Mattering at the Intersection of Psychology,Philosophy, and Politics

Mattering is an ideal state of affairs consisting of two complementary psychological experiences: feeling valued and adding value. Human beings can feel valued by, and add value to, self, others, work, and community. To make sure that the need for mattering is fulfilled, we must balance feeling valued with adding value. Moreover, we must balance adding value to self with adding value to others. Unfortunately, the dominant neoliberal philosophy does not support the values required to ensure the experience of mattering. Whereas a healthy and fair society would require equilibrium among values for personal, relational, and collective well-being, the dominant philosophy in many parts of the world favors personal at the expense of relational and collective values. Neoliberal economic and social policies have resulted in diminished sense of mattering for millions of people. Some people respond to cultural pressures to achieve higher status by becoming depressive or aggressive. Some marginalized groups, in turn, support xenophobic, nationalistic, and populist policies in an effort to regain a sense of mattering. To make sure that everyone matters, we must align the psychology, philosophy, and politics of mattering. The political struggle for a just and equitable distribution of mattering takes place in social movements and the policy arena. The perils and promises of these efforts are considered.     

The Value of Sacrifices

ABSTRACT

Most authors who discuss the normative impact of sacrifices do so with regards to the impact that a sacrifice can have on the practical reasons of the agent who makes it. A different and underappreciated phenomenon of sacrifices is their other-regarding normative impact: the sacrifice of person A can have an impact on the practical reasons of person B, either by generating practical reasons for B to act in certain ways or by intensifying existing reasons of B for specific courses of action. This paper asks when and why sacrifices have such other-regarding normative impact and argues that sacrifices can have other-regarding normative impact because sacrifices can be intrinsically good. The intrinsic value of sacrifices is explained by the recursive account of value: sacrifices are intrinsically good if and because they are appropriate responses to intrinsic values, and appropriate responses to intrinsic values are themselves intrinsically good. Furthermore, sacrifices are difficult to make, and successful pursuit in difficult activities can also be intrinsically good.     

Public concerns about violent video games are moral concerns—How moral threat can make pacifists susceptible to scientific and political claims against violent video games

Public discussions about the harmfulness of violent media are often held in the aftermath of violent felony. At the same time, we know little about whether and how experiencing real‐life violence impacts the way laypersons perceive and evaluate debates about virtual violence. In Study 1, we provided data indicating that both real‐life violence and violent video games are perceived as morally threatening by people who regard nonviolence to be an important moral value (i.e., pacifists). In Study 2, we hypothesized and found that when pacifists perceive threat from the presence of real‐life violence, they are especially susceptible to scientific and political claims indicating that violent video games are harmful. Our findings are in line with the value protection model and research on the psychological consequences of threat. Implications of the present findings are discussed with regard to a better understanding of the violent video games debate in the general public.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

Perception of parents as demonstrating the inherent merit of their values: Relations with self‐congruence and subjective well‐being

This study focuses on the parenting practice of inherent value demonstration (IVD), involving parents' tendency to express their values in behaviours and appear satisfied and vital while doing so. Data from Chinese college students (n = 89) confirmed the hypothesis that offspring's perception of their parents as engaged in IVD predicts offspring's subjective well‐being (SWB) through sense of self‐congruence. Importantly, these relations emerged also when controlling for fundamental autonomy‐supportive (FAS) parenting practices such as taking children's perspective, minimising control and allowing choice. These findings are consistent with the view that parents concerned with their children's sense of autonomy may do well to engage in IVD in addition to more fundamental autonomy‐supportive practices. Future research may examine the role of IVD in promoting authentic values that serve as an internal compass that guides children to act in ways that feel self‐congruent.     

731部队——半个多世纪后的反思

通过对日本731部队进行细菌战及美国掩盖这一事实的案例分析,强调科学不能背离人道,而要为人道服务;政治也不能不顾人道,反人道的政治终究是要失败的。因此,尊重伦理的基本价值、基本原则和基本规范具有极大的重要性和现实性。     

对心理咨询中价值干预问题的理性思考

对价值问题的处理是心理咨询中的重要哲学命题。人本主义心理学所遵循的“价值中立”原则,是心理咨询中回避价值干预的根源所在。通过对心理咨询理论的整体审视,提出不能简单地把价值中立原则拓展到整个心理咨询之中,不能忽视心理咨询的教育功能和社会责任,纯粹的“价值中立”是无法实现的。     

喜树碱类药物四十年研发的回顾与反思

通过对喜树碱类药物研发过程的历史回顾,探讨其存在的哲学意义和对其它植物药研发的价值。     

药用曲的发展历史及其当代价值

酒曲初始应用为酿酒,后我国先民发现酒曲可以用于治疗疾病便将其纳入方剂之中,方剂中的酒曲又逐渐演化成专供药用的药用曲。药用曲在我国古代各个时期具有鲜明的特征,在曲类药物的溯源研究中具有导向性作用。至1956年,《中药成药配制经验介绍》正式提出“曲剂”的名词概念和相关标准,药用曲的完整内涵得以呈现。随着传统中医与西方现代医学的交流与融合,药用曲的工艺科学价值、医药文化价值和学术启示价值得以重塑,其当代价值和实用意义进一步被明确。药用曲的发展历史折射出了我国酒曲药用的深厚认知观念和文化内涵。