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191.
Patrick S. Dieveney 《Synthese》2007,157(1):105-128
One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put,
this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over
in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these
theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability
argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism to be an essential premise of the argument. In this paper,
I consider the reasons philosophers have taken confirmational holism to be essential to the argument and argue that, contrary
to the traditional view, confirmational holism is dispensable. 相似文献
192.
Caj Strandberg 《Philosophia》2007,35(2):249-260
In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses. 相似文献
193.
Timothy Bays 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):119-135
In an earlier paper, I claimed that one version of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism turned on a subtle, but
philosophically significant, mathematical mistake. Recently, Luca Bellotti has criticized my argument for this claim. This
paper responds to Bellotti's criticisms. 相似文献
194.
John Woods 《Argumentation》2000,14(2):107-134
A slippery slope argument is an argument to this twofold effect. First, that if a policy or practice P is permitted, then we lack the dialectical resources to demonstrate that a similar policy or practice P* is not permissible. Since P* is indeed not permissible, we should not endorse policy or practice P. At the heart of such arguments is the idea of dialectical impotence, the inability to stop the acceptance of apparently small deviations from a heretofore secure policy or practice from leading to apparently large and unacceptable deviations. Using examples of analogical arguments and sorites arguments I examine this phenomenon in the context of collapsing taboos. 相似文献
195.
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans 《Argumentation》2000,14(4):447-473
In this paper, a survey is presented of the main approaches to the structure of argumentation. The paper starts with a historical overview of the distinctions between various types of argument structure. Next, the main definitions given in the various approaches are discussed as well as the methods that are proposed to deal with doubtful cases. 相似文献
196.
G. R. Mayes 《Argumentation》2000,14(4):361-380
Although explanation is widely regarded as an important concept in the study of rational inquiry, it remains largely unexplored outside the philosophy of science. This, I believe, is not due to oversight as much as to institutional resistance. In analytic philosophy it is basic that epistemic rationality is a function of justification and that justification is a function of argument. Explanation, however, is not argument nor is belief justification its function. I argue here that the task of incorporating explanation into the theory of rational inquiry poses a serious challenge to our basic concept of epistemic rationality as well as the a priori method of inquiry that still lies at the heart of analytic philosophy. Specifically, it pushes us toward a much stronger form of naturalism than is generally thought necessary, one in which argument and explanation are recognized as distinct and equally fundamental cognitive processes whose dynamic relationship is one of the central issues in the theory of rationality. 相似文献
197.
SCOTT F. AIKIN 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(5):578-590
Abstract: Properly understood, foundationalism as a meta‐epistemic theory is consistent with skepticism. This article outlines five possible points of overlap between the two views, and shows that arguments against foundationalism posited on its inability to refute skepticism are improperly framed. 相似文献
198.
Juha Saatsi 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):579-584
Aidan Lyon has recently argued that some mathematical explanations of empirical facts can be understood as program explanations. I present three objections to his argument. 相似文献
199.
Paul Kabay 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):443-460
In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent, specifically we perceive it to be consistent. I critique this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim ‘we know what it is to have a contradictory perception’ to the claim ‘we know what it is to perceive a contradiction’. I argue that this inference fails to be valid. Secondly, I give reasons for thinking that if an observable state of affairs were to be contradictory, we would perceive it to be consistent. As such that the world we observe appears consistent does not constitute evidence that it is in fact consistent. That we see a consistent world is no reason to believe that the world is consistent. I conclude the paper with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for the plausibility of trivialism. 相似文献
200.
In this paper, I discuss Spinoza's conception of the cosmological argument for the existence of God (hereafter CA), as it can be reconstructed taking departure from Letter 12. By a CA, I understand, quite broadly, an argument which infers a posteriori the existence of a necessary being, usually identified as God, from the experience that there exists some other being, often oneself, the existence of which is contingent upon the existence of this necessary being. The difference between various versions of the CA stems from differences in the way in which the relation of existential dependence is understood. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a version of the CA which would be valid on Spinoza's principles. I argue that such a version must be understood in the context of Spinoza's causal rationalism. By such causal rationalism, I mean a doctrine committed to the idea that everything is rational and thus explicable and that causal explanations are somehow fundamental. Moreover, I hold that, in Spinoza's causal rationalism, there is one form of causation through which all other types of causation are ultimately understood. This ‘archetype’ of causation is self-causation. 相似文献