Shaping reality vs. hiding from reality: Reconsidering the effects of trait need for closure on information search

For tentative and final decisions on real and artificial issues, three studies revealed a positive relation between trait need for closure and selective approach to supportive (vs. unsupportive) information. Specifically, individuals with high (vs. low) trait need for closure selected more decision-supportive information and less decision-challenging information for viewing. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that the effect of trait need for closure functioned independently of authoritarianism and dogmatism, and Study 3 showed that the effect of trait need for closure on selective approach to decision-supportive information was mediated by a current concern to get closure on the experimental issue. These findings provide a new understanding of how trait need for closure shapes post-decisional information search and decision making.     

The Discursive Frames of Political Psychology

The aim of this article is to apply elements of contemporary social theory to the major theoretical, methodological, and ideological divisions across political psychology and to consider both the origins and the impact of a range of theories and models. In so doing, we clarify some of the complexity surrounding the discursive and cultural origins of political psychology. On the basis of this analysis, we aim to overcome the redundant binaries and dualisms—both conceptual and geo‐spatial—that have characterized the field up to now. These binary pairs relate to matters of epistemology, ideology, and methodology, and we show how each pair has been the basis of claims made regarding continental differences. As we shall see, such black‐and‐white thinking limits our capacity to understand the nature and potential of political psychology. Instead we wish to encourage a greater degree of universalism and globalism that is appropriate to political psychology as it evolves into a broader global discipline. We argue that political psychology as a field must attempt to deal with the consequences of an increasingly borderless world in which political identities are becoming more fluid, increasingly hybridized, and open to transformation.     

What is conceptual research in psychoanalysis?1

The development of psychoanalysis as a science and clinical practice has always relied heavily on various forms of conceptual research. Thus, conceptual research has clarifi ed, formulated and reformulated psychoanalytic concepts permitting to better shape the fi ndings emerging in the clinical setting. By enhancing clarity and explicitness in concept usage it has facilitated the integration of existing psychoanalytic thinking as well as the development of new ways of looking at clinical and extraclinical data. Moreover, it has offered conceptual bridges to neighbouring disciplines particularly interested in psychoanalysis, e.g. philosophy, sociology, aesthetics, history of art and literature, and more recently cognitive science/neuroscience. In the present phase of psychoanalytic pluralism, of worldwide scientifi c communication among psychoanalysts irrespective of language differences and furthermore of an intensifying dialogue with other disciplines, the relevance of conceptual research is steadily increasing. Yet, it still often seems insuffi ciently clear how conceptual research can be differentiated from clinical and empirical research in psychoanalysis. Therefore, the Subcommittee for Conceptual Research of the IPA presents some of its considerations on the similarities and the differences between various forms of clinical and extraclinical research, their specifi c aims, quality criteria and thus their specifi c chances as well as their specifi c limitations in this paper. Examples taken from six issues of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 2002‐3 serve as illustrations for seven different subtypes of conceptual research.     

HOW ACTS OF DISCOVERY TRANSFORM OUR TACIT KNOWING POWERS IN BOTH SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS INQUIRY

Abstract. In this essay I take Michael Polanyi's analysis of scientific discovery and extend it to encompass fresh encounters with the living God. Given the embodied character of all human knowing, Polanyi challenged objectivism and positivism as untenable. In its place, Polanyi noted that the tacit skills established when a physicist learns to detect radio waves has its counterpart in a Christian's being trained to find God. Once trained, stubborn organismic habits constrain both physicist and believer within a socially approved heuristic circle that can be broken only by the act of discovery. The puzzlement that erupts at the onset of an inquiry ultimately finds relief only in an expanded encounter with the realities that one has been trained to serve. Thus, the act of discovery not only serves to disrupt the tradition as it has been received but also reveals that the realities being served make themselves known in novel ways. The lifelong pursuit of God and the lifelong pursuit of novel manifestations of radio waves thus share a common epistemological and phenomenological underpinning.     

