Argument Quality and Cultural Difference

Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it.This conception of argument quality presupposes that the goodness of arguments is characterizable in terms of features of the argument itself. It makes no reference either to the attributes of the persons appraising the argument and judging its normative force, or to the context in which that appraisal is carried out. But recent work by a wide range of philosophers, argumentation theorists, and social theorists rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness. Instead, these theorists insist upon taking seriously, in the evaluation of arguments, the features of the evaluators themselves. In particular, such theorists emphasize the importance of cultural difference in argument appraisal. Often locating themselves under the banner of multiculturalism, they argue that the quality of an argument depends upon culturally-specific beliefs, values, and presuppositions; that an argument may be of high quality in one cultural context but of low quality in another. Consequently, they contend, no abstract, impersonal characterization of argument quality can succeed.In this paper I consider this multiculturalist approach to argument quality. I argue that while there is much merit in the general multiculturalist perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal conceptions of argument quality fails. It fails for several reasons detailed below; most fundamentally, it fails because it itself presupposes just the kind of impersonal account of argument quality it seeks to reject. I call this presupposition that of transcultural normative reach. I identify this presupposition in the multiculturalist argument, and show how it undercuts the multiculturalist challenge to abstract, impersonal, transcultural conceptions of argument quality. I conclude with an evaluation of the strengths, and weaknesses, of the multiculturalist challenge to such conceptions of argument quality.     

Soft Libertarianism and Hard Compatibilism

In this paper I discuss two kinds of attempts to qualify incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of freedom to avoid what have been thought to be incredible commitments of these rival accounts. One attempt -- which I call soft libertarianism -- is represented by Robert Kane's work. It hopes to defend an incompatibilist conception of freedom without the apparently difficult metaphysical costs traditionally incurred by these views. On the other hand, in response to what I call the robot objection (that if compatibilism is true, human beings could be the products of design), some compatibilists are tempted to soften their position by placing restrictions on the origins of agency. I argue that both of these attempts are misguided. Hard libertarianism and hard compatibilism are the only theoretical options.     

Kant's arguments in support of the maxim “Do what is right though the world should perish”

This article takes up the challenge that the motto Do What is Right Though the World Should Perish invites for an answer to Kant's arguments in defense of the motto. His argumentation is discussed, as well as the underlying assumptions concerning the role of Providence, the rejection of moral conflict, and the prudential risks associated with abandoning moral absolutism. The first two are rejected, the third seen as only partially tenable. Finally, the question is taken up what to do about moral prohibitions in a world in which they can quite literally prevent or bring about universal perishing.     

Experimentation on humans and nonhumans

In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.     

Reconstructing and Evaluating Genetic Arguments in Judicial Decisions

Although the genetic argument is a widely used interpretative argument, what it amounts to does not seem to be altogether clear. Basic forms of the genetic argument that are distinguished are often too rough to provide an adequate basis for the evaluation of an interpretative decision. In this article I attempt to provide a more detailed analysis of the genetic argument by making use of pragma-dialectical insights. The analysis clarifies the character and the structure of different forms of the genetic argument and thus the elements that are relevant for the evaluation of the argument.* * An earlier version of this paper was presented at 21st IVR World Congress (Lund, 2003).     

Legal Progress Through Pragma-Dialectics? Prospects Beyond Analogy and E Contrario

Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather different from traditional approaches appealing to standards of propositional logic. Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e contrario seem to disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation appears to be borne by often implicit general principles and an appeal to the system of the law as a whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best seen as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal argument.     

The Vicious Circle Theorem – a Graph-Theoretical Analysis of Dialectical Structures

This article sets up a graph-theoretical framework for argumentation-analysis (dialectical analysis) which expands classical argument-analysis. Within this framework, a main theorem on the existence of inconsistencies in debates is stated and proved: the vicious circle theorem. Subsequently, two corollaries which generalize the main theorem are derived. Finally, a brief outlook is given on further expansions and possible applications of the developed framework.     

THE WEAK ANTHROPIC PRINCIPLE AND THE DESIGN ARGUMENT

Abstract. The design argument for God's existence was critically assessed when in the growth of modern science the cognitive value of ideological categories was called into question. In recent discussions dealing with anthropic principles there has appeared a new version of the design argument, in which cosmic design is described without the use of ideological terms. The weak anthropic principle (WAP), a most critical version of all these principles, describes the fine-tuning of physical parameters necessary lo the genesis of carbon-based life. It defines no physical mechanisms of the observed coordination between physical parameters. If in a future unified physical theory such mechanisms are discovered, the weak anthropic principle should be replaced by the strong anthropic principle, which asserts the physical necessity of fine-tuning. Neither of the versions can be regarded as physically trivial unless one accepts strong assumptions of the existence of parallel universes. Consequently, a new version of the philosophical design argument can be developed on the basis of the weak anthropic principle.     

Arguing about the ethics of past actions: An analysis of a taped conversation about a taped conversation

In the face of widespread cynicism as regards the possibilities for reasoned and reasonable adjudication of ethical differences in the postmodern age, this essay proposes a dialogic, reconstructive rhetoric as a vehicle for jointly arguing about the ethics of past actions, and looks to the friendship circle as a model arena for the playing out of such a rhetoric. Analyzed by way of illustration is a conversation among four good friends about the ethics of another, surreptitiously taped, conversation between two of those friends.The author wishes to thank Barbie Zeltzer and Micheal Krippondorf, both of Temple University, fot thier comments. Abridged versions of this paper were presented at the Iowa Conference on Narrative in the Human Sciences,1990 and at the England Symposium in Narratives in the Social Sciences. Commentaries at these conferences were also very useful.     

Resolving arguments accurately

This empirical investigation examined how ordinary language users resolved disagreements over the solutions to categorical syllogisms. Forty-six participants completed puzzles in logic. After completing the puzzles, participants were then randomly paired into 23 to compare their answers and to resolve 159 disagreements. Results indicate that the most frequently used strategies for resolving disagreements centered on: (a) arguing over the merits of the position (47% of the time) and (b) appealing to past solutions as a means of addressing current disputes (28% of the time). In addition, the data revealed that the most frequently used strategy (arguing the merits of the positions) was no more effective than random choice (52% increase in correct solutions) while the strategy of appealing to past solutions significantly aided dyads in reaching correct solutions (70% increase in correct solutions).