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41.
Hengameh Irandoust 《Argumentation》2006,20(2):133-148
This paper attempts to define the concept of critique, explain its function␣and properties and distinguish it from the close concept of evaluation. It is argued that, beyond the argument, a critique is concerned with the position of the proponent relatively to the reality the argument is about. Moreover, a critique is itself an argument in which assumptions regarding the position of the proponent are justified for a given audience on the basis of the proponent’s argumentative background within a specific domain. 相似文献
42.
Mitchell O. Stokes 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):439-453
In this paper I do two things: (1) I support the claim that there is still some confusion about just what the Quine-Putnam
indispensability argument is and the way it employs Quinean meta-ontology and (2) I try to dispel some of this confusion by presenting the argument in
a way which reveals its important meta-ontological features, and include these features explicitly as premises. As a means
to these ends, I compare Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of properties with Putnam’s presentation of the indispensability
argument. Van Inwagen’s argument is a classic exercise in Quinean meta-ontology and yet he claims – despite his argument’s
conspicuous similarities to the Quine-Putnam argument – that his own has a substantially different form. I argue, however,
that there is no such difference between these two arguments even at a very high level of specificity; I show that there is
a detailed generic indispensability argument that captures the single form of both. The arguments are identical in every way
except for the kind of objects they argue for – an irrelevant difference for my purposes. Furthermore, Putnam’s and van Inwagen’s
presentations make an assumption that is often mistakenly taken to be an important feature of the Quine-Putnam argument. Yet
this assumption is only the implicit backdrop against which the argument is typically presented. This last point is brought
into sharper relief by the fact that van Inwagen’s list of the four nominalistic responses to his argument is too short. His
list is missing an important – and historically popular – fifth option.
相似文献
Mitchell O. StokesEmail: |
43.
Manfred Kraus 《Argumentation》2007,21(1):3-19
In Roman rhetoric, contrarium was variably considered either a figure of speech or an argument. The paper examines the logical pattern of this type of
argument, which according to Cicero is based on a third Stoic indemonstrable syllogism: The persuasiveness of this type of argument, however, vitally depends on the validity of the alleged ‹incompatibility’ forming
its major premiss. Yet this appears to be the argument’s weak point, as the ‹incompatibilities’ employed generally hold for
the most part only, and are reducible to topical argument schemes. This is why in practical usage such arguments are most
often phrased as rhetorical questions, the persuasive force of which, enhanced by certain strategical maneuverings and fallacies,
makes the audience swallow the argument. 相似文献
44.
J. E. Adler 《Argumentation》2007,21(1):83-92
Analogies must be symmetric. If a is like b, then b is like a. So if a has property R, and if R is within the scope of the analogy, then b (probably) has R. However, analogical arguments generally single out, or depend upon, only one of a or b to serve as the basis for the inference. In this respect, analogical arguments are directed by an asymmetry. I defend the importance of this neglected – even when explicitly mentioned – feature in understanding analogical arguments. 相似文献
45.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
46.
Not a lot of work on theistic arguments has been devoted to drawing connections between a necessary being and theistic properties.
In this paper, I identify novel paths from a necessary being to certain theistic properties: volition, infinite power, infinite
knowledge, and infinite goodness. The steps in those paths are an outline for future work on what William Rowe (The Cosmological
Argument, 1975, p. 6) has called “stage II” of the cosmological argument. 相似文献
47.
Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great. 相似文献
48.
Feng Ye 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(4):614-628
The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics.
The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several
serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly:
first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but
our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create
in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2006, (8): 74–83 相似文献
49.
Speech acts and arguments 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Scott Jacobs 《Argumentation》1989,3(4):345-365
Speech act theory seems to provide a promising avenue for the analysis of the functional organization of argument. The theory, however, might be taken to suggest that arguments are a homogenous class of speech act with a specifiable illocutionary force and a single set of felicity conditions. This suggestion confuses the analysis of the meaning of speech act verbs with the analysis of the pragmatic structure of actual language use. Suggesting that arguments are conveyed through a homogeneous class of linguistic action overlooks the way in which the context of activity and the form of expression organize the argumentative functions performed in using language. An alternative speech act analysis would treat folk terminology as a heuristic entry point into the development of a technical analysis of the myriad argumentative functions and structures to be found in natural language use. This would lead to a thorough-going pragmatic analysis of the rational and functional design of speech acts in argumentation. 相似文献
50.
M. Kienpointner 《Argumentation》1996,10(4):475-494
Whorf and Wittgenstein are perhaps the most famous names in linguistics and philosophy associated with the assumption that language plays a decisive role in shaping our view of reality. After a critical discussion of Whorf's linguistic relativity principle I conclude that it is not language as a system, but the use of language according to the rules of language games which connects language thought and world view, especially if some particular usage becomes the commonly accepted norm. This traditional norm also enters argumentative discourse in the form of background assumptions occuring in the premises of arguments. Thus, traditional points of view and prevailing ideologies in a society, even if challenged in discussions, can become reinforced and stabilized. This is illustrated with a critical analysis of the role and function of tautological utterances in argumentative discourse, which only apparently are compelling means of argumentation. 相似文献