Understanding causal conditionals: A study of individual differences

Previous studies have suggested that a minority of university students, of lower cognitive ability, are inclined to interpret abstract conditional statements, if p then q, as if they were conjunctions: p and q. In the present study we administered the conditional truth table task to a large sample of students (n = 160), but using realistic, everyday causal conditionals. We also measured their general intelligence. While individual differences were found, these were not consistent with some participants adopting a conjunctive interpretation of such statements. Rather, it appears that students of lower cognitive ability are rather likely to assume that a conditional implies its converse, so that it means also if q then p. The results are discussed with reference to the suppositional theory of conditionals and our more general account of hypothetical thinking.     

Cognitive Load and the Equality Heuristic: A Two-Stage Model of Resource Overconsumption in Small Groups

Two studies were conducted to test a two-stage model of the psychological mechanisms underlying the overconsumption of scarce resources in small groups. The model proposes that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an “equal-division” heuristic and then, given sufficient cognitive capacity, adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. The results from both studies support the model. The first study found that when faced with a common resource pool almost all group members expressed thoughts regarding equality; however, individuals with sufficient cognitive capacity requested more from the pool and expressed more task-relevant thoughts than individuals lacking the necessary cognitive resources. The second study provided additional support for the two-stage model by demonstrating that group members' cognitions occur in the order predicted by the model and by demonstrating that an individual difference, social value orientation, affects thought processes only when individuals are not experiencing high cognitive loads. Implications are discussed.     

Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下双人社会困境中合作行为的影响

为揭示双人社会困境中合作行为的影响因素,选取四种不同类型的双人社会困境,采用实验法考察社会价值取向与损失情境对不同时间压力下合作行为的影响。结果显示,亲社会个体的合作率显著高于亲自我个体的合作率,收益情境下的合作率显著高于损失情境下的合作率,在社会困境中双方冲突程度越大合作率越低;此外,高时间压力提升了亲自我个体在囚徒困境以及收益情境下信任困境中的合作率,同时降低了亲自我个体在损失情境下最大差异困境中的合作率。结果表明,社会价值取向、收益损失情境以及困境冲突程度均对合作行为的发生具有影响作用,而时间压力对合作行为的作用也同样受到三者的影响。这些发现能够为合作行为自动性的理论分歧提供新的证据。     

The Definition of Moral Dilemmas: A Logical Problem

This paper concerns one of the undecided disputes of modern moral philosophy: the possibility of moral dilemmas. Whereas proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas often appeal to moral experience, many opponents refer to ethical theory and deontic logic. My aim in this paper is to clarify some of the tension between moral experience and ethical theory with respect to moral dilemmas. In Part One I try to show that a number of logical arguments against the possibility of moral dilemmas, though apparently very different, turn out to be basically the same, as they are all based on the following concept of ought: if A ought to be done, doing B is impermissible and doing A itself is permissible. In Part Two I present an overview of several definitions of moral dilemmas that have been given by proponents of moral dilemmas: definitions that define moral dilemmas in terms of oughts and definitions that define them in terms of reasons. I conclude that, while reason is to weak, ought is too strong a concept to define moral dilemmas with. In this way, the arguments from Part One create a logical problem for proponents of the possibility of moral dilemmas to define moral dilemmas.     

The Use of Communication Technology in Private Practice: Ethical Implications and Boundary Dilemmas in Therapy

This study investigates the use of communication technology (CT) by therapists in private practice. CT has exploded in the last decade and therapists have begun to implement this technology in their work. It is important to understand better the types of technology therapists are using and how they decide which devices are most useful for clinical practice. Additionally, the availability of the therapist has long been debated and CT provides media to make therapists readily available. Results show that therapists have boundary concerns and ethical dilemmas regarding CT and often feel unprepared to handle inappropriate out-of-session contacts when they occur.     

Changes in cooperative behaviour and belief in finitely repeated social dilemmas

Economic and psychological studies have determined the tendency to improve cooperation in initial interactions in which people are required to contribute in public good games. The current study examined the behavioural changes of individuals during finite interaction times. Participants were invited to make decisions twice in a step‐level public good game, and their belief in achieving the collective interest was measured. Participants were divided into three groups based on their first decisions. Results showed that high contributors demonstrated high levels of contribution in their subsequent interactions, whereas low and equal contributors increased their levels of contribution after the initial interaction. Additionally, the cooperative level of low contributors increased along with their cooperative belief. The theoretical and practical implications of changes of behaviour and belief in repeated social dilemmas were identified.