Bridging the gap between explicit and implicit measurement of personality: The questionnaire-based implicit association test

This study presents the questionnaire-based implicit association test (qIAT), a method that resembles the assessment procedures of self-report scales and allows an implicit assessment of constructs measured by such instruments. The qIAT measures the speed of association between ordinary questionnaires’ items (i.e., short statements rather than single words) and true versus false self-related sentences. Participants completed self-report measures of all Big-Five domains and the qIAT that measured extraversion. The qIAT implicit extraversion score showed good levels of internal consistency and it correlated with explicit extraversion but not with other explicit scales, thus supporting the convergent and discriminant validity of this measure. It also predicted a criterion behavior, and this prediction was incremental to self-report assessment of the same set of items. The qIAT opens the door for the indirect assessment of numerous psychological phenomena measured by existing self-report scales.     

I’m OK,I’m OK: Praise makes narcissists with low implicit self-esteem indifferent to the suffering of others

In two experiments (Ns = 105 and 49) the most grandiose individuals with the lowest implicit self-esteem became particularly callous toward their suffering peers after receiving praise about their own personality attributes. Self-reported grandiosity belied by low implicit self-esteem reflects the classic view of narcissism as defensive pride that masks less conscious shame or self-doubt (cf., Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003). Results support the classic view of narcissism and reveal that narcissistic disregard for others can be precipitated by praise.     

Differential attribution of secondary emotions to members of the ingroup and the outgroup: infrahumanization bias in children / Atribución de sentimientos a miembros del endogrupo y del exogrupo: el sesgo de infrahumanización en niños

Abstract

Research on infrahumanization has shown that people reserve uniquely human characteristics, including secondary emotions, for their ingroup, and deny them to their outgroup. However, this hypothesis has been corroborated almost exclusively in adults. The present research objective is to determine whether children, like adults, infrahumanize members of the outgroup. Forty-eight children in a competitive sports context were asked to attribute several secondary emotions to members of the ingroup and the outgroup. Results revealed that, like adults, children infrahumanize the outgroup. Their attributions showed a reluctance to accept the outgroup’s secondary emotions, which they reserved exclusively for the ingroup. Specifically, children attributed more positive and negative secondary emotions to the ingroup than the outgroup.     

At the verge of unthinkable anxiety: On the relevance of a neurophysiologically informed relational perspective on meaning-making in psychosis

Abstract

This article examines the relevance of relationally oriented psychoanalytic phenomenology as a frame of reference for understanding psychotic states in schizophrenia. The etiology and structural characteristics of such states are examined from both a neurophysiological, and a relational and interpersonal point of view. Many findings indicate organic abnormalities in schizophrenia, acquired through an exposure to physical risk factors and genetic predisposition, but relational traumas also seem to have an impact on the form and content of psychotic states. This may happen through interruptions in the “use-dependent” maturation of the brain in a relational milieu. In addition, at the level of meaning-making, we find that the emotional and relational contexts—both past and present—give the substance or “raw material” for hallucinations and delusions. In a psychotic state, the person also tries to handle basic affects and relational needs, and to make meaning in states of overwhelming chaos and anxiety. Donald W. Winnicott's theory of “a holding environment”, Stephen Mitchell's theory of the relational matrix, and Stolorow, Atwood, and Orange's concepts of a “shattered world” and annihilation anxiety are used as a framework in the analysis of the phenomenology of psychosis. Two case illustrations, one from child psychotherapy and one from therapy with an adult patient, are used to illuminate the theoretical points of view.     

Egalitarian goals trigger stereotype inhibition: A proactive form of stereotype control

Stereotype activation is often described as beyond control, unable to be prevented by willing it or engaging the self-regulatory system. Four experiments illustrate that this initial stage of the stereotyping process is controllable. Stereotypes are shown to be implicitly inhibited as part of a goal shielding process. In each experiment, egalitarian goals are triggered through a task in which participants contemplate a past failure at being egalitarian to African American men. This is followed in each experiment by a task that measures stereotype activation/inhibition using reaction times to words (either control words or stereotype-relevant words) that follow the presentation of either faces of Black or White men. The first two experiments examine participants with egalitarian goals versus those with a control goal, whereas the last two experiments examine people with egalitarian goals versus those whose egalitarian strivings have been satisfied (by contemplating success at being egalitarian). Only participants with egalitarian goals exhibit stereotype inhibition, and this occurs despite the fact that they lack awareness of the inhibition and lack the conscious intent to inhibit stereotypes at the time the response is made.     

Contextual Variation in Automatic Evaluative Bias to Racially-Ambiguous Faces

Three studies examined the implicit evaluative associations activated by racially-ambiguous Black-White faces. In the context of both Black and White faces, Study 1 revealed a graded pattern of bias against racially-ambiguous faces that was weaker than the bias to Black faces but stronger than that to White faces. Study 2 showed that significant bias was present when racially-ambiguous faces appeared in the context of only White faces, but not in the context of only Black faces. Study 3 demonstrated that context produces perceptual contrast effects on racial-prototypicality judgments. Racially-ambiguous faces were perceived as more prototypically Black in a White-only than mixed-race context, and less prototypically Black in a Black-only context. Conversely, they were seen as more prototypically White in a Black-only than mixed context, and less prototypically White in a White-only context. The studies suggest that both race-related featural properties within a face (i.e., racial ambiguity) and external contextual factors affect automatic evaluative associations.     

Eye'm lovin' it! The role of gazing awareness in mimetic desires

Recent studies showed that people evaluate objects more favorably when these objects are gazed-at by others, an effect coined as “mimetic desire”. In two studies, we tested whether mimetic desire stems from an automatic form of learning by examining one dimension of automaticity, i.e., people's awareness of the object-gaze association. Participants saw 6 neutral art paintings associated with a female gazing toward two of the paintings, away from two of the paintings, and closing her eyes with respect to the last two paintings. After the exposition phase, participants evaluated the paintings and performed a contingency-awareness test. Importantly, participants' responses on this test were genuinely driven by memory and not by inferences from liking. Results show that participants preferred objects that were gazed-at but only when they were aware of the object-gaze association. Hence, despite the adaptive function of joint attention, its impact on valence acquisition does not seem to qualify as an implicit learning process.     

Inference making and linking both require thinking: Spontaneous trait inference and spontaneous trait transference both rely on working memory capacity

Past research suggests that spontaneous trait inference (STI) and spontaneous trait transference (STT) may reflect different cognitive processes, the former being inferential and the latter associational. The present research was designed to explore whether either or both of these processes involve thinking that occupies cognitive capacity. Four studies suggest that reductions in available cognitive capacity reduce both STI and STT effects, both on measures of savings in relearning (which reflect the strength of trait associations with a person) and on trait ratings measures (which reflect the strength of trait inferences made about a person). Similar results were obtained using an individual difference measure of cognitive capacity. Although these results suggest that STI and STT are similar, in that both exhibit interference from reductions in cognitive capacity, other results, such as halo effects in trait ratings, support previous assertions that their underlying processes are distinct.