Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox: How to resolve it with lessons for psychology

Four assumptions about rule-learning in mathematics continue to be central to psychology—mathematical rules are clear and exact, their applications are well defined, their learning is typically through social experiences, whose mechanisms are causal. All four are contradicted in Wittgenstein's analysis of the rule-following paradox (RFP) one of whose essential features is the normativity of mathematical rules. Although RFP is alive well in 21st century philosophy, it has received scant attention in psychology. My argument is in four parts—a brief review of rule-learning in psychology under the four assumptions; a substantial review of RFP in which they are invalidated; a confirming re-analysis in Piaget's developmental epistemology (DE) with its research-program for an empirically based interpretation of normativity; and four implications for psychology about the limits of causal models, constructivism and rules, rules and networks, novelty as inherent in mental functioning throughout human development.     

胰腺干细胞研究中的思考

从干细胞研究发展和胰腺生理病理学研究发展两个方面,横向和纵向两个角度阐述了胰腺干细胞研究的思路,用辩证认识论和普遍联系与对立统一原理分析了胰腺干细胞研究中所面临的问题和挑战,提出应对的策略和方法,并结合胰腺干细胞发展现状,展望其应用前景。     

Are indigenous personality dimensions culture-specific? Mexican inventories and the Five-Factor Model

The universality versus cultural specificity of Mexican personality dimensions was investigated by examining: (a) the replicability of Mexican personality dimensions assessed by indigenous inventories; and (b) the extent to which Mexican dimensions are encompassed by the Five-Factor Model (FFM), one hypothesized universal model of personality structure. Mexican university students (N = 794) completed nine indigenous inventories and the Spanish version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. The FFM replicated well, although reliability was poor for a few facet scales. Reliability was acceptable for the indigenous Mexican scales. However, for most indigenous instruments, a cross-sample replication criterion suggested alternative structures of fewer, more replicable dimensions. Multiple regression and joint factor analyses revealed that most of the Mexican dimensions were well subsumed by the FFM. Thus, cultural differences did not involve clearly culture-specific dimensions, but more subtle differences in the salience or cultural flavor of particular traits.     

Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility

The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. In recent discussions, some have attempted to explicate the notion in terms of epistemic possibility. There are, however, two notions of epistemic possibility, a more familiar one and a novel one. I argue that these two notions are independent of one another. Both are irrelevant to an account of modal knowledge on the predominant view of modal reality. Only the novel notion is relevant and apt on the competing view of modal reality; but this latter view is problematic in light of compelling counterexamples. Insufficient care regarding the independent notions of epistemic possibility can lead to two problems: a gross problem of conflation and a more subtle problem of obscuring a crucial fact of modal epistemology. Either problem needlessly hampers efforts to develop an adequate account of modal knowledge. I conclude that the familiar notion of epistemic possibility (and the very term ‘epistemic possibility’) should be eschewed in the context of modal epistemology.

Universal Plotkinism: A Review Of Henry Plotkin’s Darwin Machines And The Nature of Knowledge

Plotkin's Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1993) is a major contribution to the field of evolutionary epistemology and universal Darwinism. Evolutionary epistemology is the idea that evolution is a knowledge‐gaining process. Universal Darwinism holds that processes of variation and selection can be observed at different levels from the primary level of biological evolution (where genes code for phenotypes) through to individual learning and culture (where the units of variation and selection are not so clear cut). Although antithetical to behaviorism, large parts of Plotkin's thesis can be recast in nonmentalistic terms and exploited by behavior analysts. In particular, Plotkin's arguments for a strong commonality of process between biological evolution and individual learning offer directions for progress on questions that have long interested behavior analysts, such as: Why do some organisms learn? How did learning evolve? What is the relation between behavior and evolution? Although the paths of connection between evolution and individual behavior that Plotkin sketches are not yet fully clear of confusion, his is undoubtedly a very stimulating direction to explore.     

‚Was Ist Begründung?’ Schwierigkeiten durch den Primat der Pragmatik vor der Semantik am Beispiel des Erlanger/Konstanzer Konstruktivismus

‘What is justification?’-Constructivism of Erlangen/Constanceschool as an example for problems resulting from priority of pragmatics to semantics. - R. Brandom's ‘Making it explicit’ is an attempt to work out how semantics is rooted in pragmatics: meaning in use and conceptual content in social functional roles. A philosophy that also focuses on reconstructing those norms that are implicit in pragmatics and constitutive to semanticsis developed by Constructivism of Erlangen/Constance school. This enquiry tries to work out that a discussion of constructivism might be useful for a comprehension of Brandom's ‘theory of expression’, because both philosophical positions meet themselves in a pragmatic way of justification that makes it impossible to justify claims to all rational beings but only to members of those communities that share the same interests and institutions.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.     

Schooling Bodies Through Physical Education: Insights from Social Epistemology and Curriculum History

Using mainly historical material fromAustralia, the paper seeks to understand earlyforms of school physical training, sport andmedical inspection as specialised means ofschooling bodies. The study adopts a socialepistemological perspective in seeking tounderstand the meaning-in-use of notions suchas physical training. It explores the socialconsequences of the practices carried out inthe name of physical training, particularly inrelation to shifts in the social regulation ofbodies over time from a mass, externalised, andcentralised form to a relatively moreindividualised, internalised and diffuse form.This focus on the body is of key importance fora social epistemological study of physicaleducation because it forces us to look closelyat the practices constituting physicaleducation.     

Toward a Philosophy of Blockchain: A Symposium: Introduction

This article introduces the symposium “Toward a Philosophy of Blockchain,” which provides a philosophical contemplation of blockchain technology, the digital ledger software underlying cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin, for the secure transfer of money, assets, and information via the Internet without needing a third‐party intermediary. The symposium offers philosophical scholarship on a new topic, blockchain technology, from a variety of perspectives. The philosophical themes discussed include mathematical models of reality, signification, and the sociopolitical institutions that structure human life and interaction. The symposium also investigates the metaphilosophical theme of how to create a philosophy of anything, specifically a new topic such as blockchain technology. Repeated themes are identified, in all areas of philosophical inquiry (ontology, epistemology, and axiology), and conceptual resources are elaborated to contribute to a philosophical understanding of blockchain technology. Thus, philosophy as a metaphilosophical approach is shown to be able to provide an understanding of the conceptual, theoretical, and foundational dimensions of novelty and emergence in the world, with a particular focus on blockchain technology.