Handedness differences in information framing

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to common decision biases such as anchoring and sunk cost. The present paper extends this line of work to attribute framing effects. Sixty-three undergraduates were asked to advise a friend concerning the use of a safe allergy medication during pregnancy. A third of the participants received negatively-framed information concerning the fetal risk of the drug (1–3% chance of having a malformed child); another third received positively-framed information (97–99% chance of having a normal child); and the final third received no counseling information and served as the control. Results indicated that, as predicted, inconsistent (mixed)-handers were more responsive than consistent (strong)-handers to information changes and readily update their beliefs. Although not significant, the data also suggested that only inconsistent handers were affected by information framing. Theoretical implications as well as ongoing work in holistic versus analytic processing, contextual sensitivity, and brain asymmetry will be discussed.     

Individual differences in risk perception versus risk taking: handedness and interhemispheric interaction

Research indicates that right-hemisphere mechanisms are specifically sensitive to and averse to risk. Research also indicates that mixed degree of handedness is associated with increased access to right hemisphere processing. Accordingly, it was predicted that mixed-handers would exhibit greater risk aversion. Participants were presented with various risky activities and were asked to rate (i) the perceived risk, (ii) the perceived benefit, and (iii) their likelihood to engage in each activity. No handedness differences were found for any of these ratings. Regression analyses, however, indicated that the likelihood to engage in risky activities was predicted primarily by the perceived risks in mixed-handers and by the perceived benefits in strong-handers.     

The self-regulating brain: Cortical-subcortical feedback and the development of intelligent action

To speak of cognitive regulation versus emotion regulation may be misleading. However, some forms of regulation are carried out by executive processes, subject to voluntary control, while others are carried out by “automatic” processes that are far more primitive. Both sets of processes are in constant interaction, and that interaction gives rise to a stream of activity that is both cognitive and emotional. Studying the brain helps us understand these reciprocal regulatory influences in some detail. Cortical activities regulate subcortical activities through executive modulation of prepotent appraisals and emotional responses. Subcortical systems regulate the cortex by tuning its activities to the demands or opportunities provided by the environment. Cortical controls buy us time, as needed for planning and intelligent action. Subcortical controls provide energy, focus, and direction, as needed for relevant emotion-guided behaviour. We review the neural processes at work in both directions of regulatory activity, looking at the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as a hub of cortical systems mediating downward control, and discussing limbic, hypothalamic, and brainstem systems that mediate upward control. A macrosystem that displays both directions of control includes the ACC and the amygdala within a feedback circuit whose features vary with clinical-personality differences. Developmental changes in ACC-mediated self-regulation support advances in directed attention, response inhibition, and self-monitoring. Developmental changes in amygdala-mediated self-regulation involve the compilation of meanings that direct thought and behaviour, thus consolidating individual differences over the lifespan. In this way, the capacity to exert voluntary control develops alongside the accumulation of associations that trigger the responses that demand control. The balance between these developmental progressions has implications for personality formation and mental health.     

Personality for free: Psychometric properties of a public domain Australian measure of the five‐factor model

Fifty items from Goldberg's International Personality Item Pool were compiled to form a public‐domain measure of personality, the Australian Personality Inventory (API). Data from a random community sample (N = 7615) and a university‐based sample (N = 271) were used to explore psychometric properties of this 50‐item measure of the five‐factor model of personality (FFM). In both samples, internal reliabilities were adequate. In the university‐based sample an appropriate pattern of convergent and divergent relationship was found between scale scores and domain scores from the NEO Five‐Factor Inventory. After adjusting for an apparent response set (mean response across items), exploratory factor analyses clearly retrieved the FFM in both samples. It is provisionally concluded that raw scale scores from the API provide reliable estimates of the FFM, but adjustment for mean response across the 50 items might clarify the five‐factor structure, especially in less educated samples.     

