归纳推理的多样性效应及其机制探索

归纳推理结论范围大于前提范围的这一特点决定了归纳结论的不确定性,寻求前提的多样化是增强结论可靠度的重要途径。已有研究通过寻找证据、力度判断、特征扩展与归宿选择等研究方法发现前提类别覆盖范围、前提概率原则可以较好地解释多样性的内在机制。事实上,多样性效应的实质是大数原则在归纳推理中的运用,其产生的心理过程包括差异识别、大数信息抽取与大数信息运用三个步骤     

Functional research and cognitive‐process research in behavioural science: An unequal but firmly connected pair

Drawing on illustrative examples of the functional and cognitive psychology in contemporary research, the present article emphasizes the primacy of functional relationships, which provide the fundament for all attempts to uncover invisible cognitive processes. Cognitive research is not only inherently more difficult and much more ambitious than functional research. It also suffers from several home‐made problems, such as unwarranted inferences from model fitting, the mediation‐analysis cult and the failure to take environmental influences into account. However, despite the primacy of functional psychology and the problems associated with the ambitious goals of cognitive research, the two partners in this unequal pair are firmly connected and jointly responsible for the most impressive examples of progress in behavioural science.     

When Good Things Feel Closer and Bad Things Feel Farther: The Role of Perceived Control on Psychological Distance Perception

Prior research has found that people perceive positive objects and locations as physically closer than negative ones. Yet, other work has found the opposite to be true for perceptions of temporal distance, where negative future events feel closer than positive ones. Motivated by this seeming discrepancy, we propose that (a) feelings of control can differentially influence how far away valenced (i.e., positive or negative) targets feel in space and time and that (b) the difference in perceived control over space versus time can account for these opposite findings. First, across four studies, we show that high (vs. low) control makes positive targets feel closer and negative targets feel more distant in both physical space (Studies 1 and 1a) and time (Studies 2 and 2a). Then, in Studies 3 and 4, we simultaneously examine perceptions of spatial and temporal distance and show that baseline differences in perceived control between these domains can explain the prior discrepant findings. Finally, a within‐paper meta‐analysis offers further support to these findings.     

Editorial: The role of reasoning in mathematical thinking

ABSTRACT

Research into mathematics often focuses on basic numerical and spatial intuitions, and one key property of numbers: their magnitude. The fact that mathematics is a system of complex relationships that invokes reasoning usually receives less attention. The purpose of this special issue is to highlight the intricate connections between reasoning and mathematics, and to use insights from the reasoning literature to obtain a more complete understanding of the processes that underlie mathematical cognition. The topics that are discussed range from the basic heuristics and biases to the various ways in which complex, effortful reasoning contributes to mathematical cognition, while also considering the role of individual differences in mathematics performance. These investigations are not only important at a theoretical level, but they also have broad and important practical implications, including the possibility to improve classroom practices and educational outcomes, to facilitate people's decision-making, as well as the clear and accessible communication of numerical information.     

Probability and conspiratorial thinking

Conspiracy theories as alternative explanations for events and states of affairs enjoy widespread popularity. We test one possible explanation for why people are prone to conspiratorial thinking: We hypothesize that conspiratorial thinking as an explanation for events increases as the probability of those events decreases. In order to test this hypothesis, we have conducted five experiments in which participants were exposed to different information about probabilities of fictional events. The results of all experiments support the hypothesis: The lower the probability of an event, the stronger participants embrace conspiratorial explanations. Conspiratorial thinking, we conclude, potentially represents a cognitive heuristic: A coping mechanism for uncertainty.     

Speaker reliability guides children's inductive inferences about novel properties

Prior work shows that children can make inductive inferences about objects based on their labels rather than their appearance (Gelman, 2003). A separate line of research shows that children's trust in a speaker's label is selective. Children accept labels from a reliable speaker over an unreliable speaker (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the current paper, we tested whether 3- and 5-year-old children attend to speaker reliability when they make inductive inferences about a non-obvious property of a novel artifact based on its label. Children were more likely to use a reliable speaker's label than an unreliable speaker's label when making inductive inferences. Thus, children not only prefer to learn from reliable speakers, they are also more likely to use information from reliable speakers as the basis for future inferences. The findings are discussed in light of the debate between a similarity-driven and a label-driven approach to inductive inferences.     

An application of Carnapian inductive logic to an argument in the philosophy of statistics

I claim that an argument from the philosophy of statistics can be improved by using Carnapian inductive logic. Gelman and Shalizi [9] criticise a philosophical account of how statisticians ought to choose statistical models which they call ‘the received view of Bayesian inference’ and propose a different account inspired by falsificationist philosophy of science. I introduce another philosophical account inspired by Carnapian inductive logic and argue that it is even better than Gelman and Shalizi's falsificationist account.     

Cognitive processes as mediators of the relation between mindfulness and change in social anxiety symptoms following cognitive behavioral treatment

The present study examined whether pretreatment mindfulness exerts an indirect effect on outcomes following cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Cognitive processes of probability and cost bias (i.e., overestimations of the likelihood that negative social events will occur, and that these events will have negative consequences when they do occur) were explored as potential mediators of the relation between mindfulness and social anxiety symptom change. People with higher levels of mindfulness may be better able to benefit from treatments that reduce biases because mindfulness may aid in regulation of attention. Sixty-seven individuals with a primary diagnosis of social phobia identifying public speaking as their greatest fear received eight sessions of one of two types of exposure-based CBT delivered according to treatment manuals. Participants completed self-report measures of mindfulness, probability bias, cost bias, and social anxiety symptoms. Mediation hypotheses were assessed by a bootstrapped regression using treatment outcome data. Pretreatment mindfulness was not related to change in social anxiety symptoms from pre- to posttreatment. However, mindfulness had an indirect effect on treatment outcome via its association with probability bias, but not cost bias, at midtreatment. These findings were consistent across three metrics of social anxiety symptoms. Mindfulness may play a role in response to CBT among individuals with social phobia through its relation with probability bias – even when the treatment does not target mindfulness.     

No Time to Waste: Restricting Life‐Span Temporal Horizons Decreases the Sunk‐Cost Fallacy

In three studies, we examined the influence of restricted and expansive temporal horizons on the sunk‐cost fallacy. The sunk‐cost fallacy occurs when prior investments instead of future returns influence decisions about future investments. When making decisions about future investments, rational decision makers base decisions on future consequences, not already‐invested costs that are “sunk” and cannot be recovered. In Study 1, we restricted young adult college students' temporal horizons by instructing them to imagine that they did not have much longer to live; this manipulation decreased the sunk‐cost fallacy. In Study 2, we replicated Study 1 and also found that the consequences of manipulating temporal horizons were most pronounced for prior investments of time and that prior investments of time and money had different implications for the sunk‐cost fallacy, depending on the social or nonsocial decision domain. In Study 3, we manipulated temporal horizons by instructing students to imagine their time as a college student was coming to an end. Results were mostly similar to Study 2 but also suggested that focusing on one's mortality may have unique consequences. Implications of the three studies for understanding age differences in sunk‐cost decisions, interventions to improve sunk‐cost decisions, and the situations in which interventions might be most needed are discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.