A Pathological View of Disease

This paper is a response to Christopher Boorse's recent defense of hisBiostatistical Theory (BST) of health and disease. Boorse maintains that hisconcept of theoretical health and disease reflects the ``consideredusage of pathologists.' I argue that pathologists do not use ``disease' inthe purely theoretical way that is required by the BST. Pathology does notdraw a sharp distinction between theoretical and practical aspects ofmedicine. Pathology does not even need a theoretical concept of disease. Itsfocus is not theoretical, but practical; pathology's goal is to contribute tothe healing of patients. Pathology, even experimental pathology, is notvalue-free. Not only ``disease' but also such terms as ``nerve' and ``organ'are laden with conceptual values.     

Tool-use learning in Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana)

The transmission of tool use is a rare event in monkeys. Such an event arose in a group of semi-free-ranging Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) in which leaning a pole against the parks fence (branch leaning) appeared and spread to several males. This prompted us to test individual and social learning of this behavior in seven young males. In the first experiment, three males learned individually to obtain a food reward using a wooden pole as a climbing tool. They began using the pole to retrieve the reward only when they could alternatively experience acting on the object and reaching the target. In a second experiment, we first tested whether four other subjects could learn branch leaning after having observed a group-mate performing the task. Despite repeated opportunities to observe the demonstrator, they did not learn to use the pole as a tool. Hence we exposed the latter subjects to individual learning trials and they succeeded in the task. Tool use was not transmitted in the experimental situation, which contrasts with observations in the park. We can conclude that the subjects were not able to recognize the target as such. It is possible that they recognized it and learned the task individually when we alternated the opportunity to act upon the object and to reach the reward. This suggests that these macaques could then have associated the action they exercised upon the pole and the use of the pole as a means to reach the reward.     

Something from nothing: exploring dimensions of children's knowing through the repeated reading of favourite books

Witte‐Townsend and DiGiulio explore some of the dimensions of knowing that children, teachers and parents may engage together during story‐time. They reflect on some of their own long‐term relationships with children and children's books, especially Phoebe Gilman's Gilman P 1992 Something from nothing (New York, NY, Scholastic Inc)  [Google Scholar] Something from nothing (published in 1992) and Simms Taback's Taback S 1999 Joseph had a little overcoat (New York, NY, Viking‐Penguin)  [Google Scholar] Joseph had a little overcoat, published in 1999. The authors probe issues such as why children ask to hear a favourite story over and over and why they suddenly abandon all interest and move on to a new book. They explore the meaning of the silences that sometimes arise during story‐time, pooling around the young listeners as the last words of the book are read. Witte‐Townsend and DiGiulio remind us of the value of literature in the lives of children and they affirm that the reading and re‐reading of favourite stories enables the understanding of complex human issues and contributes significantly to social, emotional and spiritual growth.     

Changes in values cognition after rating values-associated feelings

This study investigated values change as an outcome of assessing feelings elicited by contemplating the actualization of the same values. The subjects were divided into an experimental and a control group. They completed three tests in a single session. In the pretest, all subjects were asked to rate the importance of 20 values items on a 4-point scale. Subjects in the experimental group were then asked to rate the degree of pleasure they would feel in actualizing each of the values, while those in the control group rated the degree of inequality they considered women suffer in the actualization of each of the values. The post-test consisted of the same items as the pretest. The subjects in the experimental group completed a second post-test 3 months later. It was found that the experimental procedure produced significant change in the ratings of 15 values at the post-test, whereas the control procedure produced change in only five. The results suggest that rating one's emotional response to a value-related situation can change one's cognition of that value. At the post-test 3 months later, only 3-value ratings remained changed.     

Central inhibition ability modulates attention-induced motion blindness

Impaired motion perception can be induced in normal observers in a rapid serial visual presentation task. Essential for this effect is the presence of motion distractors prior to the motion target, and we proposed that this attention-induced motion blindness results from high-level inhibition produced by the distractors. To investigate this, we compared the extent of the attention-induced motion blindness effect with performance on central inhibition tasks: Stroop colour naming and negative priming. A negative correlation between Stroop interference and motion performance reflected that low Stroop scores, indicative of strong inhibition ability, was associated with more severe impairments in motion perception. This association could not be explained by individual differences in fluid intelligence, task switching or response speed. Negative priming was not specifically associated with attention-induced motion blindness. The results confirm that attention can modulate motion perception and suggest that the processes involved may be shared with high-level cognitive abilities.     

自强意识的初步调查研究

采用录音访谈和开放式问卷要求200名不同性别、年龄、职业、教育程度的成人对“自强”的含义以及在什么时候、什么心理背景下想到“自强”进行了调查,结果表明：(1)公众的自强观主要是指持久的意志力;(2)自强可分为顺境自强、逆境自强、竞争性自强、成长性自强和他向性自强．逆境自强更为公众所赞同;(3)人们回忆起自强意识产生的时间主要在参加工作以后。     

Emancipatory responses to oppression: the template of land-use planning and the Old Order Amish of Ontario

In this paper I discuss the clash of values between the Old Order Amish community of Ontario and the dominant social paradigm in agriculture. Land-use and agricultural regulations, designed for an industrial style of agriculture, are experienced as a threat to the survival of the Old Order Amish agricultural social economy and community. The paper describes how I have worked with the Old Order Amish to respond to these challenges and to create public policies that will allow them to maintain their human and agricultural diversity and small-scale sustainable farm practices. Four case studies illuminating the oppressive land-use regulations along with the emancipatory responses to the oppression are examined. The social transformation themes include principles and processes for community psychologists, land-use planners, and community economic development practitioners to consider. The article has heuristic value for a practice-based approach to social change.     

European values in bioethics: why,what, and how to be used?

Are there distinctly European values in bioethics, and if there are, what are they? Some Continental philosophers have argued that the principles of dignity, precaution, and solidarity reflect the European ethos better than the liberal concepts of autonomy, harm, and justice. These principles, so the argument goes, elevate prudence over hedonism, communality over individualism, and moral sense over pragmatism. Contrary to what their proponents often believe, however, dignity, precaution, and solidarity can be interpreted in many ways, and it is not clear which reading would, or should, be favored by popular opinion. It is therefore dangerous to think that any one understanding of "European", or any other, values could be legitimately imposed on those who have different ideas about morality in health care and related fields. Bioethical principles should be employed to promote discussion, not to suppress it.     

Getting scientists to think about what they are doing

Research scientists are trained to produce specialised bricks of knowledge, but not to look at the whole building. Increasing public concern about the social role of science is forcing science students to think about what they are actually learning to do. What sort of knowledge will they be producing, and how will it be used? Science education now requires serious consideration of these philosophical and ethical questions. But the many different forms of knowledge produced by modern science cannot be covered by any single philosophical principle. Sociology and cognitive psychology are also needed to understand what the sciences have in common and the significance of what they generate. Again, traditional modes of ethical analysis cannot deal adequately with the values, norms and interests activated by present-day technoscience without reference to its sociological, political and economic dimensions. What science education now requires is ‘metascience’, a discipline that extends beyond conventional philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific enterprise. For example, students need to learn about the practices, institutions, career choices, and societal responsibilities of research scientists, and to rehearse in advance some of the moral dilemmas that they are likely to meet. They need also to realise that science is changing rapidly, not only in its research techniques and organisational structures but also in its relationships with society at large.