New nonlinear and dynamic avenues for the study of work and organizational psychology: an introduction to the special issue

ABSTRACT

Nonlinear and dynamic approaches are two main principles of complex systems. The work and organizational psychology field has recently applied these concepts to understand human behaviour at work. In this introductory paper, we describe how human behaviour at work can be understood from a nonlinear and dynamic perspective, developing and applying the advantages of this approach to continue moving beyond the frontiers of our knowledge. We focus on the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological implications of the nonlinear dynamic approach in the field. Then, we present the five papers included in this special issue. These papers have applied nonlinear and dynamic concepts to understand a wide range of phenomena: subordinates-supervisors relationships, team behaviour, deviant workplace behaviour, transformational leadership, and training transfer. Overall, these papers demonstrate the utility of nonlinear dynamics in our field and how we can create more time-sensitive and complex knowledge by paying special attention to when and how phenomena happen and how such phenomena interrelate over time.     

On some footnotes to Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Defence of the Essay Of Human Understanding

ABSTRACT

Two footnotes added to the version of Catharine Cockburn’s Defence of the Essay Of Human Understanding (1702) reprinted in her Works (1751) have led to various accusations, including that she was confused and an inadequate interpreter of Locke’s moral epistemology. In particular, it is claimed that she did not recognize the gulf that separated her own intellectualist and internalist views from Locke’s more voluntarist and hedonistic position. This paper defends Cockburn’s interpretation of Locke, arguing that the evidence for Locke being a voluntarist and hedonist is not compelling, and that Cockburn’s interpretation of his moral epistemology is well grounded in the Essay Of Human Understanding.     

BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE: HOW FAR CAN THE DIALOGUE PROCEED?

On the stage of the religion‐and‐science dialogue, Buddhism, especially Tibetan Buddhism, is a late arrival. However, thanks primarily to the long‐standing personal interest of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan tradition he represents has come to engage deeply with various disciplines of modern science. This essay follows the active engagement that has occurred particularly in the form of the biannual Mind and Life dialogues between the Dalai Lama and scientists. From the perspective of an active participant, I present the careful deliberations that ensure constructive parameters for these dialogues so that no one side can exert a hegemonic voice. I explore the challenges that are likely to confront the Buddhist side from its encounter with science, particularly with respect to its worldview. I identify specific areas where the two sides can and do engage in concrete collaboration, especially with respect to investigating healthy qualities of the mind and the effects of conscious mental training for attention and emotion regulation. Finally, I explore the question of the possible impact of this dialogue on modern science.     

The mazes of practicing and the horizons

Teaching must take account of young people's individual needs and talents; it must develop their desire for criticism and effort. The spiritual framework must therefore rest on values of rationality and sensitivity. Morality must rest on the notion of personal dignity. In this way, we shall be able to create a horizon, a goal which can inject meaning into life.     

FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO ETHICS: Theoretical and Practical Reason in Kant and Douglass

The aim of this essay is to provide a philosophical discussion of Frederick Douglass's thought in relation to Christianity. I expand upon the work of Bill E. Lawson and Frank M. Kirkland—who both argue that there are Kantian features present in Douglass as it relates to his conception of the individual—by arguing that there are similarities between Douglass and Kant not only concerning the relationship between morality and Christianity, but also concerning the nature of the soul. Specifically, I try to show that the moral weakness of slaveholding Christianity that Douglass attacked is found in the ecclesial formation of the slaveholding Christian church; it is a formation that begins with epistemology, but ignores ethics. I conclude, in part, that both Douglass and Kant reject a Cartesian psychological dualism in favor of a conception of the soul that is more attentive to one's moral development.     

Psychoanalytic treatments and empirical research on their efficacy: A commentary

Abstract

The author summarizes the problems inherent in nomological approaches examining the efficacy of psychoanalysis as a form of treatment. He argues that nomologically oriented research operates with assumptions lacking empirical foundation and, moreover, that studies of this type merely give the impression of the effectiveness of psychoanalytic therapies while overlooking the specificity of the psychoanalytic method. He suggests that research into psychoanalytic treatments should not be subjected to a nomological conception of science, and that structural analysis of treatment courses should be examined and systematized within the frame of psychoanalytic treatment theory relative to their outcome. Given this approach, and provided that the theory of treatment is based on conceptual common ground, such studies would enable a prognostic conclusion that psychoanalytic treatments are successful, providing that the sequences generalized in the treatment theory do actually take place in treatments that take patients’ individuality into account.     

Spaceship Archeology: Methodological Experiments in NSF Counter-Insurgency at the 2017 Oregon Eclipse Festival

Abstract

This article examines several aspects of knowledge production among practitioners of 21st century capitalism, critiquing the motivations, funding, methods, and dissemination of today’s politically and economically dominant epistemology. We document a methodological experiment undertaken during the Oregon Eclipse Festival—a week-long event coinciding with the solar eclipse that crossed the United States on August 21, 2017. As commissioned participants in the festival’s Art & Science exhibit, we designed an interactive archeological excavation that sought to produce material evidence corroborating the (un)reality of UFO activity in Oregon. From this performance, we highlight four insights into the relationship between science, evidence, and responsibility.     

Evolution of sciences and education

We have to fight against scientism if we are to escape from the clutches of an omni‐present techno‐science. But we must also answer the yearning for meaning. A solid general culture, an ability to discern and to resist, a return to epistemology are all ways of putting science back in its real place.     

Integrating global and local perspectives in psycholexical studies: A GloCal approach

Similarities and differences in the results of psycholexical research across cultures may be due to real cross-cultural differences or to specific methodological choices. Two typically approaches used are: global, which follows a variation of the original lexical paradigm, and local, which is indigenous in methods and assumptions. We propose a GloCal approach that is more likely to yield a comprehensive picture of personality by combining approaches informed by a thorough understanding of that language and culture. The GloCal approach allows researchers to (a) identify shared and unique components of personality across cultures, (b) ensure that the lexicon used is relevant to the culture and (c) increase the ecological validity of stimulus materials in personality inventories.     

Epistemic Judgments are Insensitive to Probabilities

Multiple epistemological programs make use of intuitive judgments pertaining to an individual’s ability to gain knowledge from exclusively probabilistic/statistical information. This paper argues that these judgments likely form without deference to such information, instead being a function of the degree to which having knowledge is representative of an agent. Thus, these judgments fit the pattern of formation via a representativeness heuristic, like that famously described by Kahneman and Tversky to explain similar probabilistic judgments. Given this broad insensitivity to probabilistic/statistical information, it directly follows that these epistemic judgments are insensitive to a given agent’s epistemic status. From this, the paper concludes that, breaking with common epistemological practice, we cannot assume that such judgments are reliable.