全文获取类型
| 收费全文 | 642篇 |
| 免费 | 23篇 |
| 国内免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
| 666篇 |
出版年
| 2024年 | 8篇 |
| 2023年 | 12篇 |
| 2022年 | 2篇 |
| 2021年 | 9篇 |
| 2020年 | 22篇 |
| 2019年 | 42篇 |
| 2018年 | 21篇 |
| 2017年 | 26篇 |
| 2016年 | 31篇 |
| 2015年 | 24篇 |
| 2014年 | 29篇 |
| 2013年 | 82篇 |
| 2012年 | 20篇 |
| 2011年 | 11篇 |
| 2010年 | 15篇 |
| 2009年 | 25篇 |
| 2008年 | 24篇 |
| 2007年 | 36篇 |
| 2006年 | 28篇 |
| 2005年 | 22篇 |
| 2004年 | 22篇 |
| 2003年 | 32篇 |
| 2002年 | 19篇 |
| 2001年 | 12篇 |
| 2000年 | 19篇 |
| 1999年 | 16篇 |
| 1998年 | 5篇 |
| 1997年 | 13篇 |
| 1996年 | 5篇 |
| 1995年 | 8篇 |
| 1994年 | 9篇 |
| 1993年 | 1篇 |
| 1992年 | 3篇 |
| 1991年 | 5篇 |
| 1990年 | 1篇 |
| 1989年 | 2篇 |
| 1988年 | 4篇 |
| 1987年 | 1篇 |
排序方式： 共有666条查询结果，搜索用时 15 毫秒
501.
Robert C. Scharff 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):475-504
Abstract This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired. 相似文献
502.
Karl E. Peters 《Zygon》2008,43(1):19-26
Differences in methods of knowing correlate with differences in concepts about what is known. This is an underlying issue in science and religion. It is seen, first, in Arthur Peacocke's reasoning about God as transcendent and personal, is based on an assumption of correlative thinking that like causes like. This contrasts with a notion of causation in empirical science, which explains the emergence of new phenomena as originating from temporally prior phenomena quite unlike that which emerges. The scientific understanding of causation is compatible with a naturalistic theism that holds a nonpersonal model of God as the creative process. However, focusing on the immanence of God, there is a second correlation between methods of knowing and concepts of God. Classical empiricism, used by science, correlates with God understood nonpersonally as the creative process. Radical empiricism, in which feelings and not only sense perceptions have cognitive import, opens up the possibility that one can experience Peacocke's personal, panentheistic God as pattern‐forming influence. I illustrate this second method‐concept correlation with a personal experience. 相似文献
503.
Chris Coughran 《Science as culture》2013,22(3):335-339
Several academic traditions have addressed epistemological objectivity and/or partisanship in the study of technoscientific controversies. On the one hand, positivist and relativist scholars agree that the political commitments of the social researcher should not impinge on scientific enquiry, while on the other hand, feminist and Marxist scholars not only take stands in diverse technoscientific debates, but even claim their agendas to be more credible than those of orthodox scientists. Such perspectives stress that all research is partisan in one way or another because it involves questions of who controls, manipulates, and establishes decisions, facts, and knowledge. With this in mind, it is possible to identify different forms of partisan research including capture by participants, de facto and overt partisanship, and mercenary scholarship. These different forms of partisan scholarship are characterised by differences in the motives underlying epistemological choices of research topic and method, personal commitments to the fields studied, use of research findings in controversies, and positioning of results in wider debates. Two examples help to illustrate partisan scholarship: first, a study of new technologies for managing climate change (carbon dioxide capture and storage); and second, the construction of the new underground metro system in Athens and its accommodation of accessibility standards. Both cases entail partisan positions and raise similar concerns about the orthodox epistemological assumptions underpinning sociotechnical systems, especially when it comes to technoscientific controversies. Supporting STS partisan scholarship, therefore, enables greater social and democratic engagement with technoscientific development. 相似文献
504.
