Luck and Risk

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1 , the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event.     

Passé et present de la psychologie en Afrique subsaharienne

This article is aimed at presenting the past and present of psychology in general and social psychology in particular in subsaharan Africa. For domination and imperialism reasons, most subsaharan psychologists try to reproduce or imitate what is done by psychologists in Western countries. Thus, sub-Saharan psychology is western inspiration. In spite of the important development of psychology teachings in the curriculum of African universities, psychological research in subsaharan Africa remains rather minor and marginal.     

A metaphysics for practical knowledge

Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical knowledge shares features with knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category.     

胰腺干细胞研究中的思考

从干细胞研究发展和胰腺生理病理学研究发展两个方面,横向和纵向两个角度阐述了胰腺干细胞研究的思路,用辩证认识论和普遍联系与对立统一原理分析了胰腺干细胞研究中所面临的问题和挑战,提出应对的策略和方法,并结合胰腺干细胞发展现状,展望其应用前景。     

Are indigenous personality dimensions culture-specific? Mexican inventories and the Five-Factor Model

The universality versus cultural specificity of Mexican personality dimensions was investigated by examining: (a) the replicability of Mexican personality dimensions assessed by indigenous inventories; and (b) the extent to which Mexican dimensions are encompassed by the Five-Factor Model (FFM), one hypothesized universal model of personality structure. Mexican university students (N = 794) completed nine indigenous inventories and the Spanish version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. The FFM replicated well, although reliability was poor for a few facet scales. Reliability was acceptable for the indigenous Mexican scales. However, for most indigenous instruments, a cross-sample replication criterion suggested alternative structures of fewer, more replicable dimensions. Multiple regression and joint factor analyses revealed that most of the Mexican dimensions were well subsumed by the FFM. Thus, cultural differences did not involve clearly culture-specific dimensions, but more subtle differences in the salience or cultural flavor of particular traits.     

Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality. Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.

Compatibilism and Doxastic Control

Sharon Ryan has recently argued that if one has compatibilist intuitions about free action, then one should reject the claim that agents cannot exercise direct voluntary control over coming to believe. In this paper I argue that the differences between beliefs and actions make the expectation of direct voluntary control over coming to believe unreasonable. So Ryan's theory of doxastic agency is untenable.

Possibilities and Limits of Self-reflection in the Teaching Profession

Reflection seems today to be highest fashion ineducation, especially in discussions aboutteacher education and the teaching profession.This has created the paradoxical situation that reflection is often used in an unreflectedmanner. Furthermore, this discovery ofreflection is not supported by earlierresearch. In philosophy, however, reflectionhas always played a central role.The purpose of this study is to investigate thepossibilities and limits of self-reflection forthe teaching profession by relating the problemto three masters of philosophy of reflection,i.e., René Descartes, Immanuel Kant andEdmund Husserl. In this way it is hoped that itwill be possible to learn from specialists onreflection for the teaching profession. Thelessons do not, however, need to be exclusivelypositive. Also from deficiencies and mistakesit is possible to learn.     

Belief,Apparitions, and Rationality: The Social Scientific Study of Religion after Wittgenstein<Subscript>1</Subscript>

The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that – far from being a settled and established entity – religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a pragmatic resource whose configuration is shaped to allow the accomplishment of interactional moves within specific contexts. I defend this thesis by analyzing accounts pertaining to a contemporary religious apparition claim.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.