupt shift. We refer to this phenomenon as the slippery-slope effect. Our studies also demonstrate that at least part of this effect can be attributed to implicit biases that result in a failure to notice ethical erosion when it occurs slowly. Broadly, our studies provide evidence as to when and why people accept cheating by others and examine the conditions under which the slippery-slope effect occurs.     

A new formulation of the Principle of Indifference

The idea of a probabilistic logic of inductive inference based on some form of the principle of indifference has always retained a powerful appeal. However, up to now all modifications of the principle failed. In this paper, a new formulation of such a principle is provided that avoids generating paradoxes and inconsistencies. Because of these results, the thesis that probabilities cannot be logical quantities, determined in an objective way through some form of the principle of indifference, is no longer supportable. Later, the paper investigates some implications of the new principle of indifference. To conclude, a re-examination of the foundations of the so-called objective Bayesian inference is called for.