Unger (1974/2000 ) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge. 相似文献
505.
Anne Pedersen Brian Griffiths Susan E. Watt 《Journal of community & applied social psychology》2008,18(6):543-557
Although social perception research has been carried out across a number of diverse domains, to the best of our knowledge, studies have not directly assessed the relationship between attitudes toward the out‐group and perceptions of community support for those attitudes. In the present research, we report the findings of a study conducted in Western Australia using data collected from 653 participants from three different locations. The main thrust of our study was the accuracy of beliefs about consensus as it related to attitudes toward two marginalized groups: Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers. With respect to their attitudes toward these two groups, our respondents were placed in seven categories corresponding to their responses to our seven point attitude scales. Three main findings emerged. First, respondents at all seven levels overestimated community support for their views with respect to both Indigenous Australians and asylum seekers. Second, as respondents in both groups became more rejecting, their estimates of community support progressively increased in a linear fashion. Third, respondents in the more negative categories were significantly less accurate in their estimates than those in the more positive categories. How these findings might contribute to programmes designed to reduce prejudice is discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
506.
JASON BAEHR 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):456-470
Abstract: I examine here whether reliability is a defining feature of (moral or intellectual) virtues. I argue (1) that reliability is not a defining feature of a virtue where virtues are conceived (as they often are) as “personal excellences,” but (2) that there is another (also intuitive and familiar) conception of a virtue according to which reliability is a defining feature. I also argue (3) that even on the former conception, a certain rational belief pertaining to reliability is essential and (4) that reliability itself, while not a defining feature of a virtue thus conceived, nevertheless is a concomitant of it. 相似文献
507.
TIMM TRIPLETT 《Metaphilosophy》2007,38(4):370-379
Abstract: Bernard Gert argues that, while the moral system contains a procedure for resolving most moral disagreements, it does not allow for such resolution in all cases. For example, it does not allow for the resolution of disputes about whether animals and human fetuses should be included within the scope of those to whom the moral rules apply. I agree with Gert that not all moral debates can be resolved, but I believe that Gert does not use all the argumentative resources available to philosophers to resolve them. I argue that considerations outside the moral system proper can be used to provide argumentative support favoring some positions over their rivals in moral controversies that Gert regards as intractable. I illustrate this with reference to the abortion debate. I also argue that reaching such conclusions about the superiority of one position over rivals need not result in moral arrogance. 相似文献
508.
SIEGFRIED ZEPF 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2006,87(6):1529-1548
The author examines Bowlby's attachment theory and more recent versions of it from an epistemological viewpoint and subjects it to questioning on whether they are in line with central concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. He argues that Bowlby's basic tenets regarding attachment theory, which later attachment theorists never seriously questioned, do not conform to scientifi c standards, and that psychoanalytic issues such as the dynamic unconscious, internal confl icts, interaction of drive wishes and the role of defence in establishing substitutive formations are either ignored or not treated in suffi cient depth. In the light of this, Fonagy's assertion that psychoanalytic criticism of attachment theory arose from mutual misunderstandings and ought nowadays to be seen as outdated is reversed: psychoanalytic criticism can only be regarded as outdated if either basic tenets of Freudian psychoanalysis, or attachment theory or both are misunderstood. 相似文献
509.
DUNCAN PRITCHARD 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(1):1-25
Abstract: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of epistemic luck, especially that version of the problem that is traditionally presented by the epistemological sceptic. It is further claimed that once one offers a more developed notion of luck and disambiguates the problem of moral luck from the problem of epistemic luck (especially in its sceptical guise), neither of these papers is able to offer unambiguous grounds for thinking that there is a problem of moral luck. Indeed, it is shown that in so far as these papers succeed in making a prima facie case for the existence of epistemic luck, it is only the familiar sceptical variant of this problem that they identify. 相似文献
510.
REN VAN WOUDENBERG 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(2):210-221
Abstract: This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious. 相似文献