Multiculturalism,liberal fundamentalism and banal nationalism: Dilemmatic aspects of Dissolving the Diaspora

In this commentary I point to some inherent tensions within the article Dissolving the Diaspora. First, I suggest that the author may be in danger of underestimating the extent to which the values of the multiculturalism promoted in the article rely upon an acceptance of the incorrigible stats of culturally‐specific ideologies of liberalism. Second, I point to the way in which the author adopts a banal nationalist frame of reference whereby constructs such as ‘society’ and ‘polity’ and understood to be conterminous with ‘nation‐state’. I suggest that, in this respect, the author may be in danger of overlooking the ways in which the same liberal values which under pin an advocacy of multiculturalism might also be associated with utopian visions of transnational or cosmopolitan forms of solidarity and polity. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making

Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, and by thinking styles (intuitive vs. deliberative). In Studies 2 and 3, participants evaluated policy decisions to knowingly do harm to a resource to mitigate greater harm or to merely allow the greater harm to happen. When evaluated in isolation, approval for decisions to harm was affected by endorsement of moral rules and by thinking style. When both choices were evaluated simultaneously, total harm -- but not the do/allow distinction -- influenced rated approval. These studies suggest that moral rules play an important, but context-sensitive role in moral cognition, and offer an account of when emotional reactions to perceived moral violations receive less weight than consideration of costs and benefits in moral judgment and decision making.     

惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

不对称社会困境中社会价值取向对合作的影响

以往研究表明, 社会价值取向对社会困境中合作行为变异的解释量不高。本研究指出, 初始资源配置导致个体处于某种优劣势位置上, 从而影响社会价值取向不同的个体的合作行为。研究设置了两人互动和多人互动两种情境, 通过变化被试所拥有的初始资源的相对价值或相对数量来操作优势差异, 检验亲社会者和亲自我者在社会困境中的心理与行为差异。研究结果表明, 在初始资源处于相对劣势位置时, 亲社会者比亲自我者表现出更高的合作水平。     

On the near miss in public good dilemmas: How upward counterfactuals influence group stability when the group fails

In two studies we investigated the impact of degree of collective failure in a public good dilemma (near miss vs. large miss) on group members' negative reactions (negative affect, attributions of responsibility for the failure, and intention to leave the group). The results show that upward counterfactual thinking has more impact on members' negative responses when experiencing a near miss rather than a large miss. In Experiment 1, the results show that in the case of a near miss (and not a large miss), negative affect and attributions of responsibility were higher when other-focused counterfactuals rather than self-focused counterfactuals were elicited. Negative affect was found to mediate the effect on attributions of responsibility. Experiment 2 replicates these findings on a wider range of negative responses and reveals that the effect of counterfactual thought on willingness to leave the group in the case of a near miss is mediated by attributions of responsibility.     

Beyond physical harm: how preference for consequentialism and primary psychopathy relate to decisions on a monetary trolley dilemma

When is it appropriate to harm a single person to help multiple others? Psychologists have investigated this question through the study of hypothetical “trolley” dilemmas involving extreme physical harm life-or-death situations that contrast outcome-focussed, consequentialist moral reasoning with principle-focussed, deontological moral reasoning. The present studies investigate whether participants’ preference for consequentialism generalises across domains. We administered traditional physical harm dilemmas as well as a trolley-type dilemma involving monetary harm. Across four studies (N?=?809), an internal meta-analysis demonstrated that participants’ responses to the traditional dilemmas predicted their responses to the monetary dilemma. Additionally, previous research has uncovered that primary psychopathy predicts consequentialist responses on physical harm dilemmas. The current work uncovers that this association does not generalise to monetary harm dilemmas, suggesting that the association between primary psychopathy and consequentialist reasoning is not related to consequentialist reasoning per se, but to the idiosyncrasies of traditional harm-centric trolley dilemmas instead.     

社会困境中合作行为的阶层差异：自我与他人的双重视角

为了探究个体自身与他人的社会阶层对个体在社会困境中合作行为的影响及其作用机制,本研究通过问卷和实验研究来考察自身阶层的行为效应、互动对象阶层的调节效应以及信任有中介的调节作用。研究发现：（1）低阶层者倾向于比高阶层者表现出更多的合作行为;（2）感知到的互动对象阶层对不同阶层个体的合作行为存在显著的调节效应;（3）个体对互动对象的信任水平（即对他人合作行为的预期）对此调节效应起到中介作用。     

资源困境中共同收益延迟的影响：时间折扣的调节效应

通过测量83名大学生的时间折扣率和不同共同收益延迟时距上的金币拿取量,以探讨资源困境中共同收益延迟对个体决策的影响及时间折扣的调节效应。结果表明：（1）金币拿取量随共同收益延迟时距的增长而增加,增加趋势和初始时间点的金币拿取量均存在显著的个体差异;（2）时间折扣率反向调节初始延迟时间点的金币拿取量,正向调节金币拿取量随延迟时距增长而增加的速率。这表明资源困境与跨期选择两个不同研究领域具有紧密联系,对当前资源保护制度的制定与实施具有一定的启发意义。     

Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information

The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we do not need to assume that rationality is commonly known (as is done in [Aumann (1995)]) or commonly hypothesized by the players (as done in [Samet (1996)]). The proposed model is compared with the account of hypothetical knowledge presented by Samet in [Samet (1996)] and with other possible strategies for extending information structures with conditional propositions. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation: “Game-Theoretic Foundation for Multi-Agent Systems”, IIS 9734923. Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson     

两难中合作行为研究的回顾和展望

如何预测人们将做出合作行为,是社会两难决策研究中重要的问题。该文回顾了社会两难研究的进展情况,包括社会两难的特征、来源、类型、研究方法和理论基础;综述了两难中影响合作行为的个人因素和情景因素,重点介绍了目前存在争议的制裁系统和合作的关系研究,以及为什么它们之间会表现出一些自相矛盾之处;对合作行为研究存在的问题进行了初步探讨,未来的研究将更侧重于合作决策的理论建构、文化内涵和认知过程的揭示