生命性在句子加工中作用的ERP研究

生命性广泛地渗透到人类语言系统中发挥其作用。本文主要结合最新和经典的有关生命性的ERP研究探讨了生命性信息起作用的模式和时间进程。在句子加工过程中,生命性影响论元的加工并影响题元结构的建构和解释。以往研究表明,生命性违反有时引发的是N400效应,有时引发的是P600效应,少数情况还表现出N400-P600的双相模式。生命性在句子加工中的作用还跟多种变量存在交互作用,语境、题元可逆性、论元之间的语义关系、动词类型和其固有的题元结构都可能影响生命性信息起作用的模式。文章最后进行总结和展望,并提出未来研究仍有必要继续探讨生命性信息加工的时间神经动态性及其在句子加工中的具体作用机制。     

Response to Stuart Kauffman: The Measurement Problem in Quantum Mechanics

Richard Feynman, a 1965 Nobel Prize winner in physics, quoting an unknown philosopher, said: “It is necessary for the very existence of science that the same conditions always produce the same results.” And Feynman's reply: “Well, they don't.” Double-slit experiments with both slits open and the wave interference pattern created by electrons falling on a screen behind the slits speak volumes to those two statements and the interpretive problem created by the non-deterministic behavior of microscopic matter. Quantum mechanics (QM) with its successes over the last 85 years has created the information age, and with insights into nature has given humans an economy concentrated with products based on quantum technology. All this even with questions about the fundamental aspects of measurement in the quantum world still being debated! Discussing the measurement aspect of QM does not require a physics background where physics scholars join other scholarly disciplines engaged in gaining knowledge about the reality of the one world of human experience. The necessary tools for discussion are imagination, speculation, and curiosity. But for a new credible interpretation of the measurement problem, quantum training or a quantum theoretician is required.     

Developing a Validity Argument Through Abductive Reasoning with an Empirical Demonstration of the Latent Class Analysis

This article proposes and demonstrates a methodology for test score validation through abductive reasoning. It describes how abductive reasoning can be utilized in support of the claims made about test score validity. This methodology is demonstrated with a real data example of the Canadian English Language Proficiency Index Program (CELPIP)-General test—a program assessing functional English language ability in the community and workplace. Abductive reasoning seeks the enabling conditions through which a claim about a person's ability makes sense. For example, it makes sense that a person has strong functional language proficiency if he or she has been regularly using English to write emails and meet with colleagues at work. A valid test score should be affected by the extent of a person's engagement with such enabling conditions. Empirical evidence that warrants such an abductively reasoned claim is illustrated through a latent class analysis within a structural equation model. Evidence is examined to investigate whether certain classes of test takers who have been differentially engaging in the enabling conditions do, in fact, predict a person's CELPIP-General performance. The steps of the methodology are summarized in the closing section.     

Are our moral responsibility practices justified? Wittgenstein,Strawson and justification in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

D. Justin Coates argues that, in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, P. F. Strawson develops a modest transcendental argument for the legitimacy of our moral responsibility practices. I disagree with Coates’ claim that Strawson’s argument provides a justification, in Wittgenstein’s and/or Strawson’s sense of that term, of our responsibility practices. I argue that my interpretation of Strawson solves some difficulties with Coates’ argument, while retaining its advantages.     

SOUTHGATE'S COMPOUND ONLY‐WAY EVOLUTIONARY THEODICY: DEEP APPRECIATION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS

Christopher Southgate offers a remarkable evolutionary theodicy that includes six affirmations and arguments; together they form a unique and very persuasive proposal which he terms a “compound evolutionary theodicy.” Here I summarize the arguments and offer critical reflections on them for further development, with an emphasis on the ambiguity in the goodness of creation; the role of thermodynamics in evolutionary biology; the challenge of horrendous evil in nature; and the theological response to theodicy in terms of eschatology, with its own severe challenge from cosmology.     

Reid's Third Argument for Moral Liberty

Thomas Reid uses the term ‘moral liberty’ to refer to a kind of free will that is agent-causal and incompatible with determinism. I offer and textually support a new interpretation of Reid's third argument for moral liberty, which Reid presents in Section 4.8 of Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Generally regarded as obscure, most commentators either ignore Reid's third argument or lend it cursory attention. In my interpretation, Reid points to the truism that we have reason to think that human persons conceive of long-term plans. Then, Reid argues that determinism implies that God both conceives of and enacts these plans, leaving us without any reason to believe that people even conceive of these plans. Therefore, we should hold onto the truism and reject determinism. On my interpretation, Reid employs the premises of a theistic argument from design as premises of his argument.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

Infected by evil

In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that we can be influenced by fictions in ways that matter morally, and some of the time we will be unaware that we have been so influenced. These arguments fall short of proving a clear causal link between fictions and specific changes in the audience, but they do reveal rather interesting and complex features of the moral psychology of fiction. In particular, they reveal that some Platonic worries about the dangers of art cannot be dismissed lightly.     

Prover9's Simplification Explained Away

This note discusses P. Oppenheimer and E. Zalta's ‘A Computationally-Discovered Simplification of the Ontological Argument’ [this journal, 2011]. I try to explain why the simplification presented there was successful and comment on the technical aspects of the method they applied.     

What Matters in the Mirror of Time: Why Lucretius’ Symmetry Argument Fails

By appealing to the similarity between pre-vital and post-mortem nonexistence, Lucretius famously tried to show that our anxiety about death was irrational. His so-called Symmetry Argument has been attacked in various ways, but all of these strategies are themselves problematic. In this paper, I propose a new approach to undermining the argument: when Parfit’s distinction between identity and what matters is applied, not diachronically (as he uses it) but across possible worlds, the alleged symmetry can be broken. Although the pre-vital and posthumous time spans that we could have experienced are indeed analogous with respect to our identity, they are not analogous with respect to psychological continuity, which forms the basis of prudential concern. Lucretius even anticipated the Parfitian distinction. He did not, however, notice the significance that it has for his Symmetry Argument.