ALTERING THE NEAR‐MISS EFFECT IN SLOT MACHINE GAMBLERS

This study investigated the potential for recreational gamblers to respond as if certain types of losing slot machine outcomes were actually closer to a win than others (termed the near‐miss effect). Exposure to conditional discrimination training and testing disrupted this effect for 10 of the 16 participants. These 10 participants demonstrated high percentages of conditional discrimination testing performance, and the remaining 6 participants failed the discrimination tests. The implications for a verbally based behavioral explanation of gambling are presented.     

The reasoning skills and thinking dispositions of problem gamblers: a dual‐process taxonomy

We present a taxonomy that categorizes the types of cognitive failure that might result in persistent gambling. The taxonomy subsumes most previous theories of gambling behavior, and it defines three categories of cognitive difficulties that might lead to gambling problems: The autonomous set of systems (TASS) override failure, missing TASS output, and mindware problems. TASS refers to the autonomous set of systems in the brain (which are executed rapidly and without volition, are not under conscious control, and are not dependent on analytic system output). Mindware consists of rules, procedures, and strategies available for explicit retrieval. Seven of the eight tasks administered to pathological gamblers, gamblers with subclinical symptoms, and control participants were associated with problem gambling, and five of the eight were significant predictors in analyses that statistically controlled for age and cognitive competence. In a commonality analysis, an indicator from each of the three categories of cognitive difficulties explained significant unique variance in problem gambling, indicating that each of the categories had some degree of predictive specificity. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Games of luck and games of chance: the effect of luck- versus chance-orientation on gambling decisions

Chance and luck are conceived as two distinct causal agents that effect different results. The present study examined the proposition that persons who habitually attribute the outcome of random events to chance (chance-oriented persons) and those who prefer to attribute such outcomes to luck (luck-oriented persons) cope differently with decision making under uncertainty. Chance-oriented persons decide according to given or estimated odds that define the decision problem. Luck-oriented persons, on the other hand, rely on self-attributions of personal luck, and ignore the probabilities of decision outcomes. The hypothesized qualitative difference between the approaches of chance- and luck-oriented persons to decision making under uncertainty was supported substantially by the findings. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

人际距离调节自我-他人的神经表征：来自oFRN的证据

为考察人际距离对自我-他人表征的影响, 采用金钱博弈任务检测了在自己操作、观察朋友操作和观察陌生同学操作时的脑电成分反馈相关负波(FRN)。结果发现, 观察任务产生了类似于自我操作时输钱反馈的负偏向, 即观察者反馈负波(oFRN); 在观察条件下, 被试自评与朋友的亲近程度高于同学(p<0.001), 两者引起的oFRN达到边缘显著性水平(p = 0.062), 亲近程度与oFRN呈显著相关(p = 0.041)。前者说明自我和他人具有相似表征, 后者则反映了自我对他人信息表征的替代性体验可能受人际距离所调节。     

The effect of embedded bonus rounds on slot machine preference

Twenty‐three university students completed a simulated slot machine task involving the concurrent presentation of two slot machines that were varied both in win density and the inclusion of a bonus round feature to evaluate the effect of embedded bonus rounds on participant response allocation. The results suggest that participants allocated a greater percentage of responses to machines with embedded bonus rounds across both dense (Bonus: M = 68.4, SD = 19.2; No Bonus: M = 51.2; 9.6) and lean (Bonus: M = 48.8, SD = 9.6; No Bonus: M = 31.6, SD = 19.2) reinforcement schedules, in which the overall reinforcement rate across all machines was held constant.     

Transfers of stimulus function during roulette wagering

Twenty‐five recreational gamblers were initially asked to place bets on either red or black positions on a roulette board in a simulated casino setting. Each participant was then exposed to a stimulus pairing observing procedure which attempted to develop equivalence classes between one color (black or red) and traditionally positive words (e.g., love, happy, sex) and another color (black or red) and traditionally negative words (e.g., death, cancer, taxes), in the absence of consequence manipulations. Twenty‐one of the twenty‐five participants demonstrated greater response allocation to the color position on the roulette board that participated in a relational network with the positive words. Variations in sequencing of experimental conditions had no impact on poststimulus‐pairing wagers, but did impact tests for equivalence accuracy.     

Subjective relative income and lottery ticket purchases

Despite a return of only $.53 on the dollar, state lotteries are extremely popular, especially among the poor, who play the most but can least afford to play. In two experiments conducted with low‐income participants, we examine how implicit comparisons with other income classes increase low‐income individuals' desire to play the lottery. In Experiment 1, participants were more likely to purchase lottery tickets when they were primed to perceive that their own income was low relative to an implicit standard. In Experiment 2, participants purchased more tickets when they considered situations in which rich people or poor people receive advantages, implicitly highlighting the fact that everyone has an equal chance of winning the lottery. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A violation of dominance and the consumption value of gambling

We document an apparently widespread violation of dominance in the horse‐racing betting market in the UK, and use the systematic variation in the incidence of this violation to estimate the consumption value of gambling. Betting‐shop gamblers in the UK face a tax on gambling of 10%, but have the choice of paying the tax either at the time of wager or on any return on a successful bet. It can be shown, however, that the latter act is strictly dominated by another action in which tax is paid on the wager. Despite this, more than 18% of bets appear to be placed by gamblers who choose to pay tax on the return. We explore the hypothesis that this apparent violation of rationality may be explained by a component of utility which represents the consumption value of gambling, which in turn varies with the amount wagered. We then estimate this component from a dataset consisting of a record of 25,000 individual bets using probit analysis of the tax decision. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Alcohol Consumption and Computer Blackjack

The authors considered compliance with a decision aid that E. Thorp (1966) designed to minimize loss in a gambling paradigm under different levels of risk or impairment. Twenty adult men (aged 18-46) completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS; H.R. Lesieur & S. B. Blume, 1987) and the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; J. P. Allen, D. F. Reinert, & R. J. Volk, 2001) and then played a computer blackjack program before and after ingesting alcohol. The decision aid (online Basic advice) increased players' compliance with optimal play and also increased players' willingness to wager more at high stakes. Participants attained a mean peak blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.048%. Alcohol increased the rate of play. After consuming alcohol, participants appeared to spend less time on their decisions and were more reliant on support. The authors explained these results in terms of an alcohol-induced myopia that enhances responses to salient cues.     

Departures From Sensible Play in Computer Blackjack

Gambling has been viewed as irrational, and even though blackjack offers rational strategies (i.e., Basic [E. Thorp, 1966] and card counting), people exhibit departures from rationality (e.g., “Never Bust” strategies). To determine whether departures from rational behavior reflect ignorance or fatigue, university students were provided with on-line Basic advice while playing a simplified computer blackjack. Although the on-line advice initially affected the totals these players sat on, it was eventually discarded for higher risk strategies. Irrational play did not reflect ignorance or fatigue and was not necessarily conservative. Real fluctuations of odds in blackjack may lead to situations in which Basic is not perceived by players as effective. Because Basic is not a personalized strategy, it seems less likely to be maintained in the face of losses. Players were more optimistic that they might win when utilizing their personalized strategies.