What is conceptual research in psychoanalysis?1

The development of psychoanalysis as a science and clinical practice has always relied heavily on various forms of conceptual research. Thus, conceptual research has clarifi ed, formulated and reformulated psychoanalytic concepts permitting to better shape the fi ndings emerging in the clinical setting. By enhancing clarity and explicitness in concept usage it has facilitated the integration of existing psychoanalytic thinking as well as the development of new ways of looking at clinical and extraclinical data. Moreover, it has offered conceptual bridges to neighbouring disciplines particularly interested in psychoanalysis, e.g. philosophy, sociology, aesthetics, history of art and literature, and more recently cognitive science/neuroscience. In the present phase of psychoanalytic pluralism, of worldwide scientifi c communication among psychoanalysts irrespective of language differences and furthermore of an intensifying dialogue with other disciplines, the relevance of conceptual research is steadily increasing. Yet, it still often seems insuffi ciently clear how conceptual research can be differentiated from clinical and empirical research in psychoanalysis. Therefore, the Subcommittee for Conceptual Research of the IPA presents some of its considerations on the similarities and the differences between various forms of clinical and extraclinical research, their specifi c aims, quality criteria and thus their specifi c chances as well as their specifi c limitations in this paper. Examples taken from six issues of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 2002‐3 serve as illustrations for seven different subtypes of conceptual research.     

The Relation of Personal Epistemology to Parenting Style and Goal Orientation in College Mothers

This study sought to establish the relevance of mothers’ epistemic beliefs to their parenting style and preferred academic goals for their child. College mothers (N = 163) from primarily working class families completed a variety of self-report measures including a modified version of Schommer’s [(1990). Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 498–504] Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire, the Parental Attitudes Questionnaire-Revised [Reitman, Rhode, Hupp, & Altobello (2002). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 24(2), 119–127], and several goal orientation scales. Results indicated that a view of learning as effortful and under the learner’s control and a view of knowledge as actively constructed were associated with an authoritative parenting style and with a preference for their child to focus on learning, improvement, and effort in approaching academic tasks. By contrast, a view of learning as quick, straightforward, relatively passive and as based in innate constraints and a view of knowledge as consisting of discreet, unambiguous facts were associated with authoritarian and permissive styles and the adoption of performance goals for one’s child. Portions of this study were presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in Atlanta, April, 2005.     

A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition. __________ Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5)     

VIRTUE ETHICS AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Abstract: The aim of this essay is to test the claim that epistemologists—virtue epistemologists in particular—have much to learn from virtue ethics. The essay begins with an outline of virtue ethics itself. This section concludes that a pure form of virtue ethics is likely to be unattractive, so the virtue epistemologist should examine the "impure" views of real philosophers. Aristotle is usually held up as the paradigm virtue ethicist. His doctrine of the mean is described, and it is explained how that doctrine can provide a framework for an account of epistemic virtue. The conclusion of the essay is that a virtue epistemology based on analogies with virtue ethics, though well worth developing and considering, will face several challenges in fulfilling the significant promises that have been made on its behalf.     

Moving beyond the enduring dominance of positivism in psychological research: Implications for psychology in Australia

Almost since its inception, the dominant narrative of modern psychology has embraced positivism through its insistence that psychological science is objective, generalisable, and value free (or neutral). Consequently, quantitative research and, in particular, experimental designs, are privileged over other forms of enquiry, and other epistemologies, methodologies, and methods remain marginalised within the discipline. We argue that the enduring hegemony of positivism needs to be opposed to enable psychology to genuinely understand the antecedents of, and provide meaningful sustainable solutions for, complex human issues without being constrained by a narrow focus on method. We discuss the ways in which psychology in Australia can move towards embracing a constructionist epistemology that provides the framework for methodological pluralism. We provide a number of suggestions for change across the interrelated areas of accreditation, curriculum, the Australian Psychological Society, and research.     

结直肠癌治疗药物选择的哲学启示

结直肠癌是常见的恶性肿瘤,近年来结直肠癌的药物治疗在快速发展,从最初仅有化疗,到现在的靶向治疗、免疫治疗。这些药物该如何选择,是临床医生经常遇到的问题。运用哲学的唯物辩证法和唯物认识论的思维分析方法指导临床实践,厘清结直肠癌治疗过程中存在的实际问题,包括如何平衡治疗与不良反应的关系、全身治疗与局部治疗的关系、准确评估疗效、抓住治疗的节点、适度治疗。为如何在哲学思维的指导下为结直肠癌患者选择药物治疗提供了新的启示。

     

以认识论思想促进循证医学的不断发展

循证医学（evidence-based medicine,EBM）正式出现至今已历经30年,30年来EBM对医学,包括医学以外的一些领域带来了巨大的改变,可谓有力推进了整个医学的进步。本文结合人类认识进步带来的改变与特殊作用,从关于证据、进一步认识医学、颠覆式的决策思维：医患共同决策、促进EBM不断发展四个方面展开阐释和讨论。显示了认识论思想在EBM与时俱进过程中所具有的指导性与重要性,并力图以认识论的思想丰富和促进EBM的不断发展。

     

Storytellers and Scenario Spinners: Some Reflections on Religion and Science in Light of a Pragmatic, Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge

Asserting that both scientists and religious thinkers are involved in telling stories about the past and spinning scenarios about the future, I first compare and contrast the purposes of scientific and religious storytelling. Then, in light of some recent work on brain and language evolution, I offer a possible story about how humans might have become storytellers. Finally, I discuss how religious stories might be evaluated pragmatically and even scientifically by developing Lakatosian-type research programs.     

Lucky achievement: virtue epistemology on the value of knowledge

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.     

The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good

Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this "the value problem." I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p , not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p ? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. In the best kinds of knowing, the knower not only gets credit for getting the truth but also gets credit for getting a desirable truth. The kind of value that makes knowledge a fitting object of extensive philosophical inquiry is not independent of moral value and the wider values of a good life.