When and how less is more: reply to Tharp and Pickering

In DeCaro et al. [DeCaro, M. S., Thomas, R. D., & Beilock, S. L. (2008). Individual differences in category learning: Sometimes less working memory capacity is better than more. Cognition, 107, 284-294] we demonstrated that sometimes less working memory (WM) has its advantages. The lower individuals’ WM, the faster they achieved success on an information-integration (II) category learning task adopted from Waldron and Ashby [Waldron, E. M., & Ashby, F. G. (2001). The effects of concurrent task interference on category learning: Evidence for multiple category learning systems. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8, 168-176]. We attributed this success to the inability of lower WM individuals to employ explicit learning strategies heavily reliant on executive control. This in turn, we hypothesized, might push lower WM individuals to readily adopt procedural-based strategies thought to lead to success on the II task. Tharp and Pickering [Tharp, I. J., & Pickering, A. D. (2009). A note on DeCaro, Thomas, and Beilock (2008): Further data demonstrate complexities in the assessment of information-integration category learning. Cognition] recently questioned whether the II category learning task DeCaro et al. used really reflects procedural learning. In an effort to investigate Tharp and Pickering’s assertions with respect to individual differences in WM, we replicate and extend our previous work, in part by modeling participants’ response strategies during learning. We once again reveal that lower WM individuals demonstrate earlier II learning than their higher WM counterparts. However, we also show that low WM individuals’ initial success is not because of procedural-based responding. Instead, individuals lower in WM capacity perseverate in using simple rule-based strategies that circumvent heavy demands on WM while producing above-chance accuracy.     

Crossing at a red light: Behaviour of individuals and groups

The present study examines the road behaviour of individual pedestrians at an intersection with a traffic signal compared to groups of pedestrians at the same intersection.In total, 1392 pedestrians were unobtrusively observed in an urban setting at a pedestrian street crossing of undivided streets; 842 were female (60.5%) and 550 were male (39.5%). The observations took place between 7:30 and 8:30 in the morning. Chi-square test revealed the males crossed on red more frequently than females. Logistic regression predicting red-light crossing for pedestrians arriving during a red-light phase indicated that, apart from gender, the tendency to cross on red was greater when there were fewer people waiting at the curb, either when a pedestrian arrived, or joining after arrival. The discussion refers to the theoretical explanations concerning the theory of ‘social control’ and to some practical implications of the results, such as using the positive value of social control in media campaigns and adjusting the red light duration in order to encourage people to obey the traffic light.     

Old Foundations for the Logic of Agency and Action

The paper presents an infinite hierarchy of sound and complete axiomatic systems for Two-Dimensional Modal Tense Logic with Historical Necessity, Agents and Acts. A main novelty of these logics is their capacity to represent formally (i) basic action-sentences asserting that such and such an act is performed/omitted by an agent, as well as (ii) causative action-sentences asserting that by performing/omitting a certain act, an agent causes that such and such a state-of-affairs is realized (e.g. comes about/ceases/remains/remains absent). We illustrate how the formal machinery of our systems can be used to reconstruct a number of interesting ideas in the Logic of Agency and Action that have been proposed by authors like von Wright, von Kutschera, Belnap and Segerberg.     

Children's profiles of addition and subtraction understanding

The current research explored children's ability to recognize and explain different concepts both with and without reference to physical objects so as to provide insight into the development of children's addition and subtraction understanding. In Study 1, 72 7- to 9-year-olds judged and explained a puppet's activities involving three conceptual relations: (a) a+b=c, b+a=c; (b) a-b=c, a-c=b; and (c) a+b=c, c-b=a. In Study 2, the self-reports and problem-solving accuracy of 60 5- to 7-year-olds were recorded for three-term inverse problems (i.e., a+b-b=?), pairs of complementary addition and subtraction problems (i.e., a+b=c, c-b=?), and unrelated addition and subtraction problems (e.g., 3-2). Both studies highlighted individual differences in the concepts that children understand and the role of concrete referents in their understanding. These differences were related to using efficient procedures to solve unrelated addition and subtraction problems in Study 2. The results suggest that a key advance in children's conceptual understanding is incorporating subtractive relations into their mental representations of how parts are added to form a whole.