EMERGENCE AND HUMAN UNIQUENESS: LIMITING OR DELIMITING EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION?

Abstract. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence presents a highly sophisticated argument against any kind of uncritical theology that might want to follow science into a world of overly narrow, compartmentalized disciplines that do not sufficiently communicate between themselves. Clayton argues persuasively that the basic structure of the phenomenal world is multileveled, with emergent properties and degrees of freedom that cannot be adequately described, predicted, or explained in terms of lower‐level phenomena only. Moreover, the various levels of organization are linked to one another by interfaces of mutual constraint in terms of upward and downward causation. The most valuable part of Clayton's argument, however, is that in a philosophy of emergence one must also, if not especially, account for the role of the biological sciences and especially for the influence of human thoughts and skills, human choices and actions, and—one of the most important causes of all—human purposes. Clayton's biggest challenge is that the level of human personhood offers us the only appropriate level to introduce the question of God and the possibility of divine agency. I critically evaluate this central claim and its implications not only for the extent of divine influence on the world but also for the scope and limitations of the interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the sciences.     

The Relation of Personal Epistemology to Parenting Style and Goal Orientation in College Mothers

This study sought to establish the relevance of mothers’ epistemic beliefs to their parenting style and preferred academic goals for their child. College mothers (N = 163) from primarily working class families completed a variety of self-report measures including a modified version of Schommer’s [(1990). Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504] Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, the Parental Attitudes Questionnaire-Revised [Reitman, Rhode, Hupp, & Altobello (2002). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 24(2), 119–127], and several goal orientation scales. Results indicated that a view of learning as effortful and under the learner’s control and a view of knowledge as actively constructed were associated with an authoritative parenting style and with a preference for their child to focus on learning, improvement, and effort in approaching academic tasks. By contrast, a view of learning as quick, straightforward, relatively passive and as based in innate constraints and a view of knowledge as consisting of discreet, unambiguous facts were associated with authoritarian and permissive styles and the adoption of performance goals for one’s child. Portions of this study were presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in Atlanta, April, 2005.     

A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition. __________ Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5)     

PERSONALITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: COGNITIVE SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY AS A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Abstract. Implicit in the cognitive social learning model of personality as articulated by Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and others, is an epistemology which emphasizes the activity of the mind in the construction of knowledge. Using Mischel's five person variables as an outline, the epistemic implications of this model of personality are developed and then illustrated by application to William James's typology of the religious personality and to the current debate over hermeneutic and empirical approaches to studying human behavior. This approach explicates the connection between personality characteristics and epistemological approaches in terms of cognitive social learning theory.     

Rationale for a pragma-dialectical perspective

Starting from a concept of reasonableness as well-consideredness, it is discussed in what way science could serve as a model for reasonable argumentation. It turns out that in order to be reasonable two requirements have to be fulfilled. The argumentation should comply with rules which are both problem-valid and intersubjectively valid. Geometrical and anthropological perspectives don't meet these criteria, but a critical perspective does. It is explained that a pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation which agrees with this critical perspective is indeed problem-valid and that strong pragmatic and utilitarian arguments can be given for its intersubjective validity. Thus, conventional validity is promoted for a code of conduct for discussants who want to resolve their disputes reasonably by way of a critical discussion.     

Goldman and the foundations of social epistemology

This essay argues that Alvin I. Goldman's truth-linked theory of group knowledge (veritism) omits individual components of social cognition, that all group based theories of knowledge lead to scepticism, and that if any sense is to be made of social knowledge, it must be done on individualist lines. I argue that Goldman's veritism can be reconstructed by adopting a reliabilist theory,social reliabilism. And I argue that Goldman's objections to a particular sort of consensualism are not telling. So there are now two plausible and competing theories of social knowledge-social reliabilism and consensualism.I am grateful to Keith Lehrer and Alvin Goldman for their criticisms of previous drafts of this paper.