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541.
Victoria Lorrimar 《Theology & Science》2017,15(2):188-202
This paper focuses on the work of Philip Hefner, who employs Lakatosian scientific research programme methodology in order to develop and articulate certain theological concepts. Lakatos’ methodology has been criticised on several counts, including its dependence on reconstructed history and the risk of prematurely abandoning a scientific theory. Hefner does not address these critiques directly, nor does he modify his own methodology sufficiently to avoid valid criticism. Finally, this paper explores the implications of applying a Lakatosian methodology to theology for the way in which we understand truth in relation to the methodology’s criterion of fruitfulness. 相似文献
542.
Leslie Smith 《New Ideas in Psychology》2009,27(2):228-242
Four assumptions about rule-learning in mathematics continue to be central to psychology—mathematical rules are clear and exact, their applications are well defined, their learning is typically through social experiences, whose mechanisms are causal. All four are contradicted in Wittgenstein's analysis of the rule-following paradox (RFP) one of whose essential features is the normativity of mathematical rules. Although RFP is alive well in 21st century philosophy, it has received scant attention in psychology. My argument is in four parts—a brief review of rule-learning in psychology under the four assumptions; a substantial review of RFP in which they are invalidated; a confirming re-analysis in Piaget's developmental epistemology (DE) with its research-program for an empirically based interpretation of normativity; and four implications for psychology about the limits of causal models, constructivism and rules, rules and networks, novelty as inherent in mental functioning throughout human development. 相似文献
543.
Paul Boghossian 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):111-119
I agree with Sosa that intuitions are best thought of as attractions to believe a certain proposition merely on the basis
of understanding it. However, I don’t think it is constitutive of them that they supply strictly foundational justification
for the propositions they justify, though I do believe that it is important that the intuition of a suitable subject be thought
of as a prima facie justification for his intuitive judgment, independently of the reliability of his underlying capacities.
I also think that we need to be able to explain how mere understanding of a proposition can confer upon us an ability to have
reliable intuitions, that we cannot simply take that idea for granted. And that when try to explain that, our best avenue
for doing so is to take the intuitions as constituting the understanding of which they are said to be a manifestation.
相似文献
Paul BoghossianEmail: |
544.
Alex Levine 《Synthese》2009,166(3):593-600
Nineteenth and twentieth century philosophies of science have consistently failed to identify any rational basis for the compelling
character of scientific analogies. This failure is particularly worrisome in light of the fact that the development and diffusion
of certain scientific analogies, e.g. Darwin’s analogy between domestic breeds and naturally occurring species, constitute
paradigm cases of good science. It is argued that the interactivist model, through the notion of a partition epistemology, provides a way to understand the persuasive character of compelling scientific analogies without consigning them to an irrational
or arational context of discovery. 相似文献
545.
Mark H. Bickhard 《Synthese》2009,166(3):547-591
A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative
phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity,
and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational
forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This
process model of representation, called interactivism, compels changes in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief
attention to three domains in which changes are induced by the representational model: perception, learning, and language. 相似文献
546.
Igor Douven 《Synthese》2009,168(1):23-52
External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and
equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal
alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This
paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes possible
once it is recognized that the skeptic holds overly defensive and ill-motivated positions vis-à-vis both evidence and inference,
and that more reasonable ones are available. In stating these more reasonable positions, as well as in showing how they make
possible an a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate, the paper draws on the machinery of Bayesian epistemology. 相似文献
547.
EVELYN BRISTER 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(5):671-688
Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems. 相似文献
548.
Anthony J. Marsella 《Psychological studies》2009,54(1):23-27
This article identifies ten implicit and explicit assumptions of Western psychology that are rooted within its cultural history,
traditions, and values. Unfortunately, these assumptions have informed and dominated the knowledge and practice of psychology
across the world because of historic, cultural, political, and economic reasons. It is now clear, however, that the indiscriminate
acceptance and application of Western psychological knowledge and practices constitutes a serious abuse for non-Western people
and for ethnic/racial minorities in Western nations. This abuse is often transmitted and exacerbated via the training of international
and ethnic minority students who learn to accept Western psychology as universal. In a global community in which all our lives
have become interdependent, it is essential Western psychology be re-considered as a “cultural construction” with all the
ethnocentric limitations this implies. As a counter, efforts must be made to acknowledge, develop, and transmit the diverse
indigenous/national psychologies from across the world. 相似文献
549.
Mark Kaplan 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(5):563-581
Abstract: Roderick Chisholm famously held that our knowledge of the world is supported entirely by a foundation of self‐justifying statements, none of which logically implies the existence of any physical object in that world. The only contingent statements to be found in the foundation, he maintained, are those that are “about our own psychological states and the ways we are ‘appeared to’.” It is a view that, as Chisholm was well aware, tallies poorly with our ordinary practice of justifying statements. We are typically happy to justify statements by ultimate appeal to what we have seen or heard; that is, by ultimate appeal to statements that logically imply that certain things in the world are as we take them to be. This essay examines how Chisholm sought to explain away this apparent disconfirmation of foundationalism by ordinary practice—in effect, how Chisholm responded to one of the chief criticisms of foundationalism launched by J. L. Austin. My suggestion will be that, when the dust clears, it is Austin who comes out ahead. 相似文献
550.
Linda Zagzebski 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1&2):12-28
Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life. 相